RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
1815-1867

BY
BENJAMIN PLATT THOMAS

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Board of University Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Conformity with the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
1929

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PREFACE

The author wishes to express his gratitude for the kind and helpful criticism of Dr. John H. Latané of the Johns Hopkins University, under whose direction this study was carried on. He is indebted to the late Dr. Edward Raymond Turner of the Johns Hopkins University for ready advice and many valuable suggestions. From his relationship with Dr. Latané and Dr. Turner he secured constant inspiration. Dr. Charles C. Tansill of the Library of Congress kindly permitted him to consult an unpublished manuscript of his dealing with the period covered in chapters one and two. This, as well as Dr. Tansill's many suggestions as to material and his personal interest in the work, are sincerely appreciated. This study was made possible by Dr. Tyler Dennett's permission to use the archives of the State Department, and was greatly facilitated by the courteous assistance of Mrs. Natalia Summers, archivist of that department. Miss Mary Phillips rendered invaluable aid in the onerous matter of proof-reading.

B. P. T.

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RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1815-1867

CHAPTER I

The Confederations of Europe

True, disinterested friendship is a thing almost unknown among nations, whose feelings toward each other are determined usually by the absence or presence of conflicting interests or common enemies. Nowhere is this fact better exemplified than in the relations between the United States and Russia. In all other respects the antithesis of each other, one the most liberal democracy, the other the most repressive despotism in the world, these nations were both animated by a lively fear of Great Britain, a fear which made it possible for them to forget the incompatibility of their political principles and to remain, for more than half a century, the firmest of friends. During that period Russia regarded the United States as a vital element in the European balance of power, while the United States looked upon Russia as her only European friend.

As early as 1781, when Francis Dana was sent to St. Petersburg to secure recognition and admission to the League of Armed Neutrality, the United States had sought to win Russia as a friend. But at that time the Empress Catherine II, suspicious of all rebels and desirous of keeping on good terms with Great Britain, would have nothing to do with the new nation. After the recognition of its independence by Great Britain she would probably have been glad to confer recognition also, but with peace secured the United States saw no further need of seeking her good-will.[1]

Gradually, however, the two countries were brought closer together. In 1798 both were at odds with France, and Rus-

[1] Francis P. Renaut, La Politique de propagande des Américains durant la Guerre d'Independence, I, Francis Dana à Saint-Pétersbourg; American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy (ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis), I, 163-170.

sia made unsuccessful overtures to the United States to join a coalition whose object was the complete isolation of that country.[2] The establishment of formal relations was greatly facilitated by the close personal relations subsisting between Thomas Jefferson, who became president in 1801, and Alexander I, who ascended the throne of Russia the same year. Alexander, in his earlier years a fervent advocate of liberalism, was a sincere admirer of Jefferson, with whom he frequently corresponded, and he was quite willing to enter upon closer relations with the American republic.[3] Thus it came about that in 1803 Jefferson sent to St. Petersburg as consul-general Levitt Harris, who, for five years, really performed the duties of minister.[4]

But it was not until 1807 that the character of Russo-American relations changed from toleration to cordiality. In July of that year Alexander signed the Treaty of Tilsit whereby he became the ally of Napoleon.[5] England immediately declared war upon and interdicted all trade with Russia. Now Russia, a large producer of raw materials, had been absolutely dependent upon Great Britain for the transportation of her products, and her break with that country made it imperative for her to seek the friendship of some other carrier nation. Thus she turned to the United States. In June, 1808, Tsar Alexander appointed André Daschkov consul-general at Philadelphia, at the same time conferring on him the title of "chargé d'affaires near the Congress of the United States."[6]

Meanwhile the United States had shown willingness to meet the Russian advances halfway. England and France were harassing American commerce and violating our rights as neutrals, and Jefferson, foreseeing a break between England

[2] John C. Hildt, "Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia," in the Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, XXIV, 31-32.

[3] The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial Edition), XI, 103, 106, 291; XII, 395.

[4] Hildt, pp. 35-36.

[5] Georg F. de Martens, Recueil des Principaux Traités de l'Europe, VIII, 637-643.

[6] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 298.

and Russia, had determined to send a special minister to Russia, the traditional champion of neutral rights. In July he selected for the mission William Short, who sailed on October 8, carrying an autograph letter from the President to the Tsar.[7] Short proceeded as far as Paris when, learning that his nomination had been rejected by the Senate, he was forced to return home. In May, 1809, however, Alexander appointed Count Pahlen minister to the United States, and in the following month relations were formally established when the Senate confirmed the nomination of John Quincy Adams as American minister to Russia.[8]

While Alexander was at war with Great Britain the best relations were maintained between the United States and Russia, for the latter was absolutely dependent upon American ships for intercourse with the outside world. But in 1812 a great change came over the international situation. In June of that year Alexander and Napoleon quarreled over the enforcement of the latter's continental system, which imposed economic hardships on Russia, and the subsequent invasion of Russia by Napoleon forced Alexander to make peace with Great Britain. At about the same time, however, the United States went to war with Great Britain over the question of neutral rights.

Here, indeed, was a problem for the Tsar. War between the two great carrier nations meant ruin for Russian commerce. Moreover, the United States might now become allied with France, with whom England and Russia were at war, while at all events a war in America would divert British troops from Europe, where they were sorely needed against Napoleon. Thus it was imperative for Russia to bring the Anglo-American conflict to a close, and to this end Alexander, in 1812, offered to mediate between the two powers.[9]

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[7] The Works of Thomas Jefferson, XII, 153-154.

[8] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 298.

[9] Frank A. Updyke, The Diplomacy of the War of 1812, pp. 142-164; Hildt, pp. 58-90; Frank A. Golder, "The Russian Offer of Mediation in the War of 1812," in the Political Science Quarterly, XXXI.

The United States was willing to accept his offer;[10] but to Great Britain the questions of neutral rights which had caused the war were of such vital importance that she refused to submit them to the arbitrament of a third power, especially such a power as Russia, who had always given them the widest possible interpretation.[11]

It was during the War of 1812, when the United States gave the first intimation of its potential power upon the sea, that Russia, who despite her temporary alliance with Great Britain was ever eager to secure aid in limiting the maritime and colonial power of that country, first realized the value of American good-will. From that time forth she strove consistently to win and hold the friendship of the United States. Indeed in the years immediately following the war one point in Alexander's foreign policy was the formation of an alliance with this country. This project was first broached in 1816, in the confused period of readjustment in Europe which followed the overthrow of Napoleon. But Russian-American relations during that period cannot be understood without some knowledge of European relations in general with which they were inextricably interwoven. It behooves us, therefore, to consider for a moment the origins and purposes of the two great confederations existing in Europe at that time—the Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance.

The crushing burden of the Napoleonic wars had convinced the European monarchs and statesmen of the disastrous consequences of war, and had induced them to seek some formula which would insure the maintenance of universal peace. As early as 1804, with Napoleon yet irresistible, a plan for a league of nations to maintain peace after the pacification of Europe was consummated was broached to William Pitt by Tsar Alexander I. In his celebrated instructions of September 11 to Novosiltsov, at that time on a special mission to London, the Tsar said:

> If Europe be saved, the union of the two Governments which has achieved these great results ought to last on, in order to preserve

[10] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 624-625.
[11] Charles K. Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1815, pp. 14-15.

and augment them. Nothing would prevent, at the conclusion of peace, a treaty being arranged which would become the basis of the reciprocal relations of the European states. It is no question of realizing the dream of perpetual peace, but one could attain at least to some of its results, if at the conclusion of a general war, one could establish on clear, precise principles the prescriptions of the rights of nations. Why could one not submit to it the positive rights of nations, assure the privilege of neutrality, insert the obligation of never beginning war until all the resources which the mediation of a third party could offer have been exhausted, until the grievances have by this means been brought to light, and an effort to remove them has been made? On principles such as these, one could proceed to a general pacification, and give birth to a league, of which the stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations, which, sanctioned by the greater part of the nations of Europe, would without difficulty become the immutable rule of the cabinets, while those who should try to infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces of the new union.[12]

On January 19, 1805, Pitt sent the Tsar the following gratifying reply:

> Supposing the efforts of the Allies to have been completely successful . . . His Majesty would nevertheless consider this salutary work as still imperfect, if the restoration of peace were not accompanied by the most effectual measures for giving solidity and permanence to the system which shall thus have been established. . . . In order to render this security as complete as possible, it seems necessary, at the period of a general pacification, to form a Treaty to which all the principal Powers of Europe shall be parties, by which their respective rights and possessions; as they then have been established, shall be fixed and recognized; and they should all bind themselves mutually to protect and support each other, against any attempt to infringe them. . . . It should reestablish a general and comprehensive system of public law in Europe, and provide, as far as possible, for repressing future attempts to disturb the general tranquillity.[13]

This mutuality of views was embodied in the treaty of April 11, 1805, between the two powers, in a secret article wherein they covenanted to "come to an amicable understanding among themselves . . . and form an intimate union for the purpose of realizing their happy efforts."[14] Their pacific scheme was put in abeyance, however, by the death of Pitt and by the defection of Alexander to the side of Napo-

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[12] W. Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, pp. 34-35.
[13] Webster, pp. 393-394.
[14] J. Holland Rose, Select Despatches from the British Foreign Office, pp. 273-274.

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[12] W. Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, pp. 34-35.
[13] Webster, pp. 393-394.
[14] J. Holland Rose, Select Despatches from the British Foreign Office, pp. 273-274.

leon, July 7, 1807.[15] Not until 1812 did Alexander return to the side of Great Britain.

Meanwhile Castlereagh, who had taken over the duties of the British Foreign Office, had revived the project of Pitt and Alexander and was attempting to bring about a general alliance against Napoleon—an alliance "not to terminate with the war, but to contain definite engagements with mutual obligations to support the powers attacked by France with a certain extent of stipulated succours"—and finally, in the Treaty of Chaumont, signed March 1, 1814, after Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig, he secured that for which he had been working. This treaty provided that Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, the four powers that had defeated France, should continue their alliance for twenty years, during which time they should mutually guarantee each other against attack from France, "each with a body of 60,000 men."[16]

But the pacification of Europe was not yet accomplished, for Napoleon's return from Elba again threw the continent into confusion and forced the diplomats to forego further considerations on the maintenance of peace in order to discuss the means of its reattainment. Thus it was not until November 20, 1815, after the Corsican's final overthrow at Waterloo, that they were able to bring about the reestablishment of the Treaty of Chaumont under the name of the Treaty of Paris (often called the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance). This treaty provided for the continuation of the Quadruple Alliance, bound its members to guarantee the territorial provisions of the treaty of peace, and to exclude the Bonapartes from the throne of France. It also contained a new stipulation of supreme importance, inserted at the instigation of Castlereagh,[17] which provided for periodic conferences of the signatory powers "for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures

[15] Above, p. 10.
[16] British and Foreign State Papers, I, 125-128.
[17] The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy (eds. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch), I, 444.

which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary . . . for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." [18] This clause was to cause Castlereagh no end of trouble in the future. For he intended that the Quadruple Alliance should limit itself to crushing out revolutionary and militaristic movements in France alone,[19] but under cover of this indefinite clause Alexander and Metternich, the Austrian statesman, later attempted to destroy liberal movements everywhere.

While this guarantee was taking shape at Paris Tsar Alexander was working out a peace project of his own. Strongly influenced in his youth by the pacific teachings of his tutor, La Harpe, he had always been animated by a keen desire for peace. Moreover, he had of late come under the influence of Baroness Krudener, a religious fanatic, who gave to his pacific inclinations a decided religious tinge.[20] His ideas were rather nebulous and indefinite as yet, even in his own mind, but their general trend was toward some compact, based on the principles of religion, whereby the sovereigns of the world should recognize in their relations with one another and with their subjects the precepts of the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God.[21] He succeeded in conveying his ideas, in some manner, to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia who, either from hope or expediency, formed with him on September 26, 1815, the so-called Holy Alliance whereby they pledged themselves

> to manifest before the whole universe their unshakable determination to take as their sole guide, both in the administration of their respective states and in their political relations with other governments, the precepts of religion, namely, the rules of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private life, should, on the contrary, govern the decisions of Princes, and direct them in all their negotiations, forming, as they must, the only means of giving permanence to human institutions and remedying their imperfections.[22]

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[18] De Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traités de l'Europe, II, 734.
[19] The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, I, 444, 516.
[20] Pierre Rain, Alexandre Ier, pp. 142-152.
[21] William P. Cresson, The Holy Alliance, p. 22.
[22] De Martens, II, 656-658.

To this pious pact all the sovereigns of Europe, with the exception of the Pope and the Sultan, whose religion placed him without the pale, were invited to subscribe, and all except the Prince Regent of England, whose constitutional form of government prevented her ruler from binding her without the concurrence of the ministry, hastened to comply. As for Castlereagh, although he regarded the alliance as a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense" emanating from a mind "not completely sound," he advised the Prince Regent to "take it upon himself, and sign it without the intervention of the Ministers, as an autographic avowal of sentiment between him and the Sovereigns his Allies . . . [since] to decline doing so . . . might bring about very unpleasant consequences." [23] The Prince Regent, however, instead of accepting Castlereagh's advice, sent an autograph letter to the Tsar explaining that he was prevented by his position from giving the treaty his formal acceptance, but professing himself ready to cooperate with the Holy Allies "in all measures . . . likely to contribute to the peace and happiness of mankind." [24] In the House of Commons, however, even this concession to the feelings of the Tsar subjected the government to a bitter attack at the hands of the Liberals who, led by Brougham, were suspicious of the alliance from the first. Brougham called attention to the fact that the nations whose sovereigns were parties to this treaty were the same ones who, not so long before, had partitioned Poland; and asserted that "the war against . . . and the subsequent partition of that devoted country, had been prefaced by language very similar to that which this treaty contained." [25]

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[23] Webster, pp. 382-384.

[24] British and Foreign State Papers, III, 213-214; Sir A. W. Ward, The Period of Congresses, pp. 68-69.

[25] T. C. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 1st Series, XXXI, 350-360.

CHAPTER II

The United States and the Confederations

The idea of a "Holy League of Allied Sovereigns" continued to germinate in the mind of the Tsar, who visualized greater and more far-reaching possibilities in it. His conception of it now broadened into a league embracing not only the nations of Europe, but those of the whole civilized world, among them the United States. On the evening of August 4, 1816, Count Capodistrias, Russian foreign secretary,[1] informed Levitt Harris, who was temporarily in charge of American affairs at St. Petersburg pending the arrival of William Pinkney, the newly-appointed minister,[2] that he had prepared for his perusal a communication relative to the tripartite treaty concluded at Paris between the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia "with a view to know the sentiments of the American government on the subject of it." He confided that if the United States chose to yield their assent to it, the Emperor would receive it with deference, and assured Harris that notwithstanding the sinister reports which were heard regarding the league and the motives of its founder, "it was not the less a Solemn Compact formed to

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[1] At this time Russian foreign affairs were managed jointly by Count Capodistrias, "Secrétaire d'État près de la personne de Sa Majesté Impériale," and Count Nesselrode, "Secrétaire d'État dirigeant le Minestère des Affaires Étrangères." Giovanni Antonio Capo d'Istria, a Greek, had taken service with the tsar in 1809. He became secretary of foreign affairs in 1815. This position he held until 1822, when Metternich, who disliked him and accused him of "using Russian policy for Greek ends," compassed his overthrow. In 1827 he was elected president of Greece. For his own account of his career see "Aperçu de ma carrière publique, depuis 1798 jusqu'à 1822," in Sbornik Russkago Istoritcheskago Obshchestva (publication of the Imperial Russian Historical Society), III.

[2] William Pinkney of Maryland had already acquired diplomatic experience in London, where he served as commissioner under the Jay treaty of 1794 and later as minister. In 1816 he was appointed minister to Russia and special envoy to Naples. Due to a stop at the latter country, his arrival in Russia was somewhat delayed.

preserve the peace of Europe, and that whilst Russia continued to hold her present power this peace would not be troubled." [3]

Harris was cautious, however, seeing in the friendship of the Tsar merely a reinception of the Russian policy of using the increasing power of the United States as a counterpoise to Great Britain.[4] England had refused to join the Holy Alliance; was it not possible that Alexander might turn the league against her? Three days before the signing of the treaty of September 26, Harris had reported that "a continuation of hostile feeling to everything English is still apparent in the higher circles here." [5] Moreover, in the same conversation in which Capodistrias broached the subject of the Holy Alliance, Harris, in discussing the possibility of the United States securing a treaty of maritime rights with Russia, had adverted to the fact that certain of the Russian ministers had said, some years before, that after Napoleon's overthrow the Tsar would take the lead in humbling the ascendency and "baleful pretensions" of Great Britain on the sea. To this Capodistrias replied, "Such is, more than ever, the sentiment of the Emperor Alexander. I authorize you to inform your government that nothing will make him lose sight of it." [6] These facts, together with his lack of sympa-

[3] MS. Despatches, Russia, V, No. 19, 24 July/5 August 1816, United States State Department Archives, Washington, D. C. All manuscripts, unless otherwise cited, are in the State Department Archives.

[4] This policy had been explicitly stated, June 9, 1811, to John Quincy Adams, then minister to Russia, by Count Romanzov, who asserted that it was to the interest of Russia "to encourage and strengthen and multiply the commercial powers which might be rivals of England to form a balance to her overbearing power. Russia herself had not the advantages for it. She could not hope to be a great naval or maritime power, nature had in a great measure denied her the means. She ought then to support and favor those who had them. The propriety of extending this spirit to the U. S. had become more obvious and strong by the decay and disappearance of the old commercial states." (MS. Despatches, Russia, II, No. 53).

[5] MS. Despatches, Russia, V, 11/23 September 1815.

[6] Ibid., No. 19, 24 July/5 August 1816. Harris' apprehension was shared by William R. King, Pinkney's secretary of legation, who later reported that "the Emperor . . . cannot fail to see that England, and England only, stands in the way ready to oppose herself

thy for a system which extolled peace but at the same time manifested no disposition to decrease the size of armaments,[7] made Harris wary, and his reply to the count's solicitation was decidedly non-committal. He suggested that since Mr. Pinkney would soon arrive to succeed him and would be better informed of the wishes of his government in the matter it might be well to reserve the formal submission of the communication until his arrival. To this Capodistrias agreed, and the subject was temporarily allowed to drop.[8]

Meanwhile it had become apparent that the ideas of Alexander and those of Castlereagh were incompatible. Both the British foreign secretary and Metternich, the Austrian statesman, were suspicious of the Tsar, and from 1815 to 1818 their common fear of the intrigues of his agents in France and Spain and of his enormous military establishment furnished the cohesive force for the maintenance of a close union between them.[9] Furthermore, the tenseness of the situation and the advances of the Tsar to the United States must have convinced Castlereagh of the necessity of keeping on good terms with the American republic, for on November 10, 1817, he instructed Charles Bagot, the British minister in Washington, to "smoothe all asperities between the two nations

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with effect to the great designs which he is suspected to have formed. Under this state of things the growing importance of the United States as a Naval Power naturally excites the attention of all, but more particularly of Russia, who thinks she sees in her a nation likely at no distant day to become the rival of England, and at the same time from their commercial persuits [sic] most apt to come in contact, hence if for no other reason, the favorable disposition manifested towards America by this country." King continued, "It is more than probable that the powers of Europe have sung the Te Deum for an event which at no distant day they will repent with bitterness. They have freed themselves, 'tis true, from the shackles of France, but at the same time paved the way to their subjugation by the barbarous hordes of the north." (MS. Despatches, Russia, VI, 29 January 1817).

[7] MS. Despatches, Russia, V, No. 14, 27 May/8 June 1816.

[8] Ibid., No. 19, 24 July/5 August 1816.

[9] Charles K. Webster, "Some Aspects of Castlereagh's Foreign Policy," in the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3d Series, VI, 75-88; The Correspondence of Castlereagh (ed. Charles Vane), XI, 376-377; XII, 94-95. Metternich went so far as to propose a treaty of alliance to offset a similar treaty which he suspected Alexander of having formed between Russia and France.

to this end Castlereagh attempted to convince John Quincy Adams, now Secretary of State, of the undoubted success of British mediation.[17] Adams had little faith in any scheme which contemplated the return of the colonies to Spain. Indeed he doubted whether Castlereagh himself expected anything to come of it. But in the cabinet it was finally decided "to let this experiment have its full effect, without attempting to disturb it, which might unnecessarily give offense to the allies; and after it shall have failed, as fail it must . . . we shall be at perfect liberty to recognize any of the South American Governments without coming into collision with the allies." [18] This decision was made known to Bagot,[19] so when mediation failed because of Spain's unwillingness to accept the British conditions, Castlereagh, fearing that recognition would no longer be withheld, was reluctant to admit his failure to the United States.[20]

Alexander, also, feared that the increasing exasperation toward Spain in the United States would lead the American government to concede the insurgents recognition. He would have preferred to deal with the troublesome Spanish-American problem through the medium of a European congress to which the United States could be "invited to send a Plenipotentiary to confer with the other Powers. They could be told they were themselves a European people, Christian, and, therefore, like Europe, interested in questions of a general nature." [21] But this plan was vetoed by Castlereagh; and the Tsar was forced to content himself with admonishing his allies to instruct their ministers in Washington to "persuade public opinion in the United States, as well as the Executive, to adopt their point of view." As for himself, he determined to send a new minister to the United States for the express purpose of dissuading the administration from any hasty act

[17] Ibid., XII, 50.
[18] Adams' Memoirs, IV, 166-167.
[19] Ibid., pp. 138-139; Correspondence of Castlereagh, XII, 66-69.
[20] MS. Despatches, Russia, VII, No. 1, 25 September/7 October 1818; The Writings of John Quincy Adams (ed. Worthington C. Ford), VI, 520-525; Richard Rush, Residence at the Court of London, p. 15.
[21] Quoted by Cresson, pp. 79-80.

of hostility toward Spain, and of securing the adherence of the American government to the Holy Alliance;[22] since, if it were forced to deliberate with him before formulating any policy in regard to South American questions, any undue impetuosity on the part of the republic could be more easily restrained. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that Castlereagh had succeeded in excluding the question of "legitimacy" from the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and had kept the alliance to its original purpose, it was evident that a break between him and the Tsar was inevitable. Thus if Alexander could not direct the policy of the Quadruple Alliance, in which the influence of Great Britain was paramount, perhaps his ideas could be promulgated through the Holy Alliance of which she was not a member. At any rate he thought it well to strengthen the latter league.

Since Capodistrias' interview with Harris, Alexander had never given up the idea of persuading the United States to join the Holy Alliance; but for some time he had been prevented from renewing his overtures by reason of the cool relations occasioned between the two countries by the Koslov affair.[23] In November, 1815, Koslov, Russian consul-general at Philadelphia, was arrested and imprisoned on a charge of rape. Although undoubtedly guilty, he was shortly afterward released; but Dashkov, the Russian minister at Washington, denounced the arrest as a breach of international law and demanded reparation for the insult to his sovereign. Finally, after a voluminous correspondence, Dashkov, on his own initiative, broke off diplomatic relations.[24] The Tsar chose to look upon the affair as a personal affront, and for some time Harris was *persona non grata* at court.[25] At last, however, the matter was settled in a manner which completely vindicated the position taken by the United States, after which Alexander did all in his power to show his renewed friendship

[22] "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington" in the American Historical Review, XVIII, 317.
[23] See Hildt.
[24] MS. Russian Legation, I, 31, October 1816.
[25] MS. Despatches, Russia, V, No. 11, 20 March 1816.

for his potential ally. In fact, in August, 1816, Harris reported a "more cordial disposition to promote the interests of my country than ever before, at the Russian court." [26]

Dashkov, however, had not made himself particularly agreeable to the American government, so in May, 1817, Baron de Tuyll was chosen as his successor.[27] The baron was instructed to do his utmost to induce the United States to accede to the Holy Alliance, but he was to take no formal steps to that end until he was certain that his efforts would meet with success.[28] At the last, however, de Tuyll expressed a preference to be sent to a monarchical state and was accordingly sent to Lisbon, while Pierre de Poletica was given the mission to the United States.[29]

Poletica was detained in Europe pending the outcome of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and it was not until April, 1819, that he arrived in Washington. His instructions authorized him to point out to the secretary of state that the United States were

> called upon by their own interest to adhere to this system [the Holy Alliance]. . . . The last war between the United States and England must be considered as an inevitable consequence of their system of isolation. That this had ended more happily for the United States than could be expected is, however, due rather to the presumption and mistakes of their adversaries than to any other cause. It seems clear to us that even if the United States should persist in their present system of isolation from the European system, they will inevitably, sooner or later, be drawn within its influence. Thus the state of things which led to the War of 1812 will undoubtedly recur. Upon what does the United States then hope to base her future policy and what power will intervene in her behalf?

Thus a vague and guarded reference to possible protection from Great Britain was to be the bait held out to the United States. The second point in Poletica's instructions concerned the South American republics. In case the United States had not granted these insurgent states recognition at

[26] Ibid., No. 19, 24 July/5 August 1816.
[27] Ibid., VI, 12 June 1817.
[28] Cresson, p. 50.
[29] Frank A. Golder, Guide to Materials for American History in Russian Archives, p. 16. Poletica had already been in the United States from 1810 to 1812 as secretary to Count Pahlen, a former minister.

the time of his arrival, he was to attempt to restrain the government at Washington from adopting a policy at variance with that pursued by the European powers.[30]

That such a policy was seriously contemplated by the American government cannot be doubted, and in several interviews with Adams Poletica was impelled to urge the inexpediency of granting recognition as yet.[31] It is no less certain that only fear of flying in the face of the European alliance restrained the United States at this time. In August, 1818, Adams had directed Campbell,[32] who had succeeded Pinkney at St. Petersburg, to ascertain whether Russia would view recognition of the colonies by the United States "as an act of hostility to Spain, and in case Spain should declare war against us in consequence, whether Russia will take part with her in it." [33] Campbell replied that the powers, since the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, were determined to espouse the cause of legitimacy, and that negotiations looking to a reconciliation between Spain and the colonies were to be carried on at London. The Tsar favored the return of the colonies to the allegiance of the mother country, and although he would not *separately* unite with Spain in war against the United States, he would be greatly displeased at our recognition of the colonies—an event which would facilitate the "spread of republican principles." [34] Again, in February, 1819, he wrote that "it is still . . . my opinion that this government would view in an unfavorable light the acknowledgment of the independence of these colonies." [35]

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[30] "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington," p. 317; MS. Russian Legation, I, 27 November/9 December 1819.

[31] Adams' Memoirs, V, 30, 33, 34-35.

[32] George W. Campbell of Tennessee was appointed to the post in April, 1818. He returned to America in July, 1820.

[33] MS. United States Ministers Instructions, VIII, 247, 20 August 1818.

[34] MS. Despatches, Russia, VII, No. 3, 10/22 December 1818; William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations, III, 1959-1860.

[35] MS. Despatches, Russia, VII, No. 5, 6/18 February 1819; Manning, III, 1861.

In May, 1818, President Monroe had suggested to his cabinet the possibility of concerted action with England toward recognition. Adams opposed the idea at first, fearing that any overture of such a nature would be used by England to embroil us with the allies with whom he wished to move in harmony.[36] In December, however, he was won over, and attempted to induce Great Britain and France to join the United States in according recognition to La Plata.[37] But his suggestion was coldly received; and later, fearing that Alexander might think that these overtures had been conceived in a spirit of intrigue and were designed to isolate and weaken Russia, he assured Poletica that no such thought had been entertained, that the United States had been attempting to bring about a general understanding on the South American question, and that the subject had not been broached to Russia because Dashkov, who was Russian minister at that time, was not in Washington and relations with him were such that free discussion would have been impossible. Adams concluded, however, by warning Poletica that although the United States wished to pursue the same policy as the European powers, yet, if after a reasonable time they still refused to recognize the republics, the United States would probably do so alone.[38]

Whether or not the opposition of the European powers would have deterred the administration indefinitely must remain a matter of conjecture; for on February 22, 1819, Spain signed a treaty ceding Florida to the United States, and the Spanish monarch, by delaying ratification of the treaty, cleverly precluded the United States from taking any steps which would have aroused the resentment of Spain. Not until March, 1822, when the treaty had finally been ratified and Great Britain was on the verge of a break with her

[36] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, VIII, 205, 28 June 1818; Adams' Memoirs, IV, 91-92, 118; Correspondence of Castlereagh, XI, 458-459.

[37] Adams' Memoirs, IV, 186-187, 190.

[38] Ibid., pp. 440-444; "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington," pp. 319-321.

continental allies, did President Monroe see fit to confer upon the Spanish-American states a recognized political status.

In regard to the other object of his mission—the adherence of the United States to the Holy Alliance [39]—Poletica's arrival was well timed; for relations between the United States and Great Britain were such as to render an offer of friendship from a powerful state a thing not to be lightly rejected by the United States. The proximity of Florida to the British possessions in the West Indies made its transfer from the hands of impotent Spain to those of the vigorous American republic an event of importance to Great Britain.[40] Moreover, the impetuous General Andrew Jackson had recently headed a punitive expedition into this territory in pursuit of a band of renegade Seminoles and had executed with scant ceremony two British subjects, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, whom he accused of complicity with the savages.[41] This proceeding was greeted with denunciation in England, and only the moderation of Castlereagh prevented a rupture.[42] Beside this, the memory of the War of 1812 still rankled, and the two countries were at odds over various questions supposed to have been settled by the Treaty of Ghent.[43]

Although most people favored continuation of our policy of isolation from European affairs, public sentiment in the United States was by no means unanimous in this respect, for a profession of such high principles as those embodied in the treaty of the Holy Alliance was not without appeal to certain devout groups which ardently desired peace. In August, 1815, a peace society was founded in New York City and four months later a similar society was organized in Massachusetts.[44] By 1817 there were in addition to these, the latter of which had twelve auxiliary societies,[45] fourteen similar organi-

[39] Ibid., pp. 310-315.

[40] Writings of John Quincy Adams, VI, 294, 307; Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, pp. 448-449.

[41] American State Papers, Military Affairs, I, 722-734.

[42] Richard Rush, Residence at the Court of London (2d ed.), p. 448; Correspondence of Castlereagh, XII, 38.

[43] Hildt, pp. 146-156.

[44] The Friend of Peace (Boston, 1819), I, No. 10, pp. 34-35.

[45] Three of these were in New Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, and one in Connecticut.

zations in the country: one in Maine, one in Rhode Island, four in New York, five in Ohio, two in Indiana, and one in North Carolina.[46] These societies were active in the dissemination of propaganda for world peace and distributed their literature not only in this country but in England, Russia, and other countries of Europe.[47] These friends of peace accorded unqualified acceptance to the declarations of Alexander I, and considered the inception of the Holy Alliance as marking the dawn of a new era.

On April 9, 1817, one Noah Worcester, corresponding secretary of the Massachusetts Peace Society, wrote to Alexander I informing him that "the very week in which the Holy League of the three sovereigns was officially announced in Russia, a society was formed in Boston . . . the object of which is to disseminate the very principles avowed in the wonderful alliance." The various publications of the society were enclosed as a token of the high esteem in which the Tsar was held by the friends of peace in the United States.[48]

On July 4, 1817, Alexander, in reply to the above communication, expressed his cordial approbation of the purposes of his co-workers in America and promised that he would always employ his power and influence to secure for all nations the "blessings of peace."[49] Flattered by such attention from so august a sovereign, Thomas Dawes, vice-president of the Massachusetts Peace Society, uttered the following eulogistic remarks on the occasion of the society's second anniversary:

> The Holy League of august sovereigns, in which the Emperor of all the Russias has taken so conspicuous a part, is a strong indication of the future prevalence of the cause of Peace. Jealous politicians may have doubted the motive. But they had not then read the undisguised answer of that illustrious man to the corresponding Secretary of this Society. Some of our friends in New York have been favored with similar expressions of the Emperor's regard for that peace and good will towards men which were celebrated by the angels at the Redeemer's birth. We should be blind indeed not to

[46] Fourth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Peace Society.
[47] Ibid.
[48] The Friend of Peace, I, No. 10, pp. 27-28.
[49] Ibid., p. 28.

perceive in such signs of the times the operations of an overruling Providence.[50]

The Massachusetts Peace Society was frankly critical of Great Britain for her aloofness towards the "Christian Treaty", and hoped that the United States would be more favorably inclined toward it. The Friend of Peace observed:

> What there was in the *form* of this Treaty, or in the British Constitution which should preclude the Prince Regent from becoming a party in the Alliance, has never been, to our knowledge, satisfactorily explained. If in the course of the long and disastrous conflict, the island of Great Britain had been ravaged, as were the provinces of Austria, Prussia, and Russia . . . the rulers of Great Britain might, at least, have wished the removal of every obstacle in the way of their acceding to the pacific League. The friends of peace in this country devoutly hope that nothing will be found in the constitution of the United States, or in the disposition of our present rulers, which will operate as a bar to a distinct avowal of pacific principles on the part of the American government.[51]

Even after the new departure in the Emperor's ideas at Aix-la-Chapelle the confidence of the pacifists of Massachusetts in their idol and his brother sovereigns remained unshaken, and they applauded the outcome of the congress

> as a fruit of the same spirit and the same convictions which produced the Holy Alliance, in 1815. From that time to the present, so far as we have information, the several powers which united in that Alliance have pursued a pacific policy. Little reason, it is believed, has been given by their public acts to support the suspicions which were entertained of intrigue and insincerity. But since that period, many have been the acts of the Emperor Alexander, which afford reason to believe that he was sincere in professing a desire to prevent the recurrence of war.[52]

John Quincy Adams, however, was not so sure of the unselfish object of the Tsar's policy, and took umbrage at the unqualified acceptance of his pacific professions by the peace societies. Writing to Alexander H. Everett, December 29, 1817, he warned that

> If our Peace Societies should fall into the fashion of corresponding upon the objects of their institutions with foreign Emperors and Kings, they may at some future day find themselves under the neces-

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[50] Ibid., No. 11, p. 6.
[51] Ibid., No. 10, pp. 25-26.
[52] Ibid., II, No. 3, p. 30. For similar expressions see the Boston Recorder for 17 April and 26 June 1816.

sity of corresponding with attorney generals and petit juries at home. Philip of Macedon was in very active correspondence with a Peace Society at Athens, and with their co-operation baffled and overpowered all the eloquence of Demosthenes. Alexander of the Neva is not so near nor so dangerous a neighbor to us as Philip was to the Athenians, but I am afraid his love of peace is of the same character as was that of Philip of Macedon. . . . In the intercourse between *power* and *weakness*, peace in the language of the former means the submission of the latter to its will. While Alexander and his Minister of Religious Worship, Prince Galitzen, are corresponding with the Rev. Noah Worcester upon the blessedness of peace, the venerable founder of the Holy League is sending five or six ships of the line, and several thousand promoters of peace armed with bayonets to Cadiz, and thence to propagate good will to men elsewhere.[53]

Such was the situation when Poletica arrived in the United States. On May 24, 1819, he made his first call on Adams, but assured him that he had "nothing to trouble us with," being charged only to convey "the most cordial and earnest assurances of the Emperor's regard and friendship for the United States."[54] Five days later he called again, and for some unaccountable reason assured Adams that he was instructed to prevail upon the government of the United States not to associate itself with the European powers but to pursue a policy in harmony with theirs.[55]

But on June 17 he made a complete change of front, calling on Adams for the express purpose of assuring him that "the Emperor was earnestly desirous that the United States should accede to the Holy Alliance." This invitation was conveyed in a confidential and unofficial manner, but the wary Adams, wishing to avoid a direct refusal, explained that he could take no steps without consulting the President, and that any commitment made by the executive would be of no validity unless sanctioned by the Senate. Poletica expressed himself as being perfectly willing that the treaty should be referred to the Senate, assuring Adams that "the Emperor wished the United States to become parties to it because, in that case, if

[53] Writings of John Quincy Adams, VI, 280-281. Pinkney had just reported that the Russian fleet had been sold to the King of Spain to be used against the Spanish American insurgents. (MS. Despatches, Russia, VI, 13/25 September 1817).

[54] Adams' Memoirs, IV, 370-371.

[55] Ibid., p. 380.

we had any little points of difference with European powers, with Great Britain for example, he could interpose his influence in their favor." Adams finally suggested that before going further it might be well to ascertain the disposition of some of the leading senators toward the proposition; to this Poletica agreed and the interview closed.[56]

Poletica had two subsequent interviews with Adams, on August 3 and November 24, in which he again brought up this subject.[57] But the demeanor of Adams remained evasive and unencouraging; so at last, on January 25, 1820, Poletica decided to "postpone indefinitely the question as to whether the United States would join the Holy Alliance."[58] The subject was never brought up again,[59] and a few months later, in his instructions to Henry Middleton,[60] who had been chosen

[56] Ibid., pp. 394-395.
[57] Ibid., pp. 404, 446-447.
[58] Golder, p. 34.
[59] In September 1821, occurred an event which Adams interpreted as another attempt to draw us into a political connection with Russia. On the 11th of that month Middleton reported that one who "holds a place near the person of the Emperor" (probably Capodistrias), had written him, "Why do you not . . . propose a Commercial Treaty. Your predecessor have [sic] done so without success but it was English influence which prevented it. Matters are about to change. Speak to Nesselrode about it, He will discourage but never mind. Propose it. It will be accepted. You will see great changes in a short time. His Majesty is much disappointed with his position. Austria and perhaps England too hath formed an alliance with the Porte. February next at farthest will be our time for hostilities against the last named. We know you are debarred access to our ports through the Dardanelles. Could you not do something in aid of our cause which is that of Greece by a squadron. At any rate your commerce to the archipelago will require additional protection. In case of war with England your commerce in the ports in the Baltic will be interrupted unless some measures are devised. Consider what had best be done and keep your Government advised of course affairs are likely to take." (MS. Despatches, Russia, VIII, 30 August/11 September 1821).

On receipt of this Monroe suggested that we take advantage of this hint and of the Tsar's evident ill-will toward England to conclude a commercial treaty and usurp the commercial position in Russia previously held by England. Adams, however, who had served as minister at St. Petersburg and knew Alexander's aversion to all commercial treaties, feared that one would never be granted without an obnoxious *quid pro quo*. (Adams' Memoirs, V, 429-431).

[60] Middleton, a native of South Carolina and a man of large wealth, although lacking in diplomatic experiences had already served as governor of his state and in the national legislature. He remained

to succeed Campbell, Adams clearly enunciated the policy which would be pursued by the United States. He said:

> The President, approving its general principles, and thoroughly convinced of the benevolent and virtuous motives which led to the conception and presided at the formation of this system by the Emperor Alexander, believes that the United States will more effectually contribute to the great and sublime objects for which it was concluded, by abstaining from a formal participation in it, than they could as stipulated members of it. . . . If the United States, as a member of the Holy Alliance could acquire a right to ask the influence of its most powerful member in their controversies with other states, the other member must be entitled in return to ask the influence of the United States for themselves against their opponents. . . . This consideration alone would be decisive for declining a participation in that league, which is the President's absolute and irrevocable determination, although he trusts that no occasion will present itself rendering it necessary to make that determination known by an explicit refusal.[61]

It was fear on the part of the American government that the European powers were contemplating forcible intervention in the Spanish-American revolution, coupled with traditional aversion toward foreign entanglements, that made the United States suspicious of the ulterior motives of the Tsar and led to the rejection of his offer. Pinkney's despatches had sounded a warning that the powers contemplated some sort of intervention in Spanish America,[62] while both Hyde de Neuville, the French minister in Washington, and Correa, the Portuguese representative, had told Adams that some sort of project was afoot to assure the return of the colonies to Spain.[63] These reports had occasioned keen anxiety in the American cabinet, but when, after Aix-la-Chapelle, the powers manifested no disposition to intermeddle in South America and Campbell's despatches assured Adams that the influence of Russia in Spain was rapidly being superseded by that of England, this apprehension was temporarily assuaged.[64]

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in Russia until 1830, and was one of the few American ministers who seemed really to enjoy his residence there.

[61] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, IX, 18, 5 July 1820.

[62] MS. Dispatches, Russia, VI, 13/25 September 1817, and 29 September/11 October 1817; Manning, III, 1851-1852.

[63] Adams' Memoirs, IV, 40, 86.

[64] MS. Despatches, Russia, VII, Nos. 6 and 19, 21 April/3 May 1819 and 31 December 1819/12 January 1820; Manning, III, 1862, 1864.

It was reawakened, however, by the reports which issued from Troppau and Laibach during the winter of 1820-1821. Here the allied sovereigns were again assembled in conference to discuss the revolutions which had recently broken out in Naples and Piedmont; and their sittings, at which they considered the feasibility of extirpating all revolutionary movements by armed intervention, culminated in the celebrated circular despatch of May 12, 1821. This announced that "Useful and necessary changes in the governments of states must emanate only from the free will and the thoughtful and enlightened consent of those whom God has made responsible for power." [65] Innovations of a liberal character which came about in any other manner they promised to root out, if necessary, by force of arms.[66] To such a declaration Castlereagh, who "could not recognize the principle that one state was entitled to interfere with another because changes might be effected in its Government in a way which the former state disapproved," could not subscribe.[67] Foreseeing the turn which events were likely to take, he had purposely absented himself from the meetings. Thus it was from Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the three original members of the Holy Alliance, that these sentiments secured endorsement; [68] and it was to these three powers—now dominated completely by Metternich and Alexander—that the appellation "Holy Alliance" was henceforth applied.[69]

Encouraged by their success in suppressing the revolution in Naples, these apostles of repression met again in 1822, at Verona, to deliberate upon the revolution which had just broken out in Spain. Castlereagh feared that the crushing of the Spanish revolution would be followed by some move against the colonies, and instructed the British representative

[65] De Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traités de l'Europe, V, 644.
[66] Cresson, pp. 99-100.
[67] Webster, pp. 321, 344.
[68] Cresson, pp. 98-99.
[69] H. W. V. Temperly, in his Foreign Policy of Canning, refers to these three powers as the "Neo-Holy Alliance." The distinction between this later so-called Holy Alliance and the original, which by this time had for all practical purposes ceased to exist, should be carefully kept in mind.

at Verona to call attention to "the intercourse which, for a long period of years, has subsisted between Great Britain and the Provinces of Spain in America . . . and the impossibility of its being obstructed or checked without the certainty of rousing the utmost spirit of discontent in the commercial world." [70]

On the eve of the conference Castlereagh, worn out by his long struggle to hold his allies to their original purposes, his mind unbalanced by overwork, took his own life; but George Canning, his successor, shared his suspicions of the continental powers and was, moreover, even more sensitive to the demands of the commercial interests. In order to safeguard the rights of Great Britain he determined to send the Duke of Wellington to the conference with instructions "frankly and peremptorily to declare that to any . . . interference in Spain, come what may, His Majesty will not be a party." [71] His orders as to expressing disapproval of any attempt to reconquer the colonies were even more explicit.[72]

But even Wellington was powerless to restrain Metternich and Alexander, who were almost fanatical in their determination that revolutionary movements in all quarters must be stamped out. Accordingly when the powers gave France a mandate to invade Spain and restore King Ferdinand to his throne, Canning, hoping even yet to prevent intervention, ordered the duke to offer the mediation of Great Britain to France and Spain.[73] On December 17, 1822, Wellington made this offer to the Duke de Montmorency, and when it was rejected [74] expressed the disapproval of his country by leaving the conference. Thus the break between England and the continental allies was complete, and it was inevitable that Canning, isolated in Europe and fearful lest the subjugation

[70] Leonard A. Lawson, The Relation of British Policy to the Monroe Doctrine, p. 82. Chapter IV of this work contains an admirable treatment of the British commercial activities in Spanish America.

[71] Josceline Bagot, George Canning and His Friends, II, 143.

[72] Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Arthur, Duke of Wellington, I, 304; British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 51.

[73] Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Arthur, Duke of Wellington, I, 625-630.

[74] Ibid., pp. 655-656, 667.

of Spain would be followed by the conquest of her erstwhile colonies, should turn toward the United States.

In that country, since the proceedings at Troppau and Laibach, the "Club of Potentates," which was believed to subordinate all feelings of "Humanity and Justice" to the maintenance of legitimacy,[75] had became an object of execration and scorn. In May, 1821, Poletica reported that "the American newspapers are outspoken against the Allied powers," [76] and he later refused to attend a Fourth of July banquet because he was confident that some one would attack the Holy Alliance.[77] Even the peace societies, after the French invasion of Spain, considered that the methods and professions of the European sovereigns were rather inconsistent. "It must be a miserable policy," observed the Friend of Peace, "to revive military ambition to check the spirit of revolution. This is, indeed, like attempting to cast out demons by Beelzebub." [78]

Canning had been sounding out the United States for some time,[79] and on August 16 he made a definite suggestion that she and Great Britain make a joint declaration against allied intervention in Spanish America.[80] As the conquest of Spain proceeded his solicitations assumed the tone of a desperate plea; but to the one condition laid down by the United States—recognition of the independence of the colonies—he would not assent.[81] Finally he determined to act alone; and in his celebrated interview with Prince Polignac, the French representative in London, October 9, he made it plain that England would tolerate no intervention in America.[82] Meanwhile Gallatin, American minister at Paris, had pursued a similar course and had been assured by Chateaubriand that

[75] MS. Despatches, Russia, IX, No. 21, 8/20 July 1822.
[76] Golder, p. 38.
[77] "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington," p. 328.
[78] The Friend of Peace, III, No. 10, p. 315.
[79] Adams' Memoirs, VI, 151-152.
[80] Rush, Residence at the Court of London, pp. 400, 401, 412.
[81] Ibid., pp. 418, 431, 434; Adams' Memoirs, VI, 191.
[82] British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 49-53; John H. Latané, The United States and Latin America, p. 73.

France contemplated nothing more than the suppression of the insurrection in Spain itself.[83]

On October 6, 1823, Baron de Tuyll,[84] who had succeeded Poletica as Russian minister at Washington, presented Adams with a note which set forth the views of the Tsar on the Spanish-American question.[85] It said that "His Imperial Majesty, faithful to the political principles which he follows in concert with his allies, cannot under any circumstances receive any agent whatsoever, either from the regency of Colombia, or from any of the other governments which owe their existence to the events of which the New World has been for some years the stage." [86] At the same time that he presented this communication de Tuyll expressed his master's regret that the United States had seen fit to recognize the revolutionary governments, and expressed the hope that the American government would continue to pursue a policy of neutrality in the struggle between them and Spain.[87]

This communication appears to have been innocent enough. It was certainly within the province of the Tsar to withhold recognition if he so desired. But the declaration of policy came unsolicited and gave rise to serious consternation in the American cabinet, whose members saw in it all sorts of sinister implications. Monroe and Calhoun were especially disturbed, the former instructing Adams to ascertain the meaning of the expression "political principles." De Tuyll, upon being questioned, assured Adams that he understood it to refer merely to Spain's right of sovereignty over her colonies, and Adams, who according to his own account was less perturbed

[83] The Writings of Albert Gallatin (ed. Henry Adams), II, 271-272.

[84] Major General Baron de Tuyll van Serooskerken was of an old and noble Dutch family. He came to the United States from Portugal.

[85] "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington," p. 342.

[86] Manning, III, 1868.

[87] Worthington C. Ford, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine" in the American Historical Review, VII, 685-686; also "The Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine" by the same author, in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 2d Series, XV, 400-401.

than the other cabinet members, replied that this was the interpretation which he too put upon it. In reply to the verbal part of de Tuyll's communication the Secretary of State remarked significantly that the observations of the Tsar on the neutrality of the United States had been amicably received by the President, who in return wished the baron to express to his government the hope of the United States that Russia "would on her part also continue to observe the same neutrality."[88]

On November 17, another missive from Alexander was delivered at the State Department by de Tuyll. Its contents were aptly described by Adams as

> an exposition of principles relating to the affairs of Spain and Portugal, in a tone of passionate exaltation at the counter-revolution in Portugal and the impending success of the French army in Spain, an 'Io Triumphe' over the fallen cause of revolution, with sturdy promises of determination to keep it down; disclaimers of all intentions of making conquests; bitter complaints of being calumniated and one paragraph of compunctions, acknowledging that an apology was yet due to mankind for the invasion of Spain, which it is now in the power only of Ferdinand to furnish, by making his people happy.[89]

To such a paper, extolling monarchical principles and systematic repression of liberal ideas, the cabinet, which had toned down Adams' reply to de Tuyll's note of October 16 to the "tamest of all State papers,"[90] was agreed that a firmer reply must be given. Adams had consistently maintained that the allies would not interfere in America,[91] yet he believed that this communication furnished a suitable opportunity for a declaration of principles—a declaration which should serve as "an earnest remonstrance against the inter-

[88] By this time the Holy Alliance was considered in this country as "a mere hypocritical fraud." (Adams' Memoirs, VI, 170). Adams reports that Monroe was alarmed "far beyond anything that I could have conceived possible," while "Calhoun is perfectly moonstruck by the surrender of Cadiz, and says the Holy Allies, with ten thousand men, will restore all Mexico and all South America to the Spanish dominion." (Ibid., pp. 185-186).

[89] Ibid., p. 190. The text of the note is in W. C. Ford's "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," p. 30, and in his "The Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," p. 402.

[90] Manning, I, 209-210.

[91] Adams' Memoirs, V, 317; VI, 186, 203, 207.

ference of the European powers by force with South America." To this end he drew up a paper which he submitted to the cabinet for approval.[92] But since Monroe's message to Congress had already been prepared and the subject of South America was treated in it, Calhoun considered that a direct answer to Russia was unnecessary. Moreover, Adams' paper contained "rather an ostentatious display of republican principles" which would be offensive not only to the Tsar but to Great Britain.[93] Adams, on the other hand, contended that the presidential message was primarily for domestic perusal and that the monarchical panegyric of the Tsar should be given a more direct and specific reply. Finally, further delay being inexpedient, the paper, somewhat softened by the elision of Adams' incisive comparison of republican and monarchical institutions, was communicated to de Tuyll.[94]

On December 2, 1823, Monroe's message announced to the world that we could not view any European interposition in Spanish America by force "in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."[95] January 30, 1824, Canning, on receiving notice that the powers contemplated holding a conference at Paris to aid Spain in adjusting her colonial troubles, expressed his belief in the futility of any such assembly and warned that "It appears manifest to the British Government . . . that the recognition of such of the new States as have established *de facto* their separate political existence cannot be much longer delayed."[96]

These almost simultaneous declarations from the American and British governments which, although acting independently, were strengthened by the knowledge of a community of views, effectually checked whatever designs the Tsar and

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[92] Ibid., pp. 179-199. The paper as first drawn up by Adams is in Ford's "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," pp. 41-44.
[93] Adams' Memoirs, VI, 200.
[94] Ibid., pp. 201-214.
[95] James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 218.
[96] British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 58-63.

his allies may have had upon the New World;[97] for the conference at Paris deteriorated into a mere innocuous gathering of the ministers of the respective powers in that city.

[97] Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826. Perkins believes that the danger of European intervention in America has been much exaggerated. He shows that at the time of the promulgation of Monroe's ultimatum, the Tsar's ideas as to his future policy were as yet undeveloped. His ministers at Paris and Madrid, Pozzo di Borgo and Bulgari, may have been attempting to bring about armed intervention; but as for Alexander, all that he had decided was that a conference should be held at which the matter should be considered (pp. 104-143).

CHAPTER III

The Treaty of 1824 [1]

Never since the American Revolution had the American and British governments been so much in sympathy as they were in 1823; but their rapprochement, prompted by common fear of the designs of the allies in South America, was abruptly terminated by events which occurred in another quarter of the globe—the northwest coast of North America—where Russia, England, and the United States all had important interests. Russia's interest in this region dated from the early years of the eighteenth century when bands of explorers and fur traders, crossing the narrow strait which separates Asia from America, claimed the territory for the Tsar.[2] The abundance of fur-bearing animals there, and the large demand for furs in Russia and North China induced so many companies to enter the fur trade, and led to such ruthless competition, that by the end of the century the fur-bearing animals were threatened with extermination. To avert this, Tsar Paul, in 1799, brought about the consolidation of the rival companies under the name of the Russian American Company. This new corporation was given exclusive governmental and trading

[1] The negotiation of the Treaty of 1824 has already been exhaustively treated by others, and it is not the purpose of the author to discuss it at any greater length than is required by the continuity of the narrative and by reason of the fact that we shall be forced to deal with it again in considering the controversy over its meaning after the expiration of Article Four in 1834. The sources for the negotiations are American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V; Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II; "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington 1818-1825" in the American Historical Review, XVIII. The subject is well treated by Hildt, "Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia" in the Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science; by Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826; and by Shippee, "Oregon and the Diplomacy of 1821-1827" in the Oregon Historical Quarterly, XIX.

[2] Robert Greenhow, Memoir Historical and Political, on the Northwest Coast of America and the adjacent territories; Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 530-536; Frank A. Golder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850, pp. 151-164; Robert G. Cleland, A History of California, pp. 22-34.

privileges on the American coast north of the fifty-first degree north latitude for a period of twenty years. Paul himself and many Russian nobles bought shares in the company, and consequently had a pecuniary interest in its welfare and in the maintenance of its monopoly.

Its power and prestige increased rapidly, and in 1821 Tsar Alexander renewed its charter for another twenty years. More and more, however, the company's monopoly was threatened by the encroachments of American traders who came to the region in increasing numbers. This intrusion was resented by the Russians who, in 1808, tried to persuade the United States government to pass a law prohibiting its citizens from visiting those shores. Failing in this, in 1810 they proposed an arrangement whereby Americans should be allowed to transport furs from the Russian establishments to China provided they abstained from all trade with the natives in the company's territory; but this, too, was rejected by the United States.[3] Finally, on September 16, 1821, Tsar Alexander, instigated by the officials of the Russian American Company, issued a ukase claiming all of the northwest coast as far south as fifty-one degrees north latitude, and prohibiting all foreign vessels from approaching within one hundred Italian miles of the shore.[4]

This edict naturally caused concern in Great Britain and the United States, and for a time it seemed that the two nations would move in harmony to restrain the aggressive pretensions of Russia. For when the Tsar, who had apparently never intended to enforce his ukase to the letter, manifested willingness to settle the controversy by amicable negotiation, they prepared to treat jointly with him.[5] Adams had already outlined a plan whereby the Russians should make no settlement south of the fifty-fifth parallel, the United States should make none north of the fifty-first, while Great Britain should restrict her citizens to the territory between these

[3] Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia, pp. 158-159.

[4] Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II, 25-26.

[5] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 436-437, 791-793; Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II, 120, 124.

lines.[6] In December, 1823, Rush, thinking it might be useful to the British government in formulating its instructions for its minister at St. Petersburg, outlined this proposal to Canning, at the same time stating that "the United States no longer regarded any part of that coast as open to European colonization."[7] This, because of its possible effect upon British interests, was a dangerous assertion, and Canning, quick to see its implication, protested that the United States was attempting to settle not only its own affairs but those of England and Russia as well.[8] After the reception of Monroe's message which, in addition to warning the allies away from South America, contained the ultimatum that "the American continents, by the free and independent position which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers,"[9] his attitude became even more distant, and he protested to Rush that this clause affected Great Britain as much as Russia, and that unless it was retracted he would be obliged to refuse to participate with the American government in joint negotiations on a subject in regard to which the interests of the two countries were so irreconcilable. Rush, foreseeing that in the event of a tripartite negotiation the United States would be opposed on the colonization question by both England and Russia, thought it best to treat with Russia alone, and his rejection of Canning's demand precluded any further thought of joint action.[10]

Outside the State Department the ukase occasioned little excitement in the United States.[11] Many people, remembering Alexander's friendly attitude during the War of 1812 and his efforts to end that struggle,[12] believed with Alexander H.

[6] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 793.

[7] Ibid., pp. 470, 742.

[8] Lester B. Shippee, "Oregon and the Diplomacy of 1821-1827," in the Oregon Historical Society Quarterly, XIX, 196.

[9] Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 209.

[10] Rush, Residence at the Court of London, pp. 471-472; Bagot, George Canning and His Friends, II, 209-210, 217; Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II, 69.

[11] "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington," p. 333.

[12] Golder, "The Russian Offer of Mediation in the War of 1812," in the Political Science Quarterly, XXXI, 380-391; Hildt, pp. 58-59.

Everett that "He proved himself a most important and useful ally, at the critical epoch of the late war, and in consideration of this we ought not to think too hardly of him for employing a cypher or two more than was necessary in stating the extent of his jurisdiction over the Pacific Ocean."[13] Even in the State Department the chief concern was not over the territorial claim of the Tsar, but over the fact that the closing of the Pacific would deprive American citizens of a lucrative trade. Adams, knowing that the inevitable concomitant of the extension of a colonial establishment was the exclusion of foreign commerce, was determined to maintain the commercial rights of the United States in the northwest, and he instructed Middleton that he should in no case consent to a relinquishment of the right of United States citizens to fish and trade north of fifty-one degrees.[14]

Meanwhile it had become evident that Alexander had thought better of his hasty promulgation and was bent upon pursuing a conciliatory course. In a circular despatch of October 7, 1821, he explained that his ultimatum had been made necessary by the fraudulent activities of foreign ships which, by their commerce in peltries, had endangered the profits of the Russian American Company, and by selling arms, ammunition, and liquor to the natives, had encouraged them to revolt.[15] At the same time, as proof of his moderation, he ordered the Russian warships patrolling those waters to restrict their activities to the coasts and to the interception of illicit trade with the actual Russian settlements.[16] When Great Britain protested against the ukase at the Congress of Verona, Nesselrode, the Russian foreign secretary, informed Wellington that the Tsar was willing to settle the question by negotiation; while Baron de Tuyll, who was about to depart

[13] Alexander H. Everett, America, or a General Survey of the Political Situation of the Several Powers of the Western Continent (Philadelphia, 1827), pp. 59-60.

[14] "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington," pp. 333-334; Adams' Memoirs, VI, 93, 159; Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II, 47-51.

[15] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 857-861.

[16] Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II, 40, 43.

as minister to the United States, was ordered to assure Adams that although the prohibitive measures of the ukase were caused by the trespasses of American sailors, yet the Tsar's only object was to obviate any unpleasant controversies with the American government arising from their illegal activities and that he stood ready to come to an arrangement on the matter.[17] At the same time the directors of the Russian American Company were ordered to transmit to the government information as to "the parallel of latitude which can be fixed as the farthest limit of our dominions, without giving rise to remonstrances and pretensions such as those which have lately been evoked."[18] Likewise, when on July 24, 1822, Middleton read to Capodistrias an aggressive note of protest in which he envisaged the possibility of war if the ukase were put into effect and informed the count that he intended to present it to Nesselrode, Capodistrias implored him not to present it, assuring him that the Tsar already saw that he had gone too far and was not disposed to follow up his claims of 1821.[19]

Thus it is plain that the non-colonization clause, which has been of such importance in the subsequent formation of American foreign policy, accomplished nothing at the time of its promulgation except the disruption of the Anglo-American entente. Previous to its enunciation by Monroe the Tsar had decided to settle the controversy by negotiation; and in actual negotiations it was not invoked, since Nesselrode, in his first interview with Middleton, proposed that they "waive all discussion upon abstract principles of right and settle the differences in a manner conformable to their mutual interests."[20]

It was not until February, 1824, that Middleton learned that he was to negotiate alone.[21] From the middle of that

[17] Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Arthur, Duke of Wellington, I, 372-373, 577-578; "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington," pp. 330-334.
[18] Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II, 41.
[19] Ibid., pp. 42-45.
[20] Ibid., pp. 71-72.
[21] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 457-463.

month until the end of March the negotiations went forward, Middleton presenting the case of the United States and Poletica playing the leading role for Russia, although Nesselrode [22] himself was often present and took an active part in the sessions. At the outset Middleton proposed (1) mutual freedom of navigation and trade in every part of the Pacific, (2) that subjects of neither country should land at establishments of the other without first securing permission from the local authorities, (3) that the United States should neither authorize nor allow its citizens to establish settlements north of the fifty-fifth parallel, and Russia should, in like manner, enjoin her citizens from settling south of that line.[23]

As to the first and second of these propositions, Poletica immediately relinquished the right of Russia to declare any part of the Pacific a *mare clausum,* for, as we have seen, the Tsar had given up this pretension almost as soon as it had been announced; but Poletica wished to exclude Americans from all trade north of fifty-five degrees, in return for which he offered that Russians should forego all commercial activities south of it. As to the third proposition, the Russian American Company had already made a settlement at Port Bacurelli, south of latitude fifty-five, and since Poletica showed no disposition to relinquish it, Middleton gave way and agreed to fix the line at fifty-four degrees forty minutes. But on the question of trade both plenipotentiaries were adamant, and it was not until numerous conferences had been held that Poletica, believing the very existence of the Russian American Company to be at stake and consequently indisposed to concession, was induced to accept a compromise whereby freedom of trade was granted for ten years. The treaty was signed April 17, 1824. Its provisions were as follows:

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[22] Count Karl Robert Nesselrode was of German ancestry and was born in 1780 at Lisbon, where his father was Russian ambassador. He became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1816, although he had been in practical control of that office since 1812. He was appointed Chancellor of the Empire in 1844, and held this office until his death in 1862.

[23] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 458-470.

Art. I. It is agreed that in any part of the great ocean, commonly called the Pacific Ocean, or South Sea, the respective citizens or subjects of the high contracting powers shall be neither disturbed nor restrained either in navigation, or in fishing, or in the power of resorting to the coasts upon points which may not already be occupied, for the purpose of trading with the natives, saving always the restrictions and conditions determined by the following articles.

Art. II. With the view of preventing the rights of navigation and of fishing exercised upon the great ocean by the citizens and subjects of the high contracting powers from becoming the pretext for an illicit trade, it is agreed that the citizens of the United States shall not resort to any point where there is a Russian establishment without the permission of the Governor or commander; and that reciprocally, the subjects of Russia shall not resort without permission to any establishment of the United States upon the Northwest Coast.

Art. III. It is moreover agreed that hereafter there shall not be formed by the citizens of the United States, or under the authority of the said States, any establishment upon the Northwest Coast of America, nor in any of the islands adjacent to the north of fifty-four degrees and forty minutes of north latitude; and that in the same manner there shall be none formed by Russian subjects or under the authority of Russia south of the same parallel.

Art. IV. It is nevertheless understood that during a term of ten years, counting from the signature of the present convention, the ships of both powers, or which belong to their citizens or subjects, respectively, may reciprocally frequent, without any hindrance whatever, the interior seas, gulfs, harbors, and creeks upon the coast mentioned in the preceding article, for the purpose of fishing and trading with the natives of the country.

Art. V. All spirituous liquors, fire-arms, other arms, powder, and munitions of war of every kind are always excepted from this same commerce permitted in the preceding article; . . . the high contracting parties reciprocally reserving to themselves to determine upon the penalties to be incurred and to inflict the punishments in case of the contravention of this article by their respective citizens or subjects.[24]

In reality this treaty was a mere trading agreement which insured tranquillity for ten years. Boundaries were not expressly defined by it, and some of its provisions were of a contradictory nature. As we shall see, this ambiguity raised serious difficulties in 1834 when Article Four expired.[25]

[24] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 433-434.
[25] Below, p. 92.

CHAPTER IV

Cuba and Russo-American Relations

The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States and the opposition of Great Britain to foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere sealed the doom of Spanish dominion on the American continents; for it was evident that without foreign aid Spain would be unable to resubjugate her revolted colonies. For some time, however, she continued to hope that such aid would be forthcoming, and as long as this hope persisted she refused to let the colonies go. Although practically expelled from the mainland, she still retained the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico which she used as bases from which to dispatch desultory expeditions against the revolutionists in Colombia and Mexico. Thus Cuba and Porto Rico were the key to the Spanish American situation. As long as she kept them Spain could continue the war; deprived of them she would have to admit defeat. The strategic position of the islands, which gave their possessor control of the mouth of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico, made their status a matter of supreme importance to the United States which was fearful that they would fall into the hands of some powerful European nation.

In 1823, with the French armies invading Spain to restore Ferdinand to his throne,[1] the situation became especially acute. All sorts of rumors were rampant. If France were victorious, the grateful Ferdinand might cede the islands to her as a reward for her support; or England might be induced by a promise of their cession to intervene in behalf of the Spanish Liberals to free Spain from French domination. Or, the Cubans might take advantage of Spain's weakness to free themselves, although it was highly improbable that they could maintain their independence unaided, especially if it were threatened by some avaricious European power. Great Britain and the United States had long been watching the movements

[1] Above, p. 34.

of each other in the West Indies with anxious suspicion, while both feared France who reciprocated their distrust.[2] While any of these powers would have welcomed the acquisition of the islands, their mutual jealousy precluded any attempts at aggrandizement and rendered the maintenance of the status quo—the retention of the islands by Spain—the cardinal point in the policy of each of them.[3]

By 1825, when Adams became president and Henry Clay was appointed secretary of state, Spain's military operations in America had lost all semblance of purpose or efficiency, and the war there had degenerated into a useless shedding of blood. Clay had always been an active supporter of Spanish-American independence and efforts to bring the war to a close were among his first acts as secretary of state.

On April 27, 1825, he ordered Alexander H. Everett, the American minister at Madrid, to emphasize the hopelessness and danger to Spain of a protraction of the struggle, and to assure the Spanish government that the United States desired the speedy termination of the war not only for its own sake but for that of Spain as well.[4] Clay did not limit his exertions to direct intercession with Spain, however, but also attempted to persuade the principal European powers to bring pressure to bear at Madrid. May 11, 1825, he instructed Rufus King, soon to depart as minister to England, to inform the British foreign secretary that "if Great Britain, and the other European powers would heartily unite with the United States in these pacific endeavors, the President entertains the confident hope that a stop would be put to the further and

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[2] H. W. V. Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, pp. 175-176; E. J. Stapleton, The Official Correspondence of George Canning, I, 276; Adams' Memoirs, VI, 70-72, 105, 112, 138, 139; William R. Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, pp. 89-105.

[3] Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations, I, 259; 32d Cong., 1st session, H. Doc. No. 121, pp. 6-11; James Morton Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, pp. 120-165.

[4] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, X, 302; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 794, 866; 32d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 121, pp. 16-18; British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 430-432.

unnecessary effusion of human blood."[5] Two days later the minister at Paris was ordered to invite France, who, with Russia, was most influential in Spain, to assist the United States in her efforts to secure peace.[6] But it was from the Tsar of Russia that Clay expected to receive the most effectual support, and it was upon him that his greatest efforts were expended.

Why he should have expected cooperation from Alexander is inconceivable. Russia had always encouraged Spain to continue to try to recover the colonies, and it had been mainly against Alexander that the Monroe Doctrine had been issued. Nor had Alexander's views on the Spanish-American question changed; for he continued to talk of the submission of the colonies, and in September, 1824, frankly told the French minister at St. Petersburg that he believed that only foreign aid to Ferdinand was needed to bring it about. Indeed we are not at all sure that Alexander would not have furnished this aid himself had he not been deterred by the apathy of his allies and the sea power of Great Britain.[7] Nor was Clay ignorant of Alexander's attitude. July 15, 1824. Hugh Nelson, Everett's predecessor at Madrid, had reported that Count d'Ofalia had recently been superseded as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by Zea Bermudez. The change, which augured ill for liberalism and colonial hopes of independence, had been almost synchronous with the arrival at the Spanish court of a new Russian minister, d'Oubril; and Nelson believed it was directly attributable to his influence. Russia, even more than France, so he wrote, was encouraging the King to continue the war with the colonies, and it was probable that as the influence of France waned as her troops were withdrawn from Spain, the subservience of the Spanish monarch to the Tsar would be proportionately increased.[8]

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[5] MS. U. S. Ministers, Instructions, X, 345; Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 250-251.

[6] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, X, 356; Manning, I, 251-252.

[7] Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826, pp. 234-235.

[8] MS. Despatches, Spain, XXIV, No. 35, 15 July 1824; Manning, III, 2048.

In February, 1825, Middleton corroborated this exposition of the Tsar's attitude, reporting that in consequence of Canning's recent recognition of the Spanish-American states,[9] Count Lieven, Russian ambassador at London, had been instructed to express his master's regret at this action, and to assure the British government of Russia's unalterable determination to maintain her attitude of sympathy and affection for the King of Spain.[10] Two months later Middleton wrote that at the same time this despatch was sent to Lieven the Tsar had instructed his ambassador at Madrid to advise Spain to "carefully avoid giving England direct causes of rupture," but to enter a forceful protest against the action of the London cabinet and prepare all her resources for a final assault on the insurgents.[11]

It was in the face of such unpropitious auguries that Clay opened negotiations with Russia. May 10, 1825, he wrote to Middleton a long despatch which the latter was to communicate to the Russian government in such a manner as should appear "most likely to accomplish its object." This communication, combining pertinent arguments with judicious flattery, and joining a humanitarian plea for world peace with an exposition of the advantages which would accrue therefrom to Spain deserves to be quoted at length. Clay wrote:

> I am requested by the President to instruct you to endeavor to engage the Russian government to contribute its best exertions toward terminating the existing contest between Spain and her colonies. . . . Russia is so situated as that, whilst she will be less directly affected than other parts of Christendom, her might and her councils must have a controlling influence on its useless protraction or its happy termination. . . . Too much confidence is reposed in the enlightened judgment of His Imperial Majesty to allow of the belief that he will permit any abatement of his desire

[9] Great Britain recognized the republics December 31, 1824.

[10] MS. Despatches, Russia, X, No. 42, 7/19 February 1825; Manning, III, 1869-1870; "Protocols of Conferences of Representatives of the Allied Powers respecting Spanish America, 1824-1825," in the American Historical Review, XXII, 606. William S. Robertson, "The United States and Spain in 1822," in the American Historical Review, XX, 796.

[11] MS. Despatches, Russia, X, No. 45, 1/13 April 1825; Manning, III, 1870-1872.

to see such a war formally terminated, and the blessings of peace restored, from sympathies which he may feel, however strong, for the unhappy condition of Spain. These very sympathies will naturally lead His Imperial Majesty to give her the best, and most friendly advice in her actual posture. And in what does that consist? His Imperial Majesty must be the exclusive, as he is the most competent judge. But it will not be deemed inconsistent with respect, to enquire if it be possible that Spain can bring the new States again under her dominion? Where does the remotest prospect of her success break out? In Colombia, Mexico, or Peru? The reconquest of the United States by Great Britain would not be a more mad and hopeless enterprise than that of the restoration of the Spanish Power on those Continents [sic]. . . .

Viewing the war as practically terminated, so far, at least, as relates to Spanish exertion . . . let us endeavour to anticipate what may be expected to happen if Spain obstinately perseveres in the refusal to conclude peace. If the war has only a nominal continuance, the new Republics cannot disband their victorious armies without culpable neglect of all the maxims of prudence and precaution. And the first observation that occurs is, that this protracted war must totally change its character and its objects. Instead of being a war of defensive operations in which Spain has been carrying on hostilities in the bosom of the new States, it will become one to her, of a defensive nature, in which all her future exertions must be directed to the protection and defence of her remaining insular possessions. . . . For it cannot be doubted that the new States will direct their combined and unemployed forces to the reduction of those valuable Islands. They will naturally strike their enemy wherever they can reach him. And they will be stimulated to the attack by the double motive arising from the richness of the prize, and from the fact that those Islands constitute the rendezvous of Spain, where are concentrated and from which issue, all the means of annoying them which remain to her. . . .

If peace should be longer deferred, and the war should take the probable direction which has been supposed, during its further progress, other powers, not now parties, may be collaterally drawn into it. From much less considerable causes the peace of the world has been often disturbed. From the vicinity of Cuba to the United States, its valuable commerce, and the nature of its population, their Government cannot be indifferent to any political change to which the Island may be destined. Great Britain and France, also, have deep interests in its fortunes which may keep them wide awake to all those changes. In short, what European State has not much at stake, direct or indirect, in the destiny, be what it may, of that most valuable of all West India Islands? The reflections and the experience of the Emperor on the vicissitudes of war must have impressed him with the solemn duty of all Governments to guard against even the distant approach of that most terrible of all scourges, by every precaution with which human prudence and foresight can surround the repose and safety of States. . . .

In becoming the advocate of peace, one is the true advocate of Spain. If the Emperor shall, by his wisdom, enlighten the Councils of Spain, and bring home to them a conviction of her real interests, there can be no fears of the success of his powerful interposition. You are authorized, in that spirit of the most perfect frankness

and friendship which have [sic] ever characterized all the relations between Russia and the United States, to disclose without reserve, the feelings and wishes of the United States in respect to Cuba and Porto Rico. . . . In the state of possession which Spain has, there would be a ready acquiescence of those very Foreign Powers, all of whom would be put in angry activity upon the smallest prospect of a transfer of those Islands. The United States could not, with indifference, see such a transfer to any European Power. And if the new Republics . . . were to conquer them, their maritime force, as it now is, or for a long time to come is likely to be, would keep up constant apprehensions of their safety. . . .

Finally the President cherishes the hope that the Emperor's devotion to peace, no less than his friendship for Spain, will induce him to lend the high authority of his name to the conclusion of a war the further prosecution of which must have the certain effect of a useless waste of human life. No power has displayed more solicitude for the repose of the world than Russia, who has recently given the strongest evidence of her unwillingness to disturb it in the east, by unexampled moderation and forebearance.[12] By extending to America the blessing of that peace which, under the auspices of His Imperial Majesty, Europe new enjoys, all parts of this Continent will have grateful occasion for regarding him, as the United States ever have, as their most potent and faithful friend.[13]

But before Clay's efforts at intervention had had time to effect any results official circles in Mexico and the United States were disturbed by events which happened in the West Indies. For some months reports of Spanish reinforcements concentrating in the Peninsular ports to go thence to Cuba, and from there to operate against Colombia and Mexico had been circulating both in those countries and in the United States. These reports were received with equanimity, however, for no one feared the efforts of Spain. But when the first Spanish transports arrived at Havana they were accompanied by a French war vessel. Moreover, a fleet of twenty-eight French ships, which had concentrated at Martinique, was reported to be moving toward Havana; and such a movement was considered just cause for alarm. Nor was the apprehension allayed by the report that a new Spanish governor had recently arrived at Santiago aboard a French vessel.[14]

[12] Below, p. 65.

[13] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, X, 331, No. 1, 10 May 1825; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 846-849; Manning, I, 244-250; British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 403-409.

[14] Niles' Register, XXVIII, 35, 148; Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, pp. 117-119.

Alaman, the Mexican foreign minister, requested Great Britain and the United States to demand an explanation of the meaning of these events from France and Spain, and Clay and Canning, as much perturbed as Alaman, readily complied.[15] But upon being questioned, both France and Spain denied any intention of complicity to change the status of Cuba. The former asserted that the French fleet was in the West Indies merely to attend the ceremony connected with the recognition of the independence of Hayti, and that the convoying of the Spanish transports had been done on the order of the French commander at Martinique whose action had been disavowed by the French government;[16] while the Spanish government asserted that "His Majesty has at no time thought of conceding to any power the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and so far from such a purpose, is firmly determined to keep them under the dominion and authority of his legitimate sovereignty."[17]

While this correspondence had been going on, Middleton had received Clay's instructions of May 10 and had broached the subject of Russian mediation in Spain to Nesselrode who gave him no encouragement at first, "adverting to the essential difference in our way of thinking on the question between Spain and her Colonies." Undeterred, Middleton begged leave to furnish him with a copy of his instructions, which he wished Nesselrode to lay before the Tsar in the hope that His Imperial Majesty might be induced "to aid in promoting the only means that can be suggested for avoiding an increase of evils to Spain and the civilized world." Finally, with manifest reluctance, Nesselrode yielded, and on July 14, Clay's note of May 10, accompanied by an explanatory note from Middleton, was sent in to Alexander.

But the Tsar's attention was occupied with internal matters and with the revolt of the Greeks against the Turks. Then too, he was sure that Anglo-American rivalry rendered Cuba

[15] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 909-910; VI, 364; British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 488, 995.
[16] Stapleton, Correspondence of Canning, I, 376.
[17] 32d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 121, p. 14.

safe, at least for the present,[18] so many weeks passed before Middleton was vouchsafed any reply. Finally, however, on September 1, he received the following note from Nesselrode:

> . . . The Principles of the Emperor were sufficiently known to the Government of the United States to justify the perfect confidence, that in expressing a wish for the continuance and confirmation of that peace enjoyed by the world, it did but represent the most sincere desire of His Imperial Majesty; that in professing a generous solicitude for the rights of Spain over her islands in the West Indies, it avowed principles that had long since been adopted by Russia as the bases of her political system; and that in anticipating perfect impartiality and true disinterestedness from her intervention, it was not deceived as to the sentiments of the Emperor, in relation to all arrangements in which Foreign Powers might be pleased to claim or admit his good offices. . . .
>
> The opinion of His Imperial Majesty as to the question discussed by Mr. Clay in his dispatch, cannot be concealed from the Cabinet of Washington. His Imperial Majesty has ever thought that Justice, the law of Nations, and the general interest in having the indisputable titles of Sovereignty respected, could not allow the determination of the mother country in this important case to be prejudged or anticipated. On the other side, whenever Spain has wished to discuss the future condition of South America, she has addressed overtures to all the Allied Powers of Europe. It will not be possible therefore for His Imperial Majesty to change principles in this negotiation, nor to institute it separately; and until positive information has been received of the ulterior views of Spain in regard to her American possessions, of her decision upon the proposition of the United States, and of the opinion of her Allies in relation to the same subject, Russia cannot give a definite answer.
>
> She is however, in the meanwhile, pleased to hope, that the United States becoming every day more convinced of the evils and dangers that would result to Cuba and Porto Rico from a change of government . . . will use their influence in defeating as far as may be in their power, every enterprize against these islands. . . .[19]

This equivocal epistle, which seems to exhibit more anxiety toward inducing the United States to protect the Spanish islands than zeal to end the war, was hailed with great joy by the American officials. Both Middleton and Rufus King regarded it "in substance" as favorable to the American request.[20] Middleton, in fact, was exuberant, supplementing

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[18] "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington," p. 562.

[19] MS. Despatches, Russia, X, No. 49 inclosure; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 850; Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, III, 1875-1876; British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 410.

[20] MS. Despatches, Russia, X, No. 49, 27 August / 8 September 1825; Manning, III, 1877.

his official report with a private and unofficial note to Clay couched in the following optimistic tone:

You will learn from my despatch of this date all that I can officially tell you—I cannot refrain, however, from adding that I beg leave to congratulate you upon the *prospect which appears to me* to open of your succeeding in obtaining the Russian mediation between Spain and the new American States. Matters looked very discouraging when first the proposal was made, but your paper having been admirably translated into French, so as to preserve all its original force, was forwarded to the different Allied Courts, where it was much admired. I know positively that Prince Metternich approved of your proposal; and as France no doubt wishes something of the kind (which however cannot with propriety come from her) and as Prussia assents to everything which is agreeable to the majority of the Allies, I consider the question as settled. *The advice will be given* provided Pozzo di Borgo does not get up some Hobgoblin Spectre to prevent it—I feel almost assured too that *it will be accepted;* for from some communications which I have had with a person who must be nameless, I know that some of the King of Spain's Friends who are at the same time friends of their country, will back the advice by every effort in their power. The answer of the Russian Government has been so long delayed that I fear you will not receive it before the meeting of Congress. I was obliged to be a little importunate to get it even late as it came. But I think a good deal has been gained by the delay, as at first the proposal seemed to be not a little staggering.[21]

Middleton's interpretation was accepted by President Adams who agreed that it was not likely that Alexander would take any steps before consulting his allies. As to the Russian note, despite Canning's confidently expressed opinion to the contrary,[22] he considered that "although very guarded it

[21] MS. Despatches, Russia, X, 27 August/8 September 1825; Manning, III, 1877-1878.

[22] Canning assured Rush that "the United States are grievously mistaken if they imagine that the Emperor of Russia is upon this —as perhaps they may have found him upon other matters—open to the blandishments of flattery, so far as to be led to use the influence he possesses, and is proud to be thought to possess in Europe, in a direction quite different from that which his principles, his prejudices, and perhaps his interests prescribe. . . . I see no very great temptation to induce the Emperor of Russia now to change the course he has advisedly chosen; and to expose himself to the just reproaches of Spain, for having urged her on in her blind folly, until she was ruined past reparation, and then when her ruin has been accomplished, turning round and urging her to tread back her steps —too late.

"Every human motive, I confess seems to me to conspire to keep the Emperor of Russia in the path he has chosen; and though I dare say that the usual appeals to his magnanimity, generosity, power, predominance etc. etc. etc. while having soothed him and

authorizes the belief that the preponderating influence of Russia has been thrown into the scale of peace." [23]

At this juncture the ousting of Spain from the mainland of America was practically completed by the capture of the fortress of San Juan d'Ulloa at Vera Cruz by the colonials. When this event was made known to Clay he was afraid lest the attack on Cuba would be delayed no longer. De Tuyll also expressed anxiety, and in accordance with his request,[24] on December 20, Clay attempted to forestall hostile action on the part of Colombia or Mexico by presenting to their representatives at Washington identical notes informing them of the efforts of the United States to obtain the mediation of Russia, and requesting them to suspend all plans against the islands until the Tsar had had time to act.[25] Poinsett and Anderson, our ministers at Mexico City and Bogotá respectively, were also ordered to urge a policy of delay, and to inform the Mexican and Colombian governments that Baron de Tuyll "corroborates and supports the views which Mr. Middleton presents of the effect of the appeal to the Emperor of Russia." [26] These efforts on the part of the United States were made known to Middleton who was ordered to report them to the Tsar and, in order to prevent any procrastination on his part, to warn him that although we desired no change in the status of Cuba and could not tolerate its transfer to any European power, yet, if Spain should prove obdurate

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won him on former occasions, will soothe him still—they will (in my opinion) not win him to any other system of action in respect to Spain and her late colonies."

Canning proposed a tripartite exchange of notes between France, Great Britain, and the United States whereby these three powers would guarantee Cuba to Spain. Clay refused this proposition, claiming that it would encourage Spain to prolong the war since she apprehended danger to Cuba not from the new states but from the very powers who would be signatories of this agreement. With the danger of attack from them removed, Spain would continue the struggle indefinitely. (Manning, I, 254-260; III, 1557-1560).

[23] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, X, 424, No. 2, 26 December 1825; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 850-851.

[24] Adams' Memoirs, VII, 88.

[25] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 851; Manning, I, 263-264; British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 414.

[26] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, X, 426, 30 December 1825.

there was "no justifiable ground" on which we could interfere to prevent Colombia or Mexico from occupying the island.[27]

Meanwhile Everett's reports from Madrid gave scant reason for hope that either his own efforts with the Spanish government or those of Russia would meet with any success. In September, according to instructions, he had made his first overtures to Zea Bermudez, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, but while his plea for peace had been courteously received, he was given to understand that Spain would never voluntarily relinquish the colonies.[28] In November, however, the reactionary Zea was succeeded by the Duke del Infantado, whose professions of liberalism led Everett to hope that his representations would be more sympathetically received. In this, however, he was predestined to disillusionment; for feeling in Spain was such that it would have been impossible for any minister to favor recognition of the colonies and still retain his office.[29]

Thus all solicitations were without effect; the Spanish government was impervious to all appeals. In fact, it did not even deign to reply formally either to the Russian or the American proposals.[30] Thus Russia, waiting fruitlessly for an answer, made no report of the result of her intercession to the United States in consequence of which the latter government, besides condemning the stubbornness of Spain, began to suspect the sincerity of the Tsar and his representative at Madrid. Unfortunately, in October, 1825, d'Oubril, the Russian representative in Spain, had told Everett that "he was not completely satisfied that an immediate recognition was the true policy . . . and was far from being sure that

[27] Ibid., p. 424, No. 2, 26 December 1825; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 850; British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 412.

[28] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 795-797; Manning, III, 2066-2070.

[29] Chevalier Paez, Spanish minister to Russia, told Middleton that "the king could not sit upon his throne if he should venture upon such a step." (MS. Despatches, Russia, XI, 2/14 July 1826).

[30] MS. Despatches, Spain, XXVI, No. 34, 20 May 1826; Manning, III, 2119-2120.

. . . internal divisions . . . might not bring them [the colonies] again under the Spanish government." [31] He assured Everett, however, that despite his personal opinion in the matter, he had presented the American proposal to Zea, as his government had ordered, and had assured the Spanish minister that the Tsar "did not feel himself at liberty to interfere in the business without an invitation from the King; but that he should always be ready, upon such invitation being given, to offer his advice and to employ his good offices." Since tendering this offer, said d'Oubril, he had been in constant expectation of receiving some sort of reply, but so far none had been forthcoming. In consequence he had on several occasions "recommended very earnestly that the subject should be taken up and that something should be done."

In spite of this assertion, Everett was inclined to believe, as was the British representative, Mr. Lamb, "from the whole tenor of his conversation that he encourages them in regard to the probability of recovering the Colonies or at least of retaining an influence over them in one way or another. . . . In fact, it is next to impossible, that with his opinions he can converse with the Duke at all upon the subject without producing upon him an effect of that kind." [32] On June 2, Everett reported:

> I had another long conversation on the subject two or three weeks ago with the Russian Minister. Mr. d'Oubril has received no new instructions; and in fact the attention of his government has been and still is too closely occupied by affairs at home of a pressing character to leave much time for looking abroad to another world. This gentleman continues to take great interest in the progress of events in America, and often converses with the Ministers about them. He probably does not advise this Government directly to persevere in the present system; but no doubt encourages them in regard to their prospects, and by sharing in their delusion assists in some degree in keeping it up. There is little hope, I fear, at present, that the influence of Russia will be exercised here in favor of peace.[33]

[31] MS. Despatches, Spain, XXV, No. 10, 20 October 1825; American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 797.

[32] MS. Despatches, Spain, XXV, No. 25, 24 February 1826; Manning, III, 2107-2111.

[33] MS. Despatches, Spain, XXVI, No. 36, 2 June 1826; Manning, III, 2126-2127. D'Oubril was not insensible of Everett's distrust, for he protested to his government that the American minister was

A month later, Everett, in consequence of another conversation with d'Oubril, reiterated his belief that Russia, while she may possibly have presented the request of the United States, was far from zealous or persevering in her advocacy of peace. He reported that d'Oubril had informed him that he had recently received new instructions which ordered him to urge upon Spain anew

> the propriety of giving an answer to the overtures which he had made. . . . He is also directed [wrote Everett] to present to this Government as a further motive for receiving those proposals on the part of the United States and Russia with attention that the President has endeavored to dissuade the governments of Mexico and Colombia from attacking the Islands and for the present at least with success. In pursuance of these instructions Mr. d'Oubril has accordingly urged the Duke [del Infantado] to give him an answer on the subject, but hitherto without effect.

This conversation apparently convinced Everett of d'Oubril's honesty, for he now attributed the failure of the attempted mediation to insincerity on the part of the Russian government. Referring to d'Oubil he said: "I am satisfied that he will be guided wholly by his instructions and that from the moment that he shall become satisfied that his government is really anxious to bring about a pacification on the basis of mutual independence, he will exert himself warmly and actively in promoting their views." [34]

Influenced by these unfavorable reports, Clay himself became suspicious of the conduct and purposes of the Tsar. Was it not possible that Russia, without ever having had any intention of counselling Spain to adopt a policy of peace, hoped, by pursuing a policy of procrastination, to trick the United States into maintaining the inviolability of Cuba? At any rate Clay determined to ascertain just what Russia had done. On April 21, he ordered Middleton to "ascertain from the Russian Government what has been done by it . . . if

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under the "false impression" that Russia, and he in particular, were preventing Spain from recognizing the independence of the colonies. (Golder, Guide to Materials for American History in Russian Archives, p. 106).

[34] MS. Despatches, Spain, XXVI, No. 42, 13 July 1826; Manning, III, 2134-2135.

anything, and what it conceives to be the prospects in future." [35]

Meanwhile, Tsar Alexander I had died (December 1, 1825), and for several months the attention of Nicholas, his successor, was engrossed in the supression of a military revolt occasioned by the change of rulers.[36] Nevertheless, according to Middleton, the "individual and private opinion" of the new monarch was "favorable to the course which the United States desired him to pursue," and it was hoped that after the internal disorder had been quelled he would "deign to continue the work of pacification commenced by the deceased Emperor of glorious memory." [37] Hence, when Middleton received Clay's instructions (July 7) ordering him to find out what Russia had done, he immediately sent Nesselrode a note requesting an audience with the Tsar; for the death of Alexander necessitated the presentation of new credentials to the new emperor before he could officially continue his functions as minister. July 18, Middleton received a response in the shape of a private note from the count requesting him to call at his country residence the next day. Upon presenting himself there he was most cordially received, Nesselrode delivering a polite message from Tsar Nicholas wherein the monarch expressed regret that, due to his attendance at the military maneuvers and the necessity of preparing for his impending journey to Moscow, he would be unable to grant him an audience until his arrival at that place. Middleton could, perforce, do nothing but agree to a postponement of his audience; but upon being informed by Nesselrode that Nicholas wished him to consider himself as fully accredited, he informed the count of the subjects committed to his charge. He reminded him of the object of the United States in urging Colombia and Mexico to defer their attack on Cuba, and informed him that we had as yet received no official information of any attempt on the part of Russia to persuade Spain

[35] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, XI, 23, No. 3, 21 April 1826; Manning, I, 273-274.
[36] MS. Despatches, Russia, X, Nos. 51, 53, 57.
[37] Ibid., No. 56, 28 February / 12 March 1826.

to accept peace. This silence was rendered more inexplicable, said Middleton, because the Russian note of September 1 had been of such a nature as to lead the United States to hope that intercession would be employed.

Nesselrode answered without hesitation that the proposition of the United States, accompanied by observations intended to ensure its being favorably received, had been forwarded without loss of time to Madrid; but that no answer had been received as yet, a circumstance which he could explain only by the difficulty of coming to a decision upon so weighty a matter.[38]

Encouraged by these assurances of good faith, Middleton now requested Russia's aid in an attempt to bring about a suspension of hostilities in America. This request was the result of a note of March 19, 1826, from Colombia in which that country, evidently despairing of securing a definitive peace, petitioned the United States to use its good offices in inducing Spain to agree to an armistice for ten years.[39] This proposal was made known to Everett who was instructed to bring it to the attention of Spain.[40] Middleton was also informed of it and ordered to request the cooperation of Russia in persuading Spain to accept it. Accordingly, he now presented the request to Nesselrode. The count expressed his gratification that such a proposal had been made by Colombia, and his subsequent conversation convinced Middleton that he believed personally that Spain should accept it.

At his suggestion, Middleton prepared a memorandum embodying the wishes of Colombia and the United States and on the following day, July 20, sent it to the Foreign Office. Ten days later he wrote Clay, "Upon the whole, I feel confident that although this Government, to be consistent with its own declared principles, would never forestall the determination of the Parent country, yet does it by no means countenance a farther persistence on the part of Spain, in her blind

[38] Ibid., XI, No. 63, 18/30 July 1826; Manning, III, 1882.
[39] Ibid., II, 1297-1298.
[40] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, XI, No. 5, 13 April 1826; Manning, I, 271-273.

and narrow policy, and on occasion of the proposed armistice, I have great expectation that she will be strongly urged to accede to it." [41]

Nevertheless, for many weeks things seemed at a standstill, until on September 9, Middleton was accorded his long deferred audience with Tsar Nicholas. At this event Middleton expressed the hope that the Tsar's policy would lead to some effective step to end the American war. Nicholas' response, however, was unencouraging and indefinite. As Middleton reported, he "replied with vivacity, that after what his Brother the late Emperor had done, and knowing his own opinions upon the subject, I could not doubt of the language he should hold, and he understood that all we wished of him was to give pacific counsel; but he added modestly, a Sovereign who counts scarce 30 years of age and who has reigned but a few months, cannot expect much deference to be paid to his opinions." [42]

During all this time no answer was given by Spain; nor was anything further heard from Russia. Even Middleton, who had great faith in the integrity of the Russian government, began to doubt that it had done anything at Madrid. September 12, he again called Nesselrode's attention to the Colombian armistice proposal, and showed him a note from Colombia wherein that country expressed surprise and regret that, in spite of the efforts of the United States and those alleged to have been made by Russia, Spain still persisted in the war. Then, fearing that the American states could be restrained no longer, and that their congress at Panama, which was then drawing to a close, would result in an immediate attack on the islands, Middleton presented a last appeal to the count:

> Perhaps, Sir [he said], it would still be possible to avert the last blow . . . if His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas is pleased at this moment to join his solicitations to those of the other allied and neutral powers, in order to induce Spain to receive the proposition

[41] MS. Despatches, Russia, XI, No. 63, 18/30 July 1826; Manning, III, 1881-1882.

[42] MS. Despatches, Russia, XI, No. 64, 5/17 September 1826; Manning, III, 1884.

of an armistice lately made at Madrid by the interposition of the United States; an armistice which might naturally pave the way for a definitive accommodation.[43]

Finally, on September 20, Middleton had another conversation with Nesselrode which dispelled all his doubts of Russia's sincerity and convinced him that

the counsels of Russia to Spain have been pacific. It can only have been by some misapprehension that the Russian Minister at Madrid has been supposed adverse to peace. It may be from his care not to seem to anticipate the determination of the mother country upon the subject of the Independence of her Colonies, his conduct may have appeared doubtful to those who were not in the secret; but it is nevertheless certain that his instructions from the late Emperor Alexander were, to urge the Cabinet of Madrid to consider well its position in relation to the ci-devant Colonies—a position becoming every day more critical, and to prepare to make the sacrifices called for by the march of events. . . . I feel satisfied too that Mr. d'Oubril has faithfully performed his duty, but with so much discretion and with so little success as to be suspected of having taken a different course.[44]

The same courier who brought this missive to Clay brought to Baron Maltitz, Russian chargé d'affaires at Washington, the official explanation, so long awaited, of what Russia had done. This explanation, which Clay received November 30, supported Middleton's interpretation. It said:

Incorrect tokens only could have induced the Cabinet of Washington to think that the Minister of the Emperor at Madrid encouraged the Spanish Cabinet to accept no proposition of accommodation with her ancient Colonies.

The instructions, with which the Emperor Alexander furnished M. d'Oubril in that regard, recommended to him, on the contrary, to invite the government of His Catholic Majesty seriously to consider the position in which circumstances had placed him towards his American provinces, to banish from his examination illusions daily more dangerous, to appreciate the causes of the conduct of the United States, and, as it did not belong to Russia to take the lead of the determination of Spain, to let her know them as soon as possible in order that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg might communicate them to that of Washington. These instructions have been scrupulously executed by M. d'Oubril; they were founded on the just respect with which the rights of Spain have inspired Russia, and on the impossibility of giving more positive counsels to an independent State and on a question, if I may be allowed the expression, vital, which he had it in his power to resolve at his will.[45]

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[43] MS. Despatches, Russia, XI, No. 63, 30 August 1826; Manning, III, 1883.

[44] MS. Despatches, Russia, XI, No. 66, 8/20 September 1826; Manning, III, 1885.

[45] MS. Notes, Russia, II, 18/30 November 1826; Manning, III,

We know now what Clay could not be certain of then; namely, that in regard to the proposal that the Tsar should offer his mediation between Spain and the colonies, the above explanation of Russia's policy was correct. Let us see just what Russia had done. September 4, 1825, about a month after Clay's note of May 10 had been submitted to him by Middleton, Nesselrode sent d'Oubril a copy of Clay's note, together with an explanation of its contents and a copy of the Tsar's reply to the United States.[46] D'Oubril was ordered to present these documents to the Spanish foreign secretary, and to discuss the matter confidentially with him. He was to explain that Spain herself was the best judge of her future policy, that Russia did not intend to exert any pressure upon her or to attempt to settle the matter for her without her consent, but that Alexander was ready, if asked, to help her to a decision in any way. In accordance with instructions, d'Oubril presented these communications to the Duke del Infantado, explained the policy Russia would pursue, and in subsequent interviews pressed for a reply in order that his government might render some sort of report to the United States.[47] This was all that Russia had done; but even this was quite a departure from the policy of uncompromising repression which Alexander had been pursuing in Europe. Although he was reluctant, no doubt, to abandon Spain, it is evident that his advice, if requested, would have been to let the colonies go. And for this reason Spain showed no inclination to request it.

What had induced the Tsar to change his policy in regard to Spanish America and, by giving Spain to understand that she could expect no military aid from him, to admit that the policy of repression which the Holy Alliance imposed upon Europe should not be extended to America? In the first place, the opposition of Great Britain and the United States

1886. It should be noted that this explanation refers only to what Russia had done with respect to the mediation proposal. Nothing is said about the armistice proposal.

[46] Above, pp. 50-52, 54.

[47] Golder, p. 106.

made it useless for Russia, with her weak navy, to think further of giving active support to Spain. Then too, Alexander's attention was diverted from America by the revolt of the Greeks against the Turks; and his aversion to revolution was greatly decreased because of his sympathy for the struggles of his co-religionists in Greece. Finally, and most important, Russia had always looked upon the United States as a potential ally against Great Britain. It was to her interest to keep the United States and the mother country apart at all times. Once already, in the case of the Monroe Doctrine, a rapprochement had been brought about between the two countries by the threat of intervention in Spanish-America by the Holy Allies. Continued support of Spain by Russia, or even an unqualified refusal to comply with Clay's request to interpose in the interest of peace, might have brought them together again. Thus Alexander, although loath to champion actively the cause of Spanish American independence, did modify his policy in that he ceased to encourage Spain.

When the United States asked the cooperation of Russia in securing the acceptance by Spain of the Colombian armistice proposal Alexander had ceased to reign, and the attitude of Nicholas, his successor, was all that the United States could have desired. His desertion of Spain was complete, and without equivocation he gave orders that she should be advised to accept the proposal as made by Colombia and sponsored by the United States. This advice was embodied in a note sent to d'Oubril August 4, 1826, which ordered him to assure the Spanish cabinet that a truce "seems to the Emperor much to be desired and for the good of Spain." Evidently Nesselrode never doubted that this instruction would be scrupulously obeyed; for on September 18 he informed Baron Maltitz, at Washington, that Russia was urging Spain to accept the Colombian proposal.[48]

This, however, was not the case. The Tsar's advice was never proffered by d'Oubril. At this time Spain was deeply

[48] Ibid., p. 49.

involved in Portuguese affairs, and the whole attention of the ministry was concentrated upon avoiding war with Great Britain over these matters.[49] On October 5, d'Oubril informed his government of this situation, and reported that since there was no danger of an immediate attack on Cuba or Porto Rico he would defer presenting the Tsar's advice until a more propitious time.[50] Such an occasion evidently never came; for on April 4, 1828, Everett, in consequence of a conversation with d'Oubril, reported that the Russian minister's "instructions since the accession of the Emperor Nicholas have been more precise than they were before . . . but in consequence of the troubled state of the Peninsula, and the absence of the King he has had no opportunity of acting upon them." [51] Thus d'Oubril, by his own admission and in spite of instructions to the contrary, exerted no pressure to induce Spain to agree to a truce.

Yet there is no reason to accuse d'Oubril of duplicity. He was thoroughly familiar with conditions in Spain, and knew the obsession and bigotry of government and populace on the colonial question. Hence he must have been convinced of the futility of attempting to alter their opinions, and must also have realized the antipathy toward his own country which such attempts would have engendered. Russia, more than any other power, had encouraged Spain to continue the colonial struggle. Insistence now upon a change of policy would have accomplished nothing, and would have meant the loss of all Russian influence at Madrid.

Thus the failure of Clay's efforts was in no way attributable to deceit or subterfuge on the part of Russia. It is to be explained rather by the inherent obstinacy of Spain, and by the aversion of both Alexander and Nicholas to employing any semblance of coercion against her. President Adams was highly pleased with Russia's explanation of her actions, and through Clay expressed his gratification that both Alexander and Nicholas had seen fit to work for peace. Clay admitted

[49] Stapleton, II, 144.
[50] Golder, p. 107.
[51] MS. Despatches, Spain, XXVII, 4 April 1828.

that "information from Madrid did, at one time, create some apprehensions that the humane intentions of the Emperor Alexander were not seconded with sufficient zeal by his Minister at that capital," but avowed that these apprehensions were now completely dissipated.[52]

Not only Russia and the United States, but Great Britain, France and Austria also, had been urging Spain to give up the struggle; but the blindness of the latter power rendered all their efforts nugatory.[53] On April 19, 1827, Everett reported that due to quarrels which had broken out among the Spanish American states "the dominant party are less inclined than ever to acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies"; [54] while on the 30th of the same month Middleton asserted that all hope of persuading Spain "to adopt the measures suggested by reason must be abandoned." [55] Consequently, neither the United States nor Russia made any further attempts to intercede in Spain.

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[52] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 23 December 1826; Manning, I, 278-279.

[53] Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, p. 152.

[54] MS. Despatches, Spain, XXVII, No. 76, 19 April 1827.

[55] MS. Despatches, Russia, XI, 18/30 April 1827.

CHAPTER V

The Commercial Treaty of 1832, and the Proposed Treaty of Neutral Rights

Despite the friendly relations subsisting with Russia, the repeated efforts of the United States to secure a commercial treaty with that country had thus far been completely unsuccessful. At one period, during the Napoleonic Wars, when Russia, allied with France against England, was dependent upon American ships for the transportation of her products, Tsar Alexander had shown signs of deferring to the wishes of the United States. But just when John Quincy Adams, then minister to Russia, was confident that a treaty was at last about to be signed, Alexander had deserted Napoleon and allied himself with England. Supposedly on the best of terms with England, he dared not then grant any trading privileges to the United States which he was unwilling to concede to her also.[1] Thus negotiations were broken off, and Russia reverted to her traditional attitude. Subsequently both Campbell and Middleton attempted to conclude a treaty, but little progress was made.

Besides seeking to conclude commercial treaties with all nations, the United States gave consistent support to the protection of neutral rights upon the sea, attempting to establish and extend them by means of treaties with all the maritime powers. In 1823, Adams, then secretary of state, attempted to secure such treaties with England, France, and Russia; but each power avoided committing itself to a direct obligation.[2] Russia, however, since the days of the Empress Catherine and the League of Armed Neutrality, had championed the cause of the weaker maritime powers against the aggressive pretensions of Great Britain, and hope was still entertained that her refusal, which was less categorical than those of England and France, was not final, and that at some

[1] Hildt, "Early Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Russia," pp. 52-55.

[2] 33rd Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 3-25.

future time, when she was less afraid of offending Great Britain, she might consent to conclude a treaty.

In 1829, Andrew Jackson became president of the United States, and shortly thereafter Henry Middleton was recalled from St. Petersburg and John Randolph of Roanoke was sent there in his place.[3] Randolph was ordered to reopen at once both the question of a commercial treaty and that of neutral rights. It was realized that the conclusion of an agreement on the latter subject would be sure to give umbrage to Great Britain who reserved to herself the right to dictate maritime law. But that was a matter of small moment to the intrepid Jackson and the faithful Van Buren, his secretary of state. If they could secure the support of Russia they were willing to defy the mistress of the seas. Indeed, Van Buren was confident that

> The steady and progressive increase of that arm of national defense which constitutes a favorite and popular item in the policy of this country; and the new facilities afforded to the Russian navy by the Emperor's conquests in the East, must, before long, give them a preponderance in the naval concerns of the world, capable of counterbalancing that of the other powers whose views may differ from those entertained by Russia and the United States. If future events should require them again to arm in defense of neutral rights and the freedom of the seas, their combined fleets . . . will give them power and influence adequate to the maintenance of the principles they shall have asserted, and which those of the Law of Nations have given them the right to enforce.[4]

Luckily, perhaps, Tsar Nicholas entertained a more wholesome respect for the power of Great Britain and, as we shall see, was unwilling to venture as far as Jackson and Van Buren. Yet he was sincerely desirous of preserving good relations with the United States. In September, 1829, he informed Baron Krudener, his new envoy at Washington,[5] that

[3] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, XIII, No. 12, 16 June 1830.

[4] Ibid., p. 118, No. 1, 18 June 1830; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, p. 46.

[5] Krudener succeeded de Tuyll (who died in 1826) in October, 1827. He had already served at Berlin and Paris. In 1824 he had been attached to Count Capodistrias, who was then employed in reconstituting Switzerland. According to Middleton, he was a man of wit and understanding, just and liberal, and possessed of high standing and influence in court circles in Russia. (MS. Despatches, Russia, 23 September/5 October 1827).

he was willing to negotiate with the United States in respect of maritime and commercial matters provided only that the relations of the two countries did not assume a character which would be displeasing to Great Britain.[6] As further proof of his regard for the American republic, Nicholas ordered Count Orlov, his representative at Constantinople, where his recent defeat of Turkey gave him paramount influence, to give his official aid to the American plenipotentiaries who were attempting to secure a commercial treaty with the Porte.[7]

The selection of Randolph for the Russian mission was exceedingly unwise. His vehement nature, vindictive tongue, bodily infirmities, and delicate mental balance rendered him totally unfit for a foreign post.[8] Perhaps it is just as well that his stay in St. Petersburg was short. He left Norfolk on June 26, 1830, and arrived at the Russian capital on August 10, after a voyage "unprecedented at the same season of the year for the tempestuous and cold weather."[9]

Randolph lost no time in communicating with the Russian government, and on August 12 was courteously received at the Foreign Office by Prince Lieven, temporarily in charge of foreign affairs due to the illness of Nesselrode.[10] But from the first he despaired of success. Lieven, who was ambassador at London, was notoriously pro-British and was completely dominated by his imperious spouse, the celebrated Princess Dorothea, who was even more attached to Great Britain. Against this combination Randolph had no hope of attaining his purpose.[11] Then too, a recent revolutionary outbreak in Paris had reawakened the Tsar's justifiable dread of republican principles, and there was scant hope, at least according to

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[6] Golder, Guide to Materials for American History in Russian Archives, p. 55.

[7] Ibid.; MS. Notes, Russia, II, 16/28 April 1830.

[8] William C. Bruce, John Randolph of Roanoke, I, 651.

[9] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, 1 August 1830; Bruce, I, 638. It was probably also unprecedented in the fact that the doughty scion of Roanoke, citing his commission as minister, claimed to be in command of the man-of-war which conveyed him, Captain Matthew Calbreath Perry to the contrary notwithstanding.

[10] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 2, 31 July / 12 August 1830.

[11] Ibid., 7/19 August 1830.

Randolph, that at this juncture he would prove amenable to any request from a government founded on those dangerous precepts.[12] Cognizant of these obstacles, Randolph determined to act with caution. Accordingly it was not until October, when Nesselrode resumed his functions, that he communicated to the Foreign Office a proposal for a treaty of maritime rights.[13]

But Randolph's frail constitution was already succumbing to the ravages of the approaching Russian winter, and by December he was so ill that he decided to seek temporarily a milder climate. Accordingly, leaving John Randolph Clay, his secretary of legation, in St. Petersburg, he repaired to London.[14]

Clay worked sedulously to obtain a reply to Randolph's proposal; but the revolutions in France and Belgium,[15] an outbreak of the dreaded cholera, and finally a revolt in Poland absorbed the entire attention of Nesselrode.[16] Knowing that under such circumstances nothing could be accomplished and fearful lest Clay's youthful zeal might lead him to take some step which would permanently impair our chances of success, Van Buren ordered Clay to do nothing until Randolph's health should permit him to return to St. Petersburg and give the negotiations his personal attention.[17] Unwilling, however, to forego any opportunity which might lead to success, Van Buren hastily rescinded this injunction, leaving the future conduct of negotiations to the discretion of Randolph. But if any steps were taken, Clay was to be merely the agency of communication; all initiative and every decision was to emanate from Randolph himself.[18]

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[12] Ibid., No. 2, 31 July/12 August 1830

[13] Hugh A. Garland, The Life of John Randolph of Roanoke, p. 338.

[14] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, 30 August/11 September 1830; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H .Doc, No. 111, pp. 47-48; MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, XIII, No. 4, p. 194, 2 December 1830.

[15] Below, p. 83.

[16] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, 24 November/6 December 1830.

[17] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, XIII, No. 5, p. 210, 10 January 1831.

[18] Ibid., No. 6, p. 213, 19 January 1831.

With Randolph in London, such an arrangement was obviously not conducive to success. In spite of laborious exertions Clay was able to secure nothing except a promise from Nesselrode that as soon as circumstances permitted the imperial ministry would send an answer to Mr. Randolph through Prince Lieven, who had returned to London.[19] Meanwhile, as Randolph's health had shown no sign of improvement, he had been granted permission to return home.[20] This he accepted with eagerness, and in September, after appraising Lieven of his intention and apologizing for his inability to present his letter of recall to the Emperor, he embarked for the United States.[21]

Meanwhile, President Jackson had offered the post at St.

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[19] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 3, 15/27 January 1831; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 49-51.

[20] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, XIII, No. 10, 227, 23 May 1831.

[21] Bruce, I, 659-661. This mission was the occasion of many strange tales concerning the colorful Randolph. Many of these must be ascribed to the malice of enemies, but some were doubtless true. We can hardly believe the story that at his first audience with the Tsar he greeted His Imperial Majesty with the hearty salutation, "How are you, Emperor? How is madam?" Equally inconceivable is the assertion that he was so impressed with the atmosphere of the court that he "plumped down on his knees before the Empress of Russia" to the great amusement of that lady and her attendants. Yet it must be admitted that Randolph's explanation of this latter accusation seems a trifle thin. According to Washington Irving, Randolph explained it as follows: "In advancing, as one of his legs is contracted, and somewhat shorter than the other, he limped with it in such a manner that he supposes the Emperor thought he was about to bend one knee, as he made a movement as if to prevent such a thing and said: 'No! No!' Randolph, however [said Irving], is too well informed on points of etiquette and too lofty a fellow to have made such a blunder. I have no doubt, however, that he has left behind him the character of a very rare bird." (Bruce, I, 638-643).

Randolph's enemies used his long absence from his post as a pretext for a violent attack on him in Congress, attempting to strike out of the general appropriation bill the salary of the minister to Russia on the ground that that post had been vacant. (Register of Debates, VII, 483-667). Niles' Register referred to him as our "wandering minister" whose "appointment to any place in which he might be expected to attend to business was hardly thought of." (Vol. XL, 1832, pp. 80, 394). For Randolph's defense see Garland, p. 339. Randolph was also accused, probably unjustly, of peculation. (Henry Adams, John Randolph, p. 296; Niles' Register, XL, 1831, p. 308; cf. Bruce, I, 648-649).

Petersburg to James Buchanan of Pennsylvania. Fearful lest his ignorance of French would be too great a handicap [22] and loath to go to such a distant land, Buchanan hesitated, but finally yielded and accepted the mission in June, 1831.[23] On June 2, 1832, he arrived in St. Petersburg, and ten days later had his first audience with the Tsar who received him in an unusually cordial manner.[24]

And well he might. In fact the situation in Europe was such as to lead the Tsar to cultivate the best possible relations with the United States. It had appeared for some time that Russia might become involved in war with Great Britain over Poland. In 1815 the Treaty of Vienna had given a large part of Poland to Russia. But Polish aspirations for independence were strong, and in 1830 long smouldering discontent burst into seething flame of revolt. Immediately in England a hostile and insulting clamor broke out against the Tsar.[25] Constantly importuned by Polish agents,[26] both the French and British governments protested against any infringement of Polish rights by Nicholas. The former power, in fact, proposed joint intervention in behalf of the Poles,[27] but the moderation of Palmerston and Grey, who rejected all suggestions of armed interference, kept the struggle localized. Nevertheless, for some time the danger of a European war was great, and in such circumstances it seemed, to Buchanan at least, that Nicholas might not be averse to humoring the United States by the concession of a commercial treaty.[28]

Another factor pointed toward success. For some years Russian sea captains had been annoyed by desertions of sailors from Russian merchant vessels in American ports. Due to

[22] French was the diplomatic language of the Russian Empire.

[23] The Works of James Buchanan (ed. John Bassett Moore), II, 173-175. The appointment was not made public until March of the following year.

[24] Ibid., p. 197.

[25] Letters of Dorothea, Princess Lieven (ed. L. G. Robinson), p. 309; Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, XII, 1115-1151.

[26] Memoirs of Adam Czartoryski (ed. Adam Gielgud), 2d ed., II, 303-327.

[27] British and Foreign State Papers, XXXVII, 1416-1421.

[28] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 4, 29 June 1832; Buchanan's Works, II, 210-216.

the lack of any treaty of extradition between the two countries it was difficult to apprehend these men. Influenced by the loud complaints of the captains of his merchantmen, the Tsar had already expressed a desire for a pact to regulate the extradition of deserting sailors in the same manner that it was regulated in our commercial treaties with France and Prussia.[29] By judicious procedure such a pact might be expanded into a treaty of commerce.

In spite of her aversion to commercial treaties, Russia had always pursued a liberal policy in regard to foreign ships. The only discrimination practiced against American vessels was in the matter of tonnage duties. Russian ships were required to pay these only once a year, while foreign vessels were compelled to pay them every time they entered a Russian port.[30] In reality, however, this rule worked no hardship on American vessels; for, due to the slowness of the ships and the short season during which the Russian ports were free from ice, few vessels had been able to make the long voyage to Russia more than once a year. Now, however, things seemed about to change. In his first interview Buchanan told Nesselrode that "American vessels were quick sailers and that some of them had made two voyages during the last season between the United States and St. Petersburg. At this . . . [Nesselrode] expressed surprise. I then added [reported Buchanan] I doubted not, a greater number would perform the same feat during the present season, that such a spirit of emulation existed among the Americans, what one had accomplished many would attempt." Yet in this interview Buchanan did not enter into any prolonged discussion, for he wished to make himself thoroughly familiar with the subject before going into pertinent details. Buchanan was convinced that the only way a treaty could be extorted from the Tsar was by stressing the advantages which would accrue therefrom to Russia. Yet, in his own mind, he was certain that it was the United States which stood to profit most. "Give to American Navigation an open sea and equal advantages with that of other Nations,"

[29] MS. Notes, Russia, II, 27 May 1831.
[30] MS. U. S. Ministers Instructions, XIII, 191, 20 June 1830.

said he, "and the whole civilized world must now admit, that we can surpass every competitor." [31]

Before consulting Nesselrode again, Buchanan sought out Baron Krudener, the Russian minister to the United States, who was home on leave at this time and whose aid, if it could be enlisted, would be invaluable. But Krudener was not encouraging. Russia, he said, had adopted a very liberal system in regard to foreign commerce, and he perceived no necessity for a treaty. He did, however, advert to the fact that in a recent treaty with France we had reduced the duty on French wines, and intimated that if we would grant similar concessions to Russian hemp the imperial ministry might be more favorably disposed toward the project. Buchanan explained that this reduction on wines had been made in return for France's favorable treatment of American cotton; Russia could grant us no equivalent "because she took scarcely any of our productions." Krudener admitted that this was so, but expressed the belief that this condition would soon be remedied by the rapidly increasing manufactories of Russia which would soon demand a large amount of cotton. Krudener was careful to make it plain that in thus encouraging Buchanan he was speaking only in his private capacity. He had not consulted Nesselrode on the subject, and had no idea as to what his attitude would be.[32]

A week later Krudener returned Buchanan's call. Both his views and manner had changed considerably, and it was evident that he had been talking to Nesselrode, although he did not mention that fact. He spoke now as though a treaty might be arranged, and asked if the United States would be willing to include in it a provision for restoring deserters from Russian ships. Without this, he said, Russian trade with the United States would be impossible. Buchanan having assured him that such a stipulation would be satisfactory to his government, Krudener now complained that Russia was much annoyed by the tariff act of 1828—the famous Tariff of

[31] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 2, 12 June 1832.
[32] Ibid., No. 4, 29 June 1832; printed in part in 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 58-59.

Abominations—and expressed the hope that on his return to Washington he (Krudener) might be instrumental in having the duties on iron and hemp reduced. Buchanan assured him that any representations from the minister of the Tsar would be treated with the utmost respect.[33]

Next day, June 22, Buchanan, according to appointment, called on Nesselrode, and after some preliminary conversation, alluded to the proposed commercial treaty. Nesselrode immediately apologized for not having taken the matter under advisement sooner, but declared that the troubles over Poland and Belgium [34] had taken all his time. He promised to examine immediately the proposals which Randolph had left in his hands, and asked if President Jackson still wished to conclude both a commercial and a maritime treaty. Upon being assured that he did, he requested Buchanan to communicate any views that he might have on those subjects.

> A favorable opportunity being thus offered [reported Buchanan], I embraced it with all the ability in my power and endeavored to impress upon him the great advantages which Russia must derive from the conclusion of a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce with the United States. He listened to me with profound attention, and from his inquiries as I proceeded, he seemed desirous, that his want of a perfect knowledge of the English language should not prevent him from understanding every part of what I said. . . . When I concluded, he assured me of the strong disposition of the Emperor to cultivate the most friendly relations with the United States, and said he would see what could be done in relation to this matter, at the same time expressing a hope that it might be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

Nesselrode then asked if the American tariff was to be reduced in the present session of Congress. Buchanan assured him that the rapid extinction of the national debt would necessitate reductions on some articles, but whether hemp, the chief Russian export to the United States, was among these or not "would probably make but little difference to Russia; that although we could raise the article equal to any in the world our farmers had hitherto evinced an unwillingness to waterset it, and that until they would do so, we should continue to

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[33] Ibid.
[34] Below, p. 83.

use Russian hemp, both for our Navy, and our commercial Marine." [35]

Nesselrode now took up the question of a treaty of neutral rights, asking what principles the United States wished to include in such a pact. Buchanan replied that "as it would be a Treaty of great importance, and might, by its example, have a powerful influence upon other nations, we desired it should be framed with much care and contain such provisions only as could be defended before the world." Of course it should include the principles that free ships make free goods and that neutral goods on enemy ships are not subject to capture. It should also attempt an enumeration of articles contraband of war, and define a lawful blockade.[36]

"What will England say to that?" asked Nesselrode.

Buchanan replied that the agreement concerned only Russia and the United States, and England would have no right to object. Nesselrode agreed that this was true, but it was obvious that he had no desire to incur British displeasure. Accordingly, Buchanan enumerated the countries with which the United States already had such treaties, and in conclusion reminded the count that "the policy of the United States and Russia had always been of the same liberal character in regard to the protection of neutral commerce, and that we had adopted in their fullest extent . . . the principles of the Armed Neutrality." Nesselrode seemed much impressed, and in concluding the interview requested the American envoy to present in writing the views just set forth.[37]

Accordingly, on June 26, Buchanan submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office. As to the commercial treaty, he expressed satisfaction with the present treatment of American commerce by Russia, and pointed out that the United States also dealt gently with Russian trade, permitting Russian vessels with Russian cargoes to enter under the same

[35] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 4, 29 June 1832.

[36] Middleton's instructions on the same subject had contained a provision whereby capture of private property at sea and the use of privateers would have been prohibited. Randolph's and Buchanan's instructions did not contain this provision.

[37] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 4, 29 June 1832.

duties as those imposed on American ships. Only when carrying foreign products were Russian vessels discriminated against. He then tried to show how the treaty, by encouraging commerce between the two countries, would stimulate Russian agriculture and manufactures, train Russian seamen, and aid in developing the provinces around the Black Sea.[38]

The day after presenting this note, Buchanan called on Krudener, who informed him that the note had been turned over to him with orders to prepare a report upon it for the Tsar. He spoke with approbation of some of Buchanan's arguments, and seemed particularly impressed with the one concerning the Black Sea regions. He also spoke admiringly of our commercial treaty with Austria, a copy of which Buchanan had submitted as a model. As far as Krudener was concerned, the conclusion of a commercial treaty seemed assured. But he was less enthusiastic about a treaty of neutral rights. Russia, he said, had little interest in this; she had only a small merchant marine and did not doubt that her rights would be respected by all belligerents. Nevertheless, as Russia had always professed and acted upon the principles set forth in the project of the United States, he supposed that there would be no objection to embodying them in a treaty.[39]

On July 5, Buchanan received a copy of the tariff bill which had just been reported to the House of Representatives by the Secretary of the Treasury. Finding that it recommended substantial reductions in the duties on hemp, sail duck, and iron, our chief imports from Russia, he lost no time in dispatching a note to Krudener informing him of this favorable development. Krudener called the next day, expressed his approval of the proposed bill, and discoursed at length on the good influence it would have on Russian-American trade. He said that he had forwarded Buchanan's note to Nesselrode, who was so pleased with its contents that he had gone to Peterhoff[40] that very day to consult with Tsar Nicholas about it.

[38] Ibid., 14/26 June 1832; Buchanan's Works, II, 205-210.
[39] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 4, 29 June 1832.
[40] A palace outside St. Petersburg.

At this juncture, when success seemed very near, affairs took an unfavorable turn. On July 10, Buchanan called on Krudener to see if any new developments had occurred, for the baron was acting as a sort of go-between for Buchanan and the Foreign Office. But on this occasion, much to his surprise, he was treated with exceptional coolness. Upon a table was a letter from Mr. Krehmer, a member of the Russian legation in Washington; and Krudener was apparently very anxious that this missive should be seen by Buchanan. He also informed the puzzled American, with obvious intent, that important despatches from Baron Sacken, chargé d'affaires at Washington, had recently been received. It was clear that the Russian government was displeased about something; for Krudener, contrary to his custom, did not return Buchanan's call for more than two weeks. Meanwhile, Buchanan, who had received no newspapers or despatches from the United States for weeks, was completely in the dark as to the cause of this change of attitude.

It was not until August 1 that Buchanan, upon calling at the Foreign Office, learned the cause of Russia's resentment. Nesselrode had evidently been watching events in Washington with care,[41] for he informed Buchanan that he had received several despatches from Sacken relative to the progress of the new tariff bill. At this point Krudener, who was also present, took up the conversation. He said that an amendment less favorable to Russia had been proposed, and asked if Buchanan had received any news of this. Buchanan professed complete ignorance of events in the United States, whereupon Krudener offered to give him a copy of this portion of the despatch. He then continued. The proposed commercial treaty, he said, had already been submitted to the Russian minister of finance, who would be more apt to favor it if he knew that a tariff bill favorable to Russia had been passed by the United States.

By this time Buchanan was convinced that he would get no definite reply to his proposal until after the passage of the

[41] Golder, p. 58.

tariff bill, the nature of which would determine his own failure or success. Nevertheless, he was absolutely opposed to buying a commercial treaty by making tariff concessions to Russia, and was afraid lest he should be embarrassed by a direct proposal of this sort. In such an event he was determined to refuse, for, said he, "I cannot conceive any policy more pernicious than to bind ourselves by Treaty to a foreign nation, in such a manner, as to prevent Congress from freely legislating at all times upon the great interests of the nation."[42] In fact, Buchanan was a staunch advocate of high duties; in 1824 and again in 1827, while in Congress, he had warmly defended a high duty on hemp, the very article on wnich the treaty hinged, in order not "to give the growers of the article in Russia an exclusive monopoly of our market" thereby rendering ourselves dependent upon a foreign nation for an indispensable naval store.[43]

In the latter part of August, Buchanan received news of the passage of the tariff act with the duties on iron, hemp, and sail duck materially reduced. He lost no time in informing Nesselrode of this fact, but for some time received no reply, and his hope sank to low ebb.[44] Finally, on October 22, he received a note from Nesselrode in which, to his consternation, both the proposal of a commercial treaty and that of maritime rights were rejected. As to the former, Nesselrode asserted that there was now no need for a treaty since, by a law of 1830, Russian, like foreign ships, were required to pay tonnage duties every time they entered a Russian port. Thus the last discrimination against foreign ships had been removed. As to the treaty of maritime rights, it was the Tsar's belief that such a treaty, between two countries only, could be of little benefit.[45]

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[42] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 6, 9 August 1832; Buchanan's Works, II, 221-230.

[43] Annals of Congress, 18th Cong., 1st sess., II, 1888-1893; Register of Debates, 19th Cong., 2d sess., III, 747-749.

[44] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 7, 8/20 August 1832; Buchanan's Works, II, 232-236.

[45] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 8, inclosure A, 10/22 August 1832; Buchanan's Works, II, 244-247; printed in part in 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 59-60.

As Buchanan learned later, the rejection of the commercial treaty was due entirely to the opposition of M. de Blondoff, minister of the interior, and Count Kankrin, minister of finance. The latter was especially hostile, and his advice on any measure which would effect a change in the revenue of the empire had great weight with the Tsar. Nesselrode, however, was heartily in favor of a commercial agreement, and it was at his secret instigation that Buchanan, instead of accepting the Russian refusal as final, drew up a reply in which he attempted to refute all the Russian objections. This action was brought about as a result of a conversation, on October 22, which Buchanan reported as follows:

> Toward the conclusion of the interview he [Nesselrode] laid aside altogether, or at least appeared to do so, the wary diplomatist, and his manner became frank and candid. He made the request, and repeated it at least twice, that I should submit a new proposition for the conclusion of a commercial treaty . . . impressing it upon me to advert especially to the trade with the Black Sea, and the moral influence, to use his own expression, which such a treaty might have on the people of the United States.

The argument in regard to the Black Sea regions was recognized by both Buchanan and Nesselrode as being particularly potent. Indeed, it is very probable that it was this argument which was responsible for Nesselrode's warm support of the American proposition. The count owned large tracts of grazing land in the Crimea,[46] and, while he had always been friendly toward the United States, it is not at all certain that he would have favored the concession of a commercial treaty had Buchanan not pointed out how such a treaty might stimulate trade with the Black Sea ports and consequently enhance land values in that region. It is highly probable that other high officials, few of whom were immune from motives of self-interest, had secured lands there and in the territory recently conquered from Turkey. Thus the Black Sea argument, if properly presented, could be made to exercise a peculiar appeal.

At any rate, Buchanan accepted Nesselrode's advice, drew up a note, and sent it confidentially to the count for approval

[46] Buchanan's Works, II, 225.

before presenting it formally to the Foreign Office. On October 24, Baron Brunow, an under-official of the Foreign Office and a close friend of Nesselrode's, called on Buchanan, expressed the count's satisfaction with the general tenor of the note, suggested a few minor changes in phraseology, and urged Buchanan to maintain strict secrecy as to Nesselrode's part in the affair. Having agreed to all Brunow's suggestions, Buchanan expressed surprise at Russia's rejection of the treaty of neutral rights. The President, he said, would not be prepared for this, especially since he had initiated negotiations primarily because of a note of August 28, 1828, from Krudener, which assured the secretary of state that the Tsar was ready to conclude such a treaty.[47] He showed a copy of this note to Brunow, who expressed surprise at its contents. He had never seen it before, he said, and doubted whether Krudener had ever submitted a copy of it to the Foreign Office. He was certain, in fact, that in making such an assertion Krudener had exceeded his instructions, which had probably authorized him merely to express the Tsar's desire to concur in the principles upheld by the United States.

In his note of October 22, Nesselrode had based the rejection of the treaty proposal upon the uselessness of such a compact between two powers only.[48] In answer, Buchanan informed Brunow that we already had similar treaties with Prussia, Sweden, and Holland, and in the event of war between Russia and one of those powers, the property of Russian subjects would be immune from capture on American vessels. Brunow replied that there was no danger of war with any of those states, and that we had no treaties with the maritime powers, England and France, with whom Russia was most likely to come in conflict. Brunow then departed, assuring Buchanan that he would report to Nesselrode nothing except what related to the commercial treaty, and that after that was disposed of, Buchanan himself could present his arguments for a maritime treaty. Buchanan evidently

[47] This note is printed in 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 42-43.

[48] Above, p. 80.

had little faith in Brunow's reticence, for he wrote to Edward Livingston, now secretary of state, "No doubt he repeated every word."

Nor did Buchanan believe that the Russian note set forth the true reason for the rejection of the maritime treaty. This he attributed to the fact that the Russians were unwilling, at this time, "to recognize by Treaty any principles of public law which might be disagreeable to England. There is no doubt," he reported, "that all their energies, for some time past, have been directed to detach England from France and France from England." [49]

This, in fact, was the policy of the Tsar. Events in western Europe made him especially anxious to retain the friendship of Great Britain and to prevent a rapprochement between her and France. The Treaty of Vienna, in 1815, had made Belgium a part of the Kingdom of Holland. Such a union was distasteful to the Belgians, who, in August, 1830, asserted their independence. Such conduct was regarded as a direct defiance of the Holy Alliance, which prepared to crush the revolt. France, however, sympathized with the Belgians; and she and Great Britain, who also favored them, forced Austria, Prussia, and Russia to consent to a conference at London where the independence of Belgium was subsequently recognized.[50] But the Dutch and Belgians were unable to agree upon terms of separation, and in 1831 fighting broke out again. In the following year, a Dutch invasion of Belgium was followed by a counter-invasion by France.[51] The great importance of Belgium to both England and France, and the suspicion of France which this action engendered in Great Britain made the situation most delicate. In such circumstances it was the policy of Nicholas to widen the breach between England and France, and to draw the former over to the side of the Holy Alliance. If this could be accomplished

[49] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 8, 19/31 October 1832; printed in part in 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 60-62; and in Buchanan's Works, II, 253-263.

[50] De Martens, Nouveau Recueil des Traités de l'Europe, XI, 390.

[51] Ibid., XIII, 29-51, 57-58.

the Belgian revolt could be quickly crushed, and the principles of legitimacy reasserted.

That this was the real reason for Russia's rejection of the maritime treaty was attested a year later when Buchanan, on his way back to the United States, met Pozzo di Borgo in Paris. This gentleman, anxious that the American should return home with the best of feelings towards his country, assured him that "the reason why Russia did not accede to this treaty . . . was the delicate relations between them and England. Such a treaty at this time would set England in a flame. Russia was but a second-rate naval power. She agreed, however, entirely with the principles maintained by us, and at the proper time would assert them in the same manner as if she had entered into the treaty." [52]

Personally, Buchanan was not at all disappointed by his failure to secure this treaty, for he was not certain that it was to the best interest of the United States to conclude agreements of this nature.

> Should Russia assume an attitude of defiance towards England and France [he wrote], it is more than probable she would agree to treat with us concerning Maritime Rights. But ought we then to desire it? My mind never was directed to this subject, until since my arrival in St. Petersburg, and from the best reflection I have been able to give it, I fear we may yet have cause to repent that we have concluded so many treaties of this character.
>
> If we had such a Treaty with Russia, and she should be engaged in war with England, upon the capture of any American vessel having the goods of her subjects on board, she would be the first Power to call upon us to assert those principles of maritime law which we had thus sanctioned. She might say, you eagerly solicited us to adopt these principles by Treaty, and why do you not maintain them against other Nations? It is true the Treaty does not expressly bind you to cause them to be respected by England, but it does assert your general maxims of maritime law and we have a right to expect you will not suffer them to be violated with impunity. Might it not become an entangling alliance? . . . The days of our feebleness have passed away, and it is perhaps a doubtful policy now to adopt measures in peace which must arrest the free and vigorous action of our naval power in war. . . . There is but little danger that any nation will hereafter act towards us with the same lawless violence which we experienced from both the principal belligerents, previous to our late war. Our power will hereafter afford us the best security against such outrages.[53]

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[52] George T. Curtis, The Life of James Buchanan, I, 224.
[53] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 8, 19/31 October 1832.

But if Buchanan doubted the wisdom of concluding a maritime treaty, he was still anxious to secure a commercial agreement. Accordingly, about an hour after Brunow's departure he sent back to Nesselrode his amended note concerning that pact.[54] On the night of October 30, he received a gratifying and rather unexpected reply informing him that the Tsar had at last decided to sign a treaty.[55] Early next morning Buchanan presented himself at the Foreign Office, where he found Nesselrode "in fine spirits and in the most frank and candid mood." But despite the count's assurance that the treaty would now be concluded without further delay,[56] three weeks more elapsed before anything of importance was done. Finally, on the night of November 21, Buchanan met Nesselrode at a "party" where the count, drawing the American aside, said he "was now ready for him" and would send him a project of a treaty which had been drawn up by the Foreign Office. On Saturday (November 24), Buchanan received this project, and a request to call at the Foreign Office the following Monday.

On that day the final details of the treaty were decided upon. Buchanan readily assented to most of the provisions of Nesselrode's project, but there were two features to which he objected. In the first place, he noticed that the Russians had omitted that article which stipulated that the respective parties should not impose higher duties upon the products of each other than they imposed upon similar productions of any other nation—the "most favored nation" principle. Buchanan said that he was surprised at the omission of this article, and proceeded to point out the advantages which Russia, by reason of her increasing exports to the United States would derive from it. Due to the fact that American ships, for the most part, carried sugar and other West Indian products, rather than domestic goods, to Russia, our exports to that country (during 1830) were valued only at $35,461, while the value of Russian

[54] Ibid., inclosure C, 11/23 October 1832; Buchanan's Works, II, 247-251.
[55] Ibid., p. 252.
[56] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 8, 19/31 October 1832.

products imported into the United States was $1,621,899.[57] Thus, said Buchanan, Russia would gain much more by the insertion of this article than would the United States. Nesselrode and Brunow, who was also present, were surprised to learn that we took so many Russian products and that they imported comparatively few of ours. As they were obviously none too familiar with the subject Buchanan, with the aid of documents, launched into a lengthly disquisition in which he showed that American ships carried two-thirds of all the products, except bar iron, which were exported from St. Petersburg. Such facts were a revelation to the Russians, who were visibly impressed and readily agreed to the inclusion of the article in question.

Buchanan's second objection to the treaty as drawn up by Nesselrode was to the fact that the count had limited its duration to four years. After lengthy discussion, Nesselrode yielded on this point also, consenting to keep the treaty in force from year to year unless one year's notice of a desire to discontinue it was given by either party. After further discussion on minor points the plenipotentiaries adjourned, and Buchanan was convinced that the Russians were now as anxious for a treaty as was the United States.

But his belief did not seem to be borne out by events, for another long wait now ensued. Finally, on December 12, Buchanan urged Nesselrode to make haste in order that the treaty might be forwarded to the United States in time for the Senate to ratify it before adjournment in March. At this point Buchanan had a happy thought which expedited considerably the future course of events. Tsar Nicholas' birthday occurred on December 18, and Buchanan suggested that this would be an appropriate day on which to sign the treaty. The Russians, ever anxious to cultivate the favor of the Tsar, who was not impervious to such little niceties,

[57] As to our exports, Buchanan erred either in his statement to Nesselrode or in his report to Livingston, for our domestic exports to Russia at this period must have been in the neighborhood of $350,000, since a report of the secretary of the treasury for the year ending September 30, 1831, placed them at $347,914. (Niles' Register, XLIII, 155-167).

heartily approved the suggestion, and their dilatory tactics now gave place to eager haste.[58] On the day suggested the treaty was ready for signature.

Up to this point the strictest secrecy had been maintained. Nesselrode had expressed the desire that England particularly should know nothing of what was going on. As long as Russia hoped to detach England from France on the Belgian question she had no desire to alienate English sympathies by conceding to the United States a thing which she was unwilling for Great Britain to have. The temporizing policy which the imperial government had pursued for the past few months is probably explained by this fact. But all hope of separating England and France seemed recently to have disappeared, for on October 22 the two powers had signed a treaty which defined their future attitude on the Belgian question and asserted their determination to act together in support of Belgian independence.[59] The Tsar was undoubtedly chagrined. He no longer cared what England thought of a Russo-American treaty. He gave his consent to it, and used the occasion of its signature to vent his disappointment upon the British minister, the mild and unsuspecting Mr. Bligh. On the morning of December 18, Nicholas held the usual levee to commemorate his birthday, and the events which then took place are best told by Buchanan.

> The Diplomatic Corps, according to etiquette, were arranged in a line to receive the Emperor and Empress, and Mr. Bligh, the English Minister, occupied the station immediately below myself. You may judge of my astonishment when the Emperor, accosting me in French, in a tone of voice which could be heard by all around, said, "I signed the order yesterday that the Treaty should be executed according to your wishes," and then immediately turning to Mr. Bligh asked him to become the interpreter of this information. He is a most amiable man, and his astonishment and embarrassment were so striking, that I felt for him most sincerely. This incident has already given rise to considerable speculation among the knowing ones at St. Petersburg; probably more than it deserves.

After the ceremony, when Buchanan relieved Bligh's anx-

[58] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 9, 20 December 1832; Buchanan's Works, II, 271-289.

[59] British and Foreign State Papers, XIX, 258-265.

iety by assuring him that the treaty referred to by the Tsar was commercial, not political, in character, the American and Count Nesselrode proceeded to the Foreign Office, and there signed the treaty.[60] Buchanan forthwith sent it to the United States in care of J. R. Clay, his secretary of legation, and it was immediately ratified by the Senate.[61]

Buchanan would have preferred to abandon further attempts to secure a treaty of neutral rights, but Livingston ordered him to make a final effort in this direction.[62] But the Tsar was again making advances to England, and was unwilling to risk offending her. Thus Nesselrode could give Buchanan no encouragement.[63] Buchanan, meanwhile, had asked for and received permission to return home. On August 5, he had his audience of leave with the Tsar, who expressed deep regret at his departure, and assured him that his conduct had given him genuine satisfaction. A few days later he sailed for the United States.[64]

But while the bonds of friendship were being reinforced in St. Petersburg, they were stretched taut in Washington. In August, 1830, Baron Dimitri von der Osten-Sacken had been appointed Russian chargé d'affaires during Krudener's absence.[65] Shortly thereafter, the revolt in Poland assumed threatening proportions, and the American newspapers, dependent upon French and English sources for European news, printed numerous articles, some none too authentic, denouncing the policy of the Tsar.[66] Nicholas naturally resented this,

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[60] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 9, 20 December 1832; Buchanan's Works, II, 271-289.

[61] W. M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and other Powers, p. 933.

[62] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 17, 22 May 1833; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 64-65.

[63] Ibid.

[64] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 22, 7 August 1833; Curtis, I, 212-216.

[65] MS. Notes, Russia, II, 16 August 1830.

[66] For the opinions of different American ministers on the character and policy of Tsar Nicholas see F. S. Rodkey, "The Opinion of Three American Diplomats on the Character of Tsar Nicholas I," in the Slavonic Review, December 1927.

and on December 22, 1831, Sacken was ordered not to try to fight public opinion on the Polish question, but at the same time to see that the American government gave no official approval of any demonstration in favor of the Poles.[67]

At this time the Washington Globe, although privately owned, was considered the official organ of the administration. Unfortunately, this paper took up the cudgels of liberalism in defense of Polish aspirations, and Sacken, imbued with Russian ideas as to the power of government over the press, regarded its statements as emanating from the administration itself. Accordingly, he drew up a note of protest, more pungent than discreet, which he showed unofficially to Livingston, the secretary of state, who was then in New York. Livingston made no objections to Sacken's phraseology,[68] so the baron, returning to Washington ahead of the Secretary of State, on October 14, 1832, officially submitted his note to Brant, who was in charge of foreign affairs during Livingston's absence.[69] Immediately trouble began. Sacken's communication was undoubtedly offensive in tone. Worse than that, it imputed insincerity to President Jackson, whom it charged with encouraging abuse of Tsar Nicholas while at the same time professing friendship for him.[70]

Jackson acted with unusual forbearance, however, and Livingston, hoping that Sacken, after reflection, would withdraw the note, and conscious no doubt of his own negligence and therefore loathe to rebuke the Russian chargé, delayed for two months before answering the communication. At last, on December 4, he sent a strong remonstrance to Sacken, pointing out the most offensive part of his note—that in which the President's honesty was traduced—and asserting that "no further explanations . . . can be entered into, until an imputation so injurious to the reputation of this Government, and so inconsistent with its sincere professions of amity for Russia, and respect for its sovereign, shall be with-

[67] Golder, p. 57.
[68] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 21, 31 July 1833.
[69] MS. Notes, Russia, III, 14 October 1832.
[70] Ibid.

drawn." [71] After sending this, Livingston waited another month, confident that a disavowal of any intentional offense would be made. But none was forthcoming; so on January 3, the facts were reported to Buchanan, who was ordered to bring the matter to the attention of the imperial government.[72]

When this was done, Nesselrode, ever friendly to the United States, expressed regret at the occurrence, assured Buchanan that Sacken could not have meant to offend the President, and reminded him that the note had been submitted to Livingston in New York before being formally presented, and that no objection had been made by him. Nevertheless, the count made no attempt to defend the language of the note, and assured Buchanan that Sacken would soon leave the United States.[73] Thus the question was allowed to drop; but Buchanan, mindful of Russian sensitivities, suggested that the editor of the Globe be requested to refrain from further statements about Poland, and that he salve the Tsar's feelings by an appropriate recognition of that monarch's good feeling toward the United States as evinced by the conclusion of the commercial treaty.[74]

For some time after Buchanan's departure from St. Petersburg the United States continued to try to win Nicholas over to a treaty of neutral rights. William Wilkins, who succeeded Buchanan, was ordered to take up the matter but in view of the numerous Russian refusals hesitated to reopen discussion.[75] On January 27, 1835, he did mention the matter to Nesselrode; [76] but he did not expect a favorable reply, for Tsar Nicholas was still "reluctant to ruffle England." Only by first securing the acceptance of our principles by England, said Wilkins, could we hope to secure their public support by Russia.[77]

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[71] Ibid., 4 December 1832.
[72] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 1, 2 January 1833.
[73] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 15, 26 February 1833.
[74] Ibid., No. 10, 20 December; Buchanan's Works, II, 298-305.
[75] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 3, 27 December 1834.
[76] Ibid., No. 4, 15/27 January 1835.
[77] Ibid., No. 6, 23 May/4 June 1835; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 75-76.

In August Nesselrode left to take the waters at Carlsbad, and Prince Lieven was called home from London to take charge of the Foreign Office. Wilkins tried to accomplish something through him, but he would do nothing in the absence of his superior.[78] In November Nesselrode returned, and at last, on November 24, Wilkins' patience and pertinacity were rewarded by a note, polite but disappointing, reading as follows:

> There have existed, with regard to the questions of public right which the United States is desirous to have settled, various and even contradictory theories, which have more than once occasioned disagreeable collisions. Of what use, therefore, would be a convention destined to resolve these questions, merely between two powers, separated by great distances from each other, and whose interests are far from being the same, other than to render more complicated the discussions which may arise respecting these questions? In the opinion of the Imperial Cabinet such a convention could not lead to really useful results until it had received the assent of all the Maritime Powers, and especially of those which, like the United States, have a direct and national interest in maintaining certain principles relative to the rights of neutral flags. . . .
>
> The Emperor will consider himself happy in being able at some future period, with the concurrence of the Powers in alliance with Russia, to join the United States in a negotiation the result of which would be beneficial to humanity. The Imperial Government, however, under the persuasion of an entire reciprocity on the part of the United States, does not hesitate to give formal assurance that in case of a war in which the United States should be engaged, the Russian vessels will be ordered carefully to abstain from every act at variance with the rules of strict neutrality, and also that whenever Russia may have to maintain a war with a third power, the Imperial Navy will receive orders to observe the most favorable principles with regard to commerce towards the flag of the United States.[79]

This note finally silenced the United States. The subject was not brought up again until the outbreak of the Crimean War.

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[78] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 8, 15 August 1835; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 76-77.

[79] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 14 inclosure, 12/24 November 1835; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 111, pp. 77-79.

CHAPTER VI

Russian America Closed to American Trade

The expiration of Article Four of the Treaty of 1824 gave rise to a prolonged and at times acrimonious controversy between the United States and Russia; for the treaty, without that article, was interpreted in a widely different manner by the two governments. It will be remembered that the Treaty of 1824 declared that (1) citizens of the two countries should have unrestricted liberty to frequent and trade with the natives on the unsettled coasts of northwestern America, (2) citizens of either country could not resort to places where there were settlements of the other without first securing permission from the authorities, (3) Americans could make no further settlements north of fifty-four degrees forty minutes, and Russians could make none south of that line, (4) nevertheless, for a period of ten years, citizens of either country might reciprocally frequent "without any hindrance whatever, the interior sea, gulfs, harbors and creeks . . . for the purpose of fishing and trading with the natives of the country," and (5) trade in liquors, arms, and ammunition was absolutely prohibited.[1]

At the time of signature there was apparently no agreement even between the negotiators themselves as to the effect of the expiration of Article Four. Count Nesselrode construed the treaty as giving Russia absolute possession north of 54° 40′, and considered that the expiration of Article Four would deprive American citizens of any right to visit the coast north of that parallel without Russian permission. In other words, Article Four and Article One were to be considered together; the expiration of the one would abrogate the other. For ten years Americans could enjoy unrestricted trade; after that they would possess no rights other than those which Russia might concede. Writing in defense of the treaty to certain officials of the Russian American Company, July 21, 1824, Nesselrode said:

[1] Above, p. 46.

It is not less advantageous to Russia to be assured by a mutual and amicable convention that after the expiration of ten years the subjects of the United States of America will abstain entirely from visiting the waters of the North American coast beyond 54° 40′ and from fishing and trading there with the native inhabitants; for on the one hand, it would be impossible to suppose that the United States would voluntarily consent to such a concession without any compensation whatever, and, on the other hand, all the wishes expressed to the imperial ministry [by the Russian American Company] are thereby fulfilled after the expiration of a certain period.[2]

Thus, Nesselrode looked upon the treaty as a compromise; if Russia placed no restrictions on American commerce for ten years, the United States would recognize Russia's exclusive jurisdiction after that period.

Far different was the conception held by Henry Middleton, the American negotiator. In reporting the results of his labors Middleton said:

It may possibly . . . be objected, upon a superficial view of the convention, that it surrenders a permanent *right* to a community of trade upon the northwest coast in exchange for a *privilege* which is to expire in ten years. In answer to this objection, I submit that this right must always have been held subject to extinguishment whenever the maritime domain, incident to actual occupation and settlement, shall be acquired by any nation upon those coasts; and I beg leave further to remark upon the same point, that I kept it always in recollection that when the stipulation of the fourth article, for liberty of trading with the natives, shall have expired by its own limitation, these coasts, in so far as they may then remain unoccupied, will fall into the general category of unoccupied places upon the coasts of the great ocean.

The Russian plenipotentiaries have been all along particularly anxious to introduce into the convention a substantive stipulation, that the privilege to trade upon these coasts should absolutely cease after ten years. . . . Such a stipulation I perseveringly resisted in all shapes, declaring that . . . I was not authorized to enter into any stipulation of that nature. . . . With regard to the trade in unoccupied places, as permitted by the permanent articles, I am confident in the opinion that all the shores of the great ocean upon which the parties to this contract have any claim will continue open to them, respectively, for its pursuits under these stipulations.[3]

In other words, Middleton's view, later adopted by the United States government, was that the treaty granted Russia no sovereignty north of 54° 40′, except at places where settlements should be established. All other points were to be con-

[2] Fur Seal Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration at Paris, VII, 157.

[3] Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II, 78-79.

sidered as unclaimed coasts on which the right of unrestricted intercourse was affirmed by international law. Thus Article One conferred no privileges, but simply reasserted a pre-existing right. When places became settled they were to come under the exclusive jurisdiction of Russia, and with them American ships could trade only after securing permission from the Russian authorities. However, by Article Four the privilege of trading with all places, settled or unsettled, was conceded for ten years, after which Americans could trade with the unsettled regions only. Constructions so irreconcilable were certain to lead to controversy when the article in question should terminate.

The Treaty of 1824 with the United States and that of 1825 with England had raised a storm of protest from the Russian American Company which possessed a monopoly of the Russian trade on the northwest coast and also exercised wide governmental powers there. Shortly after the signing of these treaties, certain shareholders of the company, led by Admiral N. P. Mordvinov, entered a strong protest against what they considered an infringement of their rights, and requested that the treaties be annulled.[4] Although unsuccessful at that time, they were determined that when Article Four expired no further concessions should be made to the United States. From time to time the company complained of the actions of American captains, alleging that their competition jeopardized the very existence of the company, and that their sales of arms, ammunition, and liquor to the natives, in controvention of Article Five, made life in those wild regions extremely dangerous.[5] The Russian government, although attaching no political importance to northwestern America,[6] did consider itself bound to protect the interests of the com-

[4] Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 544-545.

[5] Golder, Guide to Material for American History in Russian Archives, p. 17; see for example, "Note from the Board of Administration of the Russian American Company on the conduct, at New Archangel, of the American Captain Cotting," MS. Notes, Russia, II, with Krudener's note to Clay of 12/24 March 1828.

[6] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 16, 11 December 1835; Victor J. Farrar, "The Reopening of the Russian American Convention of 1824," in the Washington Historical Quarterly, XI, 83-88.

pany's stockholders, most of whom were members of the highest class of Russian society, and by 1834 it had adopted completely the company's point of view.

April 17, 1834, Article Four expired; and on that very day two American ship captains were apprised of this fact and ordered to leave the port of New Archangel, one of the principal establishments in Russian America. The Americans refused, declaring that they intended to visit, as before, the anchoring places on the coast until notified by their own government of the cessation of the privilege to do so. Exasperated by this reply, Baron Wrangell, the Russian governor of the territory, on April 27 issued a formal notice that American ships no longer possessed the right to resort to the inland gulfs, seas, bays, and creeks north of 54° 40′.[7]

When news of these events reached St. Petersburg, officials of the Russian American Company immediately petitioned Count Kankrin, minister of finance, to urge the United States government to announce publicly and officially that Article Four was no longer in force.[8] Accordingly, Baron Krudener, who was again in Washington, was ordered to request the American government to take such action, and the armed brig Chicagov, Lieutenant Zarembo commanding, was ordered to the northwest coast with instructions to avoid the use of violence but to prevent all foreigners from resorting to those shores.[9] On May 31, 1835, Krudener reminded the American government of the termination of Article Four, and requested that the American public be informed that unrestricted trade north of 54° 40′ was no longer permitted.[10]

Up to this time the United States had apparently paid no attention to the expiration of the article; at least no attempt had been made to have it renewed. Nor does it appear that John Forsyth, now secretary of state, anticipated any serious difficulty in having the previous arrangement continued. On

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[7] MS. Notes, Russia, III, 19/31 May 1835; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 24-26; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 236-237.
[8] Ibid., p. 232.
[9] Ibid., pp. 233-234.
[10] MS. Notes, Russia, III, 19/31 May 1835.

June 24, replying to Krudener's note, he expressed the keen repugnance of President Jackson toward taking any action which would interrupt an arrangement beneficial to the citizens of both countries. Instead of giving notice that the privileges conferred by the fourth article had come to an end, Forsyth suggested that they be renewed and attempted to sound Krudener as to the probable attitude of the Tsar toward such a proposition.[11] Krudener, pleading lack of instructions, refused to prophesy as to this, and on July 11 again requested that official announcement be made of the expiration of the article.[12]

Finally, on July 21, Forsyth informed Krudener that his request would be granted, and at the same time asked him for information on the measures adopted, or to be adopted, by Russia in regard to the northwest coast.[13] On July 22, notice of Wrangell's warning to American ships was published in the Washington Globe. Still Forsyth anticipated no trouble in having Article Four renewed, and on July 30 ordered Wilkins, in St. Petersburg, to open negotiations with that end in view. He rightly attributed the unfavorable Russian policy to the influence of the Russian American Company, but this, he believed, could be easily overcome.[14]

Wilkins, at St. Petersburg, more cognizant of the machinations and power of the company, was less optimistic than Forsyth. Foreseeing difficulties, he had not waited for instructions, but on September 13, 1835, had addressed a note to Nesselrode defending the treaty as originally signed, deploring the adverse influence of the fur company, asserting his belief that there had been no serious infractions by Americans of the provisions of the treaty in regard to firearms and liquor, and arguing that a continuation of Article

[11] MS. Notes to Russian Legation, VI, 5; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 26-27; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 237.

[12] MS. Notes, Russia, III, 29 June/11 July 1835; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 27-28; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 238.

[13] MS. Notes to Russian Legation, VI, 4, 21 July 1835; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 28-29; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 238.

[14] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 4, 30 July 1835; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 30-31; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 239-240.

Four would obviate collisions in that "wild and distant region," avoid the dangers which would arise from conflicting interpretations of the treaty, and place the United States, Great Britain, and Russia "upon the same fair footing, and upon the same equality, in the enjoyment of a community of privileges." The United States, he said, was not sure that Article One of the commercial treaty of 1832 should not apply to the northwest regions, but he hoped a dispute over this point would be rendered unnecessary by the renewal of Article Four.[15]

Wilkins received Forsyth's instructions of July 30 on September 19, but due to the absence of Nesselrode was unable to begin negotiations for more than six weeks. On November 4, having finally secured an interview, he made a formal request that Article Four be renewed. Nesselrode tried to avoid a direct reply, and said that he was under the impression that the privilege therein granted was of small moment to us since we made practically no use of it.[16] Wilkins immediately contested this assertion, claiming that American ships were annually on the coast, and that their visits helped to furnish the Russian settlements with supplies and had often relieved them in times of scarcity. The count listened with patience, but assured Wilkens that he must consult the Russian American Company before coming to a decision.[17] Wilkins had to be content with this for the present; but when a month passed and he heard nothing further from Nesselrode, he renewed his efforts, suggesting that the two countries sign a convention con-

[15] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 14, inclosure, 1/13 September 1835; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 242-244. Article One of the commercial treaty read: "There shall be between the territories of the high contracting parties a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation. The inhabitants of their respective states shall mutually have liberty to enter the ports, places and rivers of the territories of each party wherever foreign commerce is permitted." Wilkins later admitted that this treaty did not apply to the northwest coast. (MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 16, 11 December 1835).

[16] Ibid., No. 14, inclosure, 23 October/4 November 1835; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 242.

[17] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 14, 23 November 1835; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 39-40.

tinuing Article Four indefinitely, either party to have the right after January 1, 1837, to abrogate the convention on one year's notice. Convinced that Russia's silence was due to the fur company, he pleaded that mere selfish questions of gain merited slight attention in a question which was primarily one of national goodwill. Nesselrode admitted the importance of amicable sentiments, but reminded Wilkins that the Russian American Company had a large amount of capital tied up in America, and that its interests must also be considered. The question, he said, was one of supreme importance, and he deemed it advisable to postpone a definite answer until the return of Governor Wrangell, next season, when a correct understanding of the whole subject could be arrived at.[18]

Such consideration for the company's welfare was recognized by Wilkins as a precursor of failure. As to that organization, he wrote that

> the objects which alone exercise an influence over their proceedings are: exclusive privileges, gain in the traffick upon the coast, and a prevention of all commercial competition. Their claim to these favors from their government rests upon the assumption of many advantages to Russia derived from the trade with north China, the introduction of a great amount of furs into their Empire, the duties paid thereon into the Imperial Treasury, and the profits upon the stock held entirely by Russians, at the head of whom stands the Emperor himself as a stockholder.

As for Baron Wrangell, although a captain in the imperial navy, he held his appointment as governor, and received his salary from the company, and his testimony, believed Wilkins, "will strengthen and increase the indisposition . . . to a revival of the stipulations of the fourth article." [19]

In April, 1836, Wilkins received permission to return

[18] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 16, 11 December 1835; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 44-49; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 246-250. A provision similar to that of Article IV, in the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1825 had also expired, but England had thus far not requested its renewal. Nesselrode promised that if England were given renewed privileges, we should receive the same consideration.

[19] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 16, 11 December 1835; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 44-47.

home,[20] and in August, 1837, George M. Dallas arrived in St. Petersburg to take his place;[21] the duties of the legation being carried on in the interim by Clay. Meanwhile, an occurrence on the northwest coast had brought matters to a head. On August 22, 1836, the American brig Loriot, Richard D. Blinn master, sailed from the Sandwich Islands, bound for the northwest coast to procure provisions and Indians for hunting sea-otters in the north Pacific. On September 14, the Loriot anchored in the harbor of Tuckessan. Four days later a Russian armed brig entered the harbor, and the following day her officers boarded the Loriot and peremptorily ordered Blinn to leave the "dominions of Russia." When he remonstrated the order was repeated. At last, when Blinn still refused to go, armed boats were sent to the Loriot which was ordered to sail to the harbor of Tateskey. This order was likewise ignored by Blinn, but when it was repeated he thought it best to obey. Off Tateskey the weather became threatening and Blinn asked permission to enter the harbor. This was refused, and he was again ordered to quit Russian waters. Further resistance being useless, Blinn abandoned his voyage and set sail for the Sandwich Islands, arriving there November 1. He immediately drew up a protest which John C. Jones, United States consul at Honolulu, forwarded to the secretary of state. It was apparent, wrote Jones, that Russia was endeavoring to claim exclusive jurisdiction north of 54° 40′, and was enforcing her claim with armed cruisers.[22]

According to the American interpretation of the Treaty of 1824, the character of Russia's conduct depended entirely upon whether there were or were not Russian settlements at Tuckessan and Tateskey. If there were, American ships could be legally excluded; if there were not, such exclusion was an unwarranted violation of American rights. Accordingly, Dallas was instructed that his first duty would be to

[20] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, 24 April 1836.
[21] The Diary of George Mifflin Dallas (ed. Susan Dallas), p. 118. Dallas had already been in Russia in 1813 as secretary to Albert Gallatin.
[22] 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 34-35.

ascertain the exact location of the Russian settlements on the northwest coast. Even if the points in question were found to be settled he was to complain of the act of the Russian brig "as one of the most unfriendly character, as the United States has had no official or other notice of the existence of such establishments, and have not, although an application has long since been made for them, ever been furnished by the Russian Government with the regulations consequent on the expiration of the 4th article of the convention proposed to be applied to American vessels resorting to the Russian settlements on that coast." [23]

In choosing to consider this "a most unfriendly act" Forsyth was certainly assuming a high tone; for even the American interpretation would have justified the exclusion of American ships from inhabited points. If no establishments were found to exist at Tuckessan and Tateskey, Forsyth considered that

> this outrage on the Loriot assumes a still graver aspect. It is a violation of the right of the citizens of the United States, immemorially exercised, and secured to them as well by the law of nations as by the stipulations of the first article of the convention of 1824, to fish in these seas, and to resort to the coast, for the prosecution of their lawful commerce upon the points not already occupied. As such, it is the President's wish that you should remonstrate, in an earnest but respectful tone, against this groundless assumption of the Russian Fur Company, and claim from His Imperial Majesty's Government for the owners of the brig Loriot, for their losses and for the damages they have sustained, such indemnification as may, on an investigation of the case, be found to be justly due to them.[24]

In taking this position Forsyth was absolutely correct.

Dallas arrived in St. Petersburg in early August. He had attempted, without success, to secure maps of the northwest coast in London, and his efforts, since his arrival in St. Petersburg, to obtain knowledge from Russian naval officers or officials of the company had been equally abortive.[25] Not until August 27 was he able to ascertain "from a source

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[23] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 3, 4 May 1837; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 33-34.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

entitled to reliance" that no settlements had been made at Tuckessan or Tateskey.[26] Having secured this information, he immediately dispatched a note to Nesselrode remonstrating against the conduct of the Russian naval officers in attempting to prohibit intercourse with regions "yet distinguished by no establishment," and expressed himself as

> unwilling to make . . . the remarks naturally suggested . . . until every reasonable and just opportunity shall have been given to the Russian officers implicated to temper, if possible, their harshness by explanation. His firm confidence in the dispositions heretofore expressed and manifested towards his country precludes his supposing, for one moment, that a proceeding so unfriendly in its nature and circumstances, and so inconsistent with the rights of American citizens . . . was authorized by His Imperial Majesty's Government, or can receive its sanction.

The note ended with a claim for indemnity for the owners of the Loriot.[27]

Despite the sharp tone of this note, six months elapsed before Dallas received a reply, which, when it did come, was a complete rejection of his demands.

> It is true indeed [said Nesselrode], that the first article of the convention of 1824, to which the proprietors of the Loriot appeal, secures to the citizens of the United States entire liberty of navigation in the Pacific Ocean, as well as the right of landing without disturbance upon all points on the northwest coast of America, not already occupied, and to trade with the natives. But this liberty of navigation is subject to certain conditions and restrictions, and one of these restrictions is that stipulated by the 4th article, which has specially limited to the period of ten years the right on the part of the citizens of the United States to frequent, without disturbance, the interior seas, the gulfs, harbors, and creeks, north of 54 degrees 40 minutes. Now this period had expired more than two years before the Loriot anchored in the harbor of Tuckessan.

In view of these facts, and since the Loriot had sailed in spite of public announcement of the expiration of Article Four, the Russian government disclaimed all responsibility for losses incurred by the owners of the vessel.[28]

It was becoming increasingly evident that Article Four

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[26] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 7, 8 September 1837; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 52.

[27] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 7 inclosure, 15/27 August 1837; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 53-54.

[28] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, 23 February (O. S.) 1838; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 57-60.

would not be renewed, and that Russia was attempting again, as she had attempted in 1821, to exclude foreign ships from what she considered to be her shores. As early as March, 1836, J. R. Clay, American secretary of legation at St. Petersburg, had expressed fear that Russia would claim "sovereignty, and as a concomitant thereto an assertion of an exclusive right to trade upon the North-West Coast of America." He was alarmed lest, if Article Four were not renewed, and our right to trade was based on Article One, which applied only to unsettled regions, "unless it be definitively stipulated what shall constitute an actual occupancy of the country . . . this government may endeavor to deprive the citizens of the United States of that trade by making partial settlements." [29] Unless negotiations were expedited, he said, the Russians might attempt to "strengthen the claim to an exclusive trade by adducing arguments founded upon right by prescription besides that of prior discovery" and thus shut out the citizens of the United States entirely.[30]

Forsyth, likewise, feared that Russia would claim exclusive jurisdiction over the territory. Article Three prohibited Americans from making any settlements north of 54° 40′, and imposed similar restrictions on Russian settlement south of that line. To forestall any claim to exclusive possession by Russia, Forsyth wrote to Dallas that in agreeing to this stipulation the United States in no way acknowledged any Russian right to absolute possession above that line, except at settled places. He argued that although Russia agreed not to make any settlements south of the line, this did not give the United States exclusive possession there, for Russia had a similar agreement with Great Britain.[31]

If Russia refused to renew Article Four and persisted in

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[29] This, he said, had already been done to the British, one of whose ships had been barred from the Stikine River by Russians who had built a block-house at its mouth. According to this interpretation of a settlement they could construct block-houses at the mouths of all the rivers and thus exclude foreigners from the whole territory.

[30] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 3, 10/22 March 1836.

[31] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 4, 3 November 1837; 25th Cong., 3rd sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 36-38.

interpreting the treaty in a manner inimical to the commercial interests of the United States, Dallas recommended strong measures. "A refusal to revise their decision," wrote he, "definitively communicated, would seem to invite the United States to the protection of their lawful commerce by forcible means:—an invitation which will not, I presume, however unwelcome, need to be twice repeated." He believed that the Tsar—whom he reported as under the impression that our treasury was bankrupt, that we were on the eve of a war with Great Britain over the Maine boundary, and with Mexico over Texas, and that a civil war was not improbable, and who considered it a propitious moment to expel us from the northwest coast—should be speedily disillusioned.[82]

The tone of Nesselrode's note of February 23 made it clear that the forebodings of the American officials were not without foundation. True, Russia had not yet made any formal claim to exclusive jurisdiction, or definitely refused to renew Article Four. In fact, it seemed that Nesselrode was trying to secure by implication and prescription that which, openly asserted, would have been contested, perhaps to the point of open rupture, by the United States. Yet by this time the Russian purpose was sufficiently evident. Accordingly, in order to make it plain that no far-fetched construction of the treaty would be tolerated, Dallas, on March 17, 1838, sent Nesselrode a note setting forth the interpretation which the United States would put upon the treaty minus the fourth article. He assured the count that the President would be sorry to learn that the Russian naval officers had acted under instructions from their government; then reminded him that the United States had received no answer to its inquiries as to the future Russian policy on the northwest coast. Finally he asserted that, "Had the purport of the instructions, under which the Loriot was seized and driven from her voyage, been communicated, it could not have been allowed to work injury and loss to unoffending persons with-

[82] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, No. 15, 22 January 1838.

out at least being first made the object of candid remonstrance or of precautionary notice." The President, in the absence of notice of the points at which Russian settlements had been made, "could not but view the abrupt proceedings to which Captain Blinn was subjected, as an act, under any aspect, of the most unfriendly character. How far this sentiment will be changed or qualified by unexpectedly finding the slight on the American flag, and the armed opposition to American trade to have been ordered, and to be now sanctioned by the Government of His Imperial Majesty, upon the principles stated, the undersigned cannot venture to forsee."

Finally Dallas admonished that

> In no sense can the Third Article be understood as implying an acknowledgment, on the part of the United States, of the right of Russia to the possession of the coast above the latitude of 54° 40′ north. . . .
>
> The United States can only be considered, inferentially, as having acknowledged the right of Russia to acquire, above the designated meridian, by actual occupation, a just claim to unoccupied lands. Until that actual occupation be taken, the first article of the convention recognizes the American right to navigate, fish, and trade, as prior to its negotiation.[33]

Notes less strong than this have been known to lead to war, yet it is certain that Forsyth did not wish to carry matters that far, but was probably bluffing in the hope that Russia would back down. Yet the United States undoubtedly had a strong case. The contention that Americans still possessed the right to resort to unsettled points on the coast admits of no refutation. The Russian claim that Article Four acted as a limitation on Article One was absurd. As to the correctness of the American hypothesis that Russia had no right to ownership over any territory except settled places, there is more room for doubt, although here too Forsyth made out a strong case.

Despite the logical correctness of Dallas' position and the sharpness of his tone, his note had no effect on the Russian government, and on March 21 Nesselrode definitely refused to renew the fourth article. The execution of the privileges of that article, said he, had been attended by serious incon-

[33] Ibid., 5/17 March 1838; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 60-65.

veniences "really injurious to the prosperity of the Russian establishments." Americans, he claimed, had constantly violated Article Five by selling liquor and arms to the natives. This had occasioned remonstrances which, if continued, might lead to serious disputes. To obviate such unpleasantness as well as to protect the interests of the fur company the imperial government deemed it unwise to renew the article.

> The regret experienced by it on the occasion is, however, diminished [said Nesselrode], by the conviction that the United States would not themselves derive any especial advantages from the longer continuance of these stipulations; since, according to a statement of the navigation in these places, even whilst the fourth article was yet in force, there were never more than four American vessels arrived in the course of a whole year, and that even that number . . . diminished in proportion as enterprises on the northwest coast offered fewer chances of success. It appears evident from this, that the formal renewal of the fourth article could hardly contribute to extend, in a reciprocally useful manner, the commercial relations between Russia and the United States of America; or by consequence, answer the constant solicitude of the Imperial Government to cement more and more, and in a mutual interest, the friendly intelligence which it is always happy to cultivate with the Government of the Union.[34]

In this gentle, but no less firm and final manner, the United States was given to understand that its ships would no longer be welcome north of 54° 40′. Even yet Dallas did not seem to comprehend that Russia was asserting the right to exclusive possession. He wrote to Forsyth: "It will become necessary now to have some distinct understanding as to the nature and range of the act of colonizing which shall permanently vest the dominion in either nation. Without this our commerce in that interesting quarter must be impeded and narrowed, and probably soon entirely destroyed, by the absurd pretensions of the Russian Fur Company." [35]

On May 9, Nesselrode made his position plainer by reminding Dallas that American vessels were now excluded absolutely from the interior waters north of 54° 40′, by confirming Wrangell's order of 1834, and by inviting the United

[34] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, 9/21 March 1838; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, pp. 68-70.

[35] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, 14/26 March 1838; 25th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 71.

States government to warn its citizens not to contravene that prohibitory notice.[36]

It is inconceivable that the United States government, ever ready to oppose any abridgment of its commercial rights and with an undoubtedly strong case, should have acquiesced in a construction so prejudicial to the interests of its citizens. Yet, despite the high tone which he had assumed for awhile, Forsyth made no further effort to contest the Russian view—a fact which can be explained only by the urgency of more important issues or because American trade with the region was, as President Van Buren said, "too inconsiderable to attract much attention." [37]

American sea captains, however, must have treated the Russian prohibition with little respect. From 1842 to 1845 the Russian American Company complained frequently to the Russian government that their trade was injured by the activities of American whalers.[38] Finally conditions became so bad that the Russian government protested to the United States. Bodisco,[39] the new minister at Washington, presented a note to Buchanan, now secretary of state, asserting that notwithstanding the order of Governor Wrangell there had been repeated encroachments by American vessels upon Russian territory, and warning that for the United States "to tolerate longer such a state of things would be to aid in the ruin of the Russian establishments, to contribute to the demoraliza-

[36] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIII, 13 May 1838. About this time, according to a statement made in the House of Representatives by Nathaniel Banks, July 1, 1868, the United States offered to settle the controversy by purchasing the Russian territory. I have been unable to find any documentary evidence to support this statement. (Congressional Globe, 1867-1868, part 4, p. 3662).

[37] Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, III, 488. Victor J. Farrar, in his article "The Background of the Purchase of Alaska," in the Washington Historical Quarterly, XIII, 93-104, attributes the firm stand taken by the United States to expansionist fervor. He thinks that we hoped not only to wrest the Oregon country up to 54° 40′ from Great Britain, but by reasserting our claim north of that line, to secure the whole Pacific coast. Control of Congress by Southern interests, which desired expansion to the south rather than to the north, was a factor contributing to the abandonment of our claim.

[38] Golder, pp. 19, 70.

[39] Alexander Andravich Bodisco was appointed minister in 1837, and held this post until his death, in 1854. He became very popular in Washington, and married an American woman.

tion of the native population and to provoke painful and inevitable collisions." He gave notice that a cruiser patrol would be established "to maintain the prohibition against American vessels, resulting from the expiration of the 4th article of the convention of 1824." [40]

Again the United States supinely acquiesced, Buchanan meekly agreeing that the cruiser patrol "cannot but contribute to keep up the excellent relations existing between the two countries." [41] No further attempt was made to protect our commercial rights on the northwest coast until March, 1850, when Secretary of State Clayton, influenced by the growing interest in the Russian territory manifested in California and Oregon, tried unsuccessfully to revive the old argument that Article One of the commercial treaty of 1832 was applicable to Russian America.[42]

Even before this time, Russia's interest in the territory had begun to decline, and in 1840 the Russian American Company had leased a large strip of territory on the coast to the British Hudson's Bay Company.[43] The United States was greatly perturbed, for a while, at what it feared was an extension of British territory.[44] In fact, Bodisco advised against the lease on the ground that the United States might think that it had been turned out of the Russian territory in order to let England in.[45] For a while it seemed that trouble might develop,[46] but when convinced that the transaction was a lease and not a transfer, the United States made no further protest. But the lease of this tract to the British company marked the beginning of the end of Russian dominion in America.[47]

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[40] MS. Notes, Russia, III, ? July 1845.
[41] MS. Notes to Russian Legation, III, 25 September 1845.
[42] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, 32; Golder, p. 72.
[43] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIV, No. 3, 21 July 1840; Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 555-559; Thomas W. Balch, The Alaska Frontier, pp. 39-47.
[44] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 2, 2 June 1840.
[45] Golder, p. 65.
[46] Ibid., p. 66.
[47] Clarence L. Andrews, "Russian Plans for American Dominion," in the Washington Historical Quarterly, XVIII, 83-92.

CHAPTER VII

Relations During the Crimean War

The enervating climate of St. Petersburg, and the expense incident to residence at the most sumptuous court in Europe, where lavish expenditure for social purposes was demanded by diplomatic etiquette, prevented the Russian mission from being generally sought after. Unless engaged in important negotiations, few of our ministers remained long in Russia; and this was especially so in the period from 1839 to the outbreak of our Civil War. Dallas left St. Petersburg in July, 1839.[1] He was succeeded by Churchill C. Cambreleng, who was appointed in May, 1840, and resigned about a year later.[2] September, 1841, Charles S. Todd left for Russia, remaining there until early in 1845. He was followed by Ralph I. Ingersoll, who stayed on, much against his will,[3] until the summer of 1848. Arthur P. Bagby was appointed to the mission in August, 1848, and resigned in February, 1849. Then came Neill S. Brown, who remained about three years. Thomas H. Seymour succeeded him, and was in Russia from March, 1854, to 1858, when he was replaced by Francis W. Pickens of South Carolina, who resigned and returned home in June, 1860, to become war-governor of his state. That same month John Appleton was appointed to the mission, but in April, 1861, he gave way to Cassius Marcellus Clay, an ardent abolitionist, who held the post during most of the Civil War.

Throughout this whole period the most friendly relations were maintained. At only one time—during the Koszta affair, when Russia sent a rather sharp note of protest to the United States—was there even a semblance of friction. Martin Koszta, a Hungarian by birth, and a leader in the revolutionary troubles of 1848, had fled from Austria, the scene of

[1] MS. Despatches, Russia, XII, No. 27, 29 June 1839.
[2] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 5, 21 May 1841.
[3] The unsettled condition of Europe, with the revolutions of 1848 approaching, made it imperative that we have a minister at St. Petersburg, and several requests from Ingersoll to be recalled were refused.

his activities, and had settled in Turkey, where he announced his intention of becoming an American citizen. In 1853, the Austrian consul-general at Smyrna, a Turkish port, exercising his extraterritorial jurisdiction, arrested Koszta and had him taken aboard an Austrian brig-of-war. On the morning of July 2, by order of the American chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, Commander Ingraham of the United States sloop St. Louis, then at Smyrna, informed the Austrian commander that Koszta was an American citizen, and demanded that he be delivered into his hands. The Austrian commander refused to give Koszta up, whereupon Ingraham prepared to open fire. Hostilities were avoided only by agreeing to confide Koszta to the custody of the French consul-general pending the settlement of the dispute.[4]

Austria protested most vehemently against the conduct of Ingraham, and Tsar Nicholas, ever fearful of revolutionary agitation, ordered Count Bodisco to do likewise.[5] August 10, Nesselrode wrote Bodisco a vigorous note with orders to present it to the American government. He said:

> The Imperial Cabinet participates in the painful impression which the occurrences that have taken place at Smyrna must have produced at Vienna; and this impression has no doubt been the same wherever the principles of international law are still held in respect. It is willing to believe that it will have been sufficient for the Cabinet of Washington to have been informed of the conduct of its agents to disavow the same and tender to Austria the satisfaction to which she is entitled. At all events, you are expressly invited, Sir, to cooperate with your colleague of Austria, and not to allow the Secretary of State to remain ignorant in regard to the point of view in which, with us, a matter that affects, in an equal degree, all civilized nations, is considered. The proceedings of Mr. Offley, consul at Smyrna, and of Mr. Ingraham, commander of the sloop of war 'St. Louis,' present in fact, a dangerous precedent; and what would become of international relations if this example was to find imitators, and every pretension, whether well founded or not, could, in the midst of peace, justify acts of violence, which would not even be tolerated in time of war, in the dominions of a neutral power?[6]

Russia was evidently very much in earnest, for during the

[4] John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law, III, 824-835.
[5] Frank A. Golder, Guide to Material for American History in Russian Archives, p. 75.
[6] MS. Notes, Russia, IV, 10 August 1853.

course of the same month Nesselrode protested again.[7] But these protests were not followed up, and by the next year, when the Crimean War broke out, the matter was practically forgotten.

By November, 1853, it was evident that war between Russia and Great Britain was inevitable. Already the Russian Foreign Office had ordered Bodisco to inquire as to the attitude the United States would take in the event of a war,[8] and the officials of the Russian American Company were making frantic efforts to insure the safety of their American possessions, which would be put at the mercy of the British fleet. P. S. Kostromitinov, agent of the company, believed that the best method of saving the company's territory would be to devise a fictitious sale to an American company. With this end in view a blank contract, transferring Russian America to the American Russian Commercial Company of San Francisco, was drawn up and sent (January 30, 1855) to the Russian legation in Washington. The Russian minister consulted Marcy, now secretary of state, and Gwin, senator from California, and the three were unanimous in believing that the ruse would be easily penetrated by Great Britain. Accordingly they advised against it.

Meanwhile, however, the company's officials in St. Petersburg had managed to insure the safety of their property. With the advice and consent of the Russian Foreign Office, they proposed to the Hudson's Bay Company that the territories and property of the two companies should be neutralized for the period of the war. Great Britain, in command of the sea, had all to lose and nothing to gain from such a bargain; but fearing that a refusal would bring about an

[7] Ibid., 20 August 1853.

[8] Golder, "Russian American Relations during the Crimean War," in the American Historical Review, XXXI, 462-463. When Prof. Golder was preparing his Guide to Materials for American History in Russian Archives, for the Carnegie Institution, he was allowed to examine the archives of the Russian Foreign Office down to 1854; subsequently this permission was extended to 1870. Hence his numerous articles, which I have used freely, are of great value in determining the Russian point of view.

actual sale to the United States,[8a] the British government, although reserving the right to capture any Russian ship encountered in the Pacific Ocean and to blockade all Russian ports, agreed to respect the territorial integrity of the possessions of the Russian company.[9] Thus any further attempts at a feigned transfer were made unnecessary, and all talk of selling the territory was stopped. But the company's fleet was still in danger, and attempts were made to "sell" it to the American Russian Commercial Company, which was to use it to trade with Kodiak and Sitka. But this plan likewise came to nought. Beverley C. Sanders, head of the American concern, had been interested in the scheme chiefly because it would have opened the northwest trade to American citizens. Now, fearing that the Russian fleet would be captured by Great Britain, he refused to carry it through.[10]

Just before the outbreak of the war, which arrayed England, France, and Turkey against the Tsar, Bodisco died, and the duties of the Russian legation devolved upon Constantine Catacazy and Éduard de Stoeckl, young and zealous men, whose sole aim was to nurture the chronic anti-British feeling in the United States.[11] Both had plans for drawing the United States into the war. England had never recognized the principle that free ships make free goods, a principle which had always been staunchly supported by the

[8a] Stoeckl quoted Marcy as telling him that all through the war "the British Legation at Washington was on the qui-vive to know if it really was a question of the sale of our colonies to the Americans." (MS. Russia, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petrograd, 1857, I, 9, No. 4, Washington. Photostats, Library of Congress).

[9] Golder, "The Purchase of Alaska," in the American Historical Review, XXV, 411-412; Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 570-571; Thomas W. Balch, The Alaska Frontier, pp. 49-51.

[10] Golder, "The Purchase of Alaska," p. 412.

[11] MS. Notes, Russia, IV, 23 January 1854. Constantine Gavilovich Catacazy had been made secretary of legation in 1851. In 1856, he was transferred to Europe, but returned to the United States as minister in 1869. In 1872, he was recalled at the request of the United States. Éduard de Stoeckl had been in Washington in a subordinate capacity in 1849. In 1853, he was appointed consul-general to the Sandwich Islands. Landing in New York at the time of Bodisco's death, he was ordered to take his place temporarily, and was appointed minister in 1857, holding the office until 1868.

United States. This principle was at the base of the schemes of both Russians, for it was over it that a controversy between the United States and England was most apt to arise. Catacazy suggested that an American ship be loaded with a Russian cargo and sent through the British blockade. The ship would be seized, a controversy would arise, and war between the United States and England might ensue. Stoeckl believed that a break could be brought about merely by encouraging American ships to trade with Russia, and to this end proposed that Americans be given special tariff concessions and other similar privileges in Russian ports. American skippers, ever alert for commercial gain, would sail for Russian ports in large numbers; searches and seizures by British blockading squadrons would follow, and war might result.[12]

The danger that the United States might be drawn into the war was undoubtedly real. Many Americans rather expected a rupture with England over neutral rights. Already Seymour, minister at this time, had written from St. Petersburg suggesting that a frigate be sent to the Baltic to prevent illegal interference with our trade.[13] April 14, 1854, Marcy demanded that the belligerents make known their future attitude toward neutral commerce, and asserted his intention of upholding the principles that free ships make free goods and that neutral goods on an enemy ship are not subject to capture. He informed Seymour that trouble was to be expected from England and France although none was anticipated with Russia.[14]

But the British and French governments saw the danger as clearly as the United States did, and had no desire to bring a strong naval power into the war on the side of their enemy. Foreseeing just such a contingency as Stoeckl and Catacazy wished to bring about, Lord Clarendon, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, had already informed Buchanan, now

[12] Golder, "Russian American Relations during the Crimean War," pp. 463-465.

[13] MS. Despatches, Russia, XVI, No. 1, 31 March 1854.

[14] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 6, 14 April 1854; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 103.

minister at the Court of St. James's, that Great Britain had resolved to recognize, during the course of the war, both principles for which the United States contended.[15] Thus the schemes of the Russians were rendered unavailing. Nevertheless, although abiding by both principles temporarily, England consistently refused to recognize either of them as a permanent rule of international law.[16] Throughout the course of the war Marcy tried to persuade her to do this; but never with success.[17] Russia, at the mercy of Great Britain on the sea and anxious to alleviate the conditions of maritime warfare, had already declared her adherence to both principles,[18] and now, at the behest of Marcy [19] she embodied them in a treaty with the United States to which she agreed to invite other powers to accede.[20]

Balked in his attempt to draw the United States into the struggle, Stoeckl, now chargé d'affaires, contemplated various plans for fitting out privateers in American ports. He dared not go ahead, however, without at least the tacit consent of Marcy; and to his numerous attempts to secure secret encouragement the Secretary of State maintained discreet silence. Doubtful as to the attitude of the United States, Stoeckl gave up his plans, and his decision was heartily approved by Nesselrode who informed him that under no circumstances should he take any steps which might alienate the sympathy of the United States.[21]

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[15] Moore, The Works of James Buchanan, IX, 165; 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 103, pp. 6-7, 9-10.

[16] Buchanan's Works, IX, 308; Journal de St. Petersbourg, 26 August 1854. As further evidence of her desire for friendship Great Britain agreed to a treaty settling the Newfoundland fisheries dispute, granting reciprocal trading privileges across the Canadian border, and opening the St. Lawrence River to our commerce. (British and Foreign State Papers, XLIV, 25-29; Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, pp. 668-672).

[17] 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 103, pp. 4-5.

[18] Above, p. 91.

[19] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 6, 9 May 1854.

[20] MS. Despatches, Russia, XVI, No. 4, 2 June 1854. The treaty was signed at Washington by Marcy and Stoeckl, 10/22 July 1854. Ratifications were exchanged 31 October. The treaty is given in Malloy, pp. 938-939.

[21] Golder, "Russian American Relations during the Crimean War," p. 446.

For some time England was very anxious as to the attitude that the United States would take in regard to privateers. The commercial world was especially concerned, and marine insurance rates were unusually high.[22] Clarendon scarcely believed that the American government would permit its ports to be used as bases by privateers, but he was less certain as to how it would regard the enlistment of its citizens on Russian privateers.[23] In order to prevent sailors of such known ability from taking service with the enemy, Clarendon proposed to Buchanan that Great Britain, France, and the United States should sign a tripartite treaty agreeing to treat as pirates any of their citizens who, when their country was at peace, should sail as belligerents against either of the other signatories.[24] But Marcy refused to conclude such a treaty while the war was in progress, on the ground that such action would in reality constitute an unneutral act toward Russia.[25]

This was good news to Stoeckl who believed that Marcy's action was intended as a rebuff to Great Britain, and that it could be taken as indicating that the United States had no objection to its citizens taking service with Russia. According to generally accepted law, the captain and two-thirds of the crew of a privateer had to be citizens of the country for which they sailed, and the ship itself had to be fitted out in that country. Stoeckl now wrote home suggesting that Americans be permitted and encouraged to fit out privateers in the Russian ports in northwestern America, and that the Russian officials there be allowed to issue letters of marque and naturalization papers. While waiting for Nesselrode's reply, Stoeckl busied himself in interviewing prospective Russian citizens; for the Russian legation "was inundated with requests" for letters of marque from United States citizens who wished to enter Russian service. But it was all a waste of time. His scheme was absolutely vetoed by Nesselrode, who foresaw the complications to which it would inevit-

[22] Buchanan's Works, IX, 166.
[23] 33d Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. No. 103, pp. 10-11.
[24] Buchanan's Works, IX, 162; The London Times, 29 April 1854.
[25] Buchanan's Works, IX, 190; Moore's Digest, VII, 539.

ably lead. Naturalization after the outbreak of war, and letters of marque issued under such circumstances would never have been recognized as legal by Great Britain, while the use of Russian America as a base for privateers would have led to its speedy capture by the British fleet. But worst of all, the enlistment of American citizens on United States soil would never have been tolerated by the United States government whose friendship was to be kept at all costs.[26]

Nevertheless, encouraged by certain Americans—notably Senator Gwin of California and Beverley C. Sanders of San Francisco—Stoeckl continued to suggest to Nesselrode fantastic plans for securing American aid. His plotting was finally ended on December 31, 1855, by President Pierce's public warning that both the equipment of belligerent cruisers and the enlistment of persons in the service of any foreign state on American soil "either as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer" were contrary to both American and international law, and that any attempt to violate this law would be considered as an attempt to violate our national sovereignty.[27]

Although it maintained neutrality to the end, there is no doubt that the United States government sympathized with Russia. Numerous Russian well-wishers in Congress, among them Sumner, Mason, Clayton, Clingman, and Fish, introduced resolutions or sponsored petitions requesting the President to tender his good offices to end the war.[28] As early as July, 1854, Marcy himself informed Stoeckl that mediation had been discussed in the cabinet, and asked how the Tsar would view a proposition of that nature. Although scarcely believing that England, to whom the close relations between the United States and Russia were well known, would ever consider such a proposal, Stoeckl and Catacazy believed, as did Marcy, that its rejection by her would make public senti-

[26] Aleksandr Genrikhovich Jomini, Étude Diplomatique sur la Guerre de Crimée (a Russian government publication), II, 79-86.

[27] Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, V, 332.

[28] 33d Cong., 2d sess., House Journal, pp. 55, 62; Ibid., Senate Journal, pp. 63, 75, 146; Ibid., Congressional Globe, Appendix, pp. 60-62.

ment even more outspoken for their country. Thus, knowing that at least Russia had nothing to lose, they advised Nesselrode to accept. Early in October they received his reply. He gave no definite assurance that he would accept or reject the offer, if made. At the same time he regarded the proposal with no enthusiasm; for, he said, knowing the intimacy between the two countries, the allies would view any such suggestion coming from the United States as having been inspired by Russia, and would interpret it as a confession of weakness on the part of the Tsar. But Nesselrode was saved the difficulty of coming to a decision, for the United States, becoming more and more engrossed in domestic difficulties, never again brought up the proposal.[29]

Although the government maintained an attitude proper and discreet, the American press and populace were outspoken in their friendship for Russia, and in denunciation of Great Britain and France, while even government officials were privately hostile to those latter countries.[30] On March 12, 1854, Marcy wrote confidentially to Buchanan:

> Should Russia be defeated . . . and crippled . . . and the *entente cordiale* between Great Britain and France continue, their abstinence from intermeddling in our affairs can hardly be expected—this view of the subject is Russianizing some of our people. They have shown —G. B. particularly—too much of a disposition to be guardians of the whole world. As our policy and practice has been to let them alone in their proper sphere of action—we have a right to ask and expect that they should do the same to us—will they do so if they weaken and humble Russia? [31]

On another occasion Marcy wrote, "Great Britain as well as France, since the 'entente cordial,' has placed herself in our path, and attempted to obstruct us in whatever direction we have attempted to move." [32]

Belief in this Franco-British hostility was strengthened by

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[29] Golder, "Russian American Relations during the Crimean War," pp. 471-473.

[30] For an exposition of Russia's appreciation of this amicable attitude see the Journal de St. Petersbourg, 1 October 1854.

[31] MS. William L. Marcy Papers, Library of Congress. Private Letter-book of letters to U. S. ministers and others abroad while secretary of state, p. 65.

[32] Buchanan's Works, IX, 354.

certain indiscreet utterances of Emperor Louis Napoleon, and by a speech of the Earl of Clarendon, who announced in the House of Commons, January 31, 1854, that "The happy accord and good understanding between France and England have been extended beyond Eastern policy affecting all parts of the world, and I am heartily rejoiced to say that there is no portion of the two hemispheres with regard to which the policy of the two countries . . . is not now in perfect harmony." [33] This expression, together with England's "lack of good faith" in refusing to accept our construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and the belief that the United States' attempt to secure a commercial treaty with the Dominican Republic had been frustrated by the British and French consuls acting in concert,[34] led many to suppose that England and France contemplated intervention in Central America. Rumors of a Franco-British plot to annex Cuba,[35] and the protest of the two countries against our attempted acquisition of the Sandwich Islands [36] did not tend to allay the bad feeling.

At first the London papers were rather tolerant of the hostile attitude of the American press, which they considered as setting forth not the honest opinions of the American people but the "ranting and vindictive fury of Irish rebels and Cuban filibusteros." [37] But as the unfriendly attitude of the American journals became more pronounced the British papers retaliated in kind, denouncing the American policy in Central America, accusing us of imperialistic designs on Cuba [38] and Santo Domingo,[39] and warning that the British fleet "which can winter in the Baltic can summer in the Gulf of Mexico." [40] On January 19, 1854, Buchanan wrote Marcy privately that our apparent sympathy for the "Despot" was injuring us in the opinion of the English masses

[33] Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3d Series, CXXX, 43.
[34] Buchanan's Works, IX, 309.
[35] Ibid., pp. 166-167; The London Times, 11 May 1855.
[36] Buchanan's Works, IX, 167.
[37] The London Times, 28 April 1854.
[38] Ibid., 17 and 24 March 1855.
[39] Ibid., 28 November 1855.
[40] Ibid., 1 March 1855.

"which were formerly and are naturally our friends." [40a] Toward the end of the war the mutual animosity was increased by British protests against our shipments of arms and ammunition to Russia,[41] and by our indignation toward Crampton, the British minister, whose zeal in enlisting recruits for the British army in contravention of our neutrality laws finally forced us to demand his recall.[42]

The war ended in 1856, and the European powers upon making peace subscribed to the famous declaration of Paris whereby they agreed that (1) privateering is and remains abolished, (2) free ships make free goods, except contraband, (3) neutral goods, except contraband, on an enemy ship are not subject to capture, and (4) a blockade to be legal must be effective.[43] In May, the French government invited the United States to accede to this agreement. Marcy was in full accord with articles two, there, and four, but could not agree to give up privateers. Such an agreement, he said, would put us at the mercy of England, for, with our comparatively weak navy, privateers were our only hope in case of a war with a strong maritime power. But the treaty could not be accepted in part; it must be accepted or rejected in full. For this reason Marcy proposed a fifth article whereby "the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent, on the high seas shall be exempt from seizure . . . except it be contraband." [44] Such a stipulation would have restricted maritime warfare to conflicts between armed ships, would have largely exempted commerce both neutral and belligerent from interference, and would thus have made privateers useless. Marcy informed France that if this article were added the United States would sign the declaration.[45]

Early in April, Mason, minister to France, had told Count Orlov, the Russian minister there, that the United States

[40a] MS. William L. Marcy Papers, Library of Congress. Private Letters from James Buchanan in London to William L. Marcy, p. 11.
[41] British and Foreign State Papers, XLVIII, 237.
[42] Ibid., XLVII, 358-474; XLVIII, 189-300.
[43] Moore's Digest, VII, 562.
[44] 34th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 5, pp. 35-43.
[45] Ibid.; British and Foreign State Papers, LV, 589-599.

could not give up the right to fit out privateers; since such abnegation would put us at the mercy of Great Britain. Orlov had immediately reported this conversation to St. Petersburg. The Russian government, anxious at all times to limit the sea power of Great Britain, decided to stiffen the determination of the United States not to give up privateers. Marcy rejected the Declaration of Paris July 28, and when news of this reached Europe, Prince Gortchakov,[46] now foreign minister of Russia, assured Seymour that the Tsar was in full accord with Marcy's views on privateering, and that although Russia had signed the Declaration of Paris, this agreement would have no binding force between her and the United States.[47] October 1, Stoeckl, by order of Gortchakov, assured Marcy that his government fully understood the position of the United States and was in favor of the Marcy proposition for the freedom of the seas. Furthermore, "should the declaration of the government of the United States become the object of a collective deliberation, the vote of the Imperial government is secured to the United States."[48] This promise was repeated November 28.[49]

Indeed the Tsar, not waiting for a conference, attempted to induce France and Great Britain to accept the Marcy proposal at once. Gortchakov believed, or affected to believe for a while, that his master's efforts would meet with success. November 28, he observed to Seymour that "England sees that the unqualified recognition of this doctrine by Russia may have the effect of adding strength to the good understanding which exists between the United States and Russia and therefore would be glad perhaps to neutralize it, if possible, by some approach towards the recognition of the same

[46] Alexander Mikhailovich Gortchakov (1798-1883), after a long diplomatic career, became minister of foreign affairs in 1856. He retained this office until 1863 when he became chancellor. Even after this he devoted himself almost entirely to foreign affairs, taking little part in the great internal reforms of Alexander II's reign.

[47] MS. Despatches, Russia, XVII, No. 85, 4/16 September 1856.

[48] MS. Notes, Russia, IV, 1 October 1856.

[49] Ibid., 28 November 1856; 34th Cong., 3d sess., H. Doc. No. 1, p. 44; Ibid., S. Doc. No. 5, p. 44.

principle." [50] But such beliefs, if held, were mere self-delusion. England, although no doubt desirous of preventing a firmer Russian-American feeling, could not seriously consider a proposition so adverse to her interests. Consequently, when Marcy gave way to Lewis Cass, the United States ceased to agitate for freedom of the seas.[51] Cass did suggest to Gortchakov, through Pickens, that Russia and the United States should make a joint declaration embodying those points of the Declaration of Paris which the United States had expressed itself as willing to accept, and limiting contraband of war to arms, ammunition, and things necessary to their production; [52] but Gortchakov, unwilling to offend England, suggested that this matter could best be settled in a conference of all the powers, since it was in a conference that the original declaration had been agreed upon.[53] Thus nothing came of Cass' proposal, and the United States was still a non-signatory of the declaration at the outbreak of the Civil War.

The Crimean War undoubtedly proved the wisdom of Russia's policy of cultivating American friendship, and in fact, drew the two nations even closer together. There was never any doubt of the feelings of the majority of the American people, and the government itself performed many little acts of friendship. The Tsar was much benefited by England's acceptance of the principle that free ships make free goods—an acceptance which would probably never have been given except for the attitude of the United States. Recruiting for the British army was stopped in the United States, and the British minister ejected. Mediation was often suggested, usually with a view to saving Russia. Nor was Alexander II [54] insensible of American good-will. His gratitude was manifested in many ways. Immediately after the signing of the Declaration of Paris he took pains to assure the United States that in case of war between her and a third power American privateers

[50] MS. Despatches, Russia, XVII, No. 93, 16/28 November 1856.
[51] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, No. 18, 29 June 1859.
[52] MS. Despatches, Russia, XVIII, 28 July/9 August 1859.
[53] Ibid., 18 August (O. S.) 1859.
[54] Nicholas I died during the war (1855).

would be admitted, as before, to Russian ports. American merchants had for some time coveted a share in the rich trade with the Russian possessions of Sakhalin Island and the Amur region. Gortchakov now authorized Stoeckl to inform the American government confidentially that although for international reasons consuls could not yet be admitted, nevertheless American traders might freely visit, and would be warmly welcomed in those regions, the Tsar having already given orders to that effect.[55]

[55] Golder, "Russian American Relations during the Crimean War," p. 475.

CHAPTER VIII

The American Civil War

The outbreak of the Civil War gave the United States government good cause to regret its refusal to agree to the abolition of privateering, for on April 17, 1861, Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederacy, announced that letters of marque and reprisal would be issued to all persons desiring to fit out privately owned vessels to prey upon the commerce of the Northern states.[1] Two days later President Lincoln proclaimed the blockade of Southern ports and warned that any person molesting the commerce of the United States under pretext of a commission from the Confederacy would "be held amenable to the law of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy."[2] On the same day Seward, secretary of state, anxious to hamper the secession movement and to enlist the sympathy of Europe in the Union cause, ordered American diplomatic representatives abroad to announce the willingness of the United States to accede without reserve to the Declaration of Paris. They were again to request the European governments to adopt the Marcy proposition for the freedom of the seas, but were to announce that with or without that addendum the United States was ready to subscribe to the declaration.[3]

According to Seward's theory of the rebellion, the revolted states were still legally within the Union, and their citizens were still citizens of the United States, subject to its laws and bound by its treaties. Thus the adhesion of the United States to the Declaration of Paris would have given to Southern privateers the character of pirates under international law; for the Declaration of Paris had now been accepted by the principal maritime nations.

But already France and England had recognized the Con-

[1] J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, I, 60.
[2] Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 14-15.
[3] Moore, Digest of International Law, I, 570-573.

federates as belligerents.[4] Strongly sympathetic toward the South, they were resolved to do nothing prejudicial to its cause. Although ready to welcome the adherence of the United States to the Declaration of Paris, they were determined that this action should in no way restrict the maritime activities of the Confederate states, who were non-signatories of the declaration. To this end they insisted upon a specific assurance from Seward that the prohibition of privateering should be inapplicable to Confederate vessels.[5] But Seward, believing such an agreement tantamount to recognition of the Confederacy, refused and stopped further discussion.[6]

Meanwhile, Russia had readily yielded to the wishes of the United States, and although rejecting the Marcy proposition as useless unless accepted by all the maritime powers,[7] had signed (August 24, 1861) a treaty embodying the four points of the Declaration of Paris.[8] She raised no questions concerning the rights or liabilities of Confederate privateers. But a new complication now arose. The open friendship for the South exhibited by England and France was warmly resented in the North, where hostile feeling against those countries became increasingly outspoken. Diplomatic relations became more and more strained, and for a while war seemed far from impossible. It was at this juncture that Stoeckl, now minister,[9] raised a most significant point. In an interview with Seward, in early November, he asked whether or not, in the event of war with either England or France, the United States would equip and send out privateers. Without hesitation Seward replied, "That is a matter of course." The Russian minister then pointed out that in that case the operations of Northern privateers in the north Pacific would be greatly impeded; for Russia, which controlled most of the ports

[4] Ibid., p. 185; British and Foreign State Papers, LI, 165.
[5] Ibid., LV, 555, 557; Diplomatic Correspondence 1861, p. 242.
[6] E. D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War, I, 168-169; Charles Francis Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," in the Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, XLVI.
[7] MS. Notes, Russia, V, 18 July (O. S.) 1861; ibid., 28 July 1861.
[8] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, 24 August 1861.
[9] Stoeckl was raised to that rank in January, 1857.

there, would be bound by the treaty of August 24 to consider them as pirates. Seward was visibly startled. "I never thought of that," said he, "I must write to Mr. Clay about it." [10] Fortunately the treaty had not yet been ratified by the Senate, nor had the Tsar taken final action upon it. Stoeckl informed Seward that his master would probably be willing to postpone final action if the United States so desired, so Seward checked further discussion of the treaty in the Senate, and immediately wrote to Clay [11] explaining the inconveniences to which the treaty would give rise, and ordering him to lay the matter before Gortchakov, to make it plain that "our delay in acting upon the treaty results from the uncertainty which still clouds, although less darkly, our relations with some other European powers," and to request permission to defer final action indefinitely.[12]

No trouble was experienced from the Russian government which readily sanctioned an indefinite postponement of an agreement fraught with such pernicious consequences to the Union cause. Gortchakov assured Clay that "the Emperor, holding to the great advance of liberal principles in the intercourse of nations, would yet do nothing which would embarrass the United States—that we might take our time—that he had rather anticipated such eventuality—and that therefore the Emperor had not finally subscribed the treaty—but would be ready to do so at any time when it was matured at Washington." [13] At the same time Stoeckl was ordered to express the same sentiment to Seward who, in reply, assured him of "the President's high appreciation of the liberality and good feeling towards the United States which are manifested by His Imperial Majesty in consenting that under existing circumstances and for the present the proceedings for ratifying the treaty may be suspended. This act will form a new link in our ancient friendship." [14]

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[10] E. D. Adams, I, 171 note. This conversation was reported November 14, 1861, by Mr. Schleiden, minister from Bremen.

[11] Cassius M. Clay, who became minister to Russia in June, 1861.

[12] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, 239, 9 November 1861.

[13] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 13, 10 December 1861.

[14] MS. Notes to Russian Legation, VI, 114, 8 January 1862. The treaty was never brought up again.

Indeed, many such links were forged during the course of the war. Russia, still smarting from the defeat administered by England and France in the Crimean War, was still antagonistic to those powers. When they took an attitude favorable to the South, Russia "naturally leaned the other way."[15] Throughout the struggle the Russian people evinced the most candid friendship for the North. Simon Cameron, who went to Russia in 1862, found "constant desire to interpret everything to our advantage." Indeed, said he, "There is no capital in Europe where the loyal American meets with such universal sympathy as at St. Petersburg; none where the suppression of our unnatural rebellion will be hailed with more genuine satisfaction."[16] "America," "American friends," "transatlantic friends" were household words everywhere.[17]

Less open, but no less strong, was the good will of the government itself. Although England and France often evinced eagerness to end the war—on the basis of Southern independence—Russia alone of European powers made an attempt to avert it. For in the dark days before the fall of Sumter Stoeckl went to "the very verge of diplomatic prudence" in remonstrating with Slidell, Benjamin, and other Southern leaders with whom he was on intimate terms, in attempting to effect a reconciliation. Yet after hostilities had begun, all intercourse between Stoeckl and the Confederates was abruptly terminated,[18] and all suggestions of intervention contemplating recognition of the Confederacy were summarily rejected at St. Petersburg,[19] where Gortchakov immediately gave Clay

[15] Baron Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, I, 21.

[16] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 4, 23 July 1862; Diplomatic Correspondence 1862-63, I, 449-450.

[17] Rosen, I, 22. Baron Rosen, later a well-known diplomat, was then a student in college. He well remembered this feeling.

[18] Frederick Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward, II, 134-135 note. Stoeckl informed Colonel Charles A. de Arnaud, a Russian who had enlisted in Northern service, that "he had received positive instructions from his government to express its friendliest sympathy to the Union authorities and on no consideration whatever to have any relations with representatives of the Confederacy." (The Union and its Ally Russia, Reminiscences of Col. Charles A. de Arnaud, p. 3).

[19] Below, p. 127.

"unequivocal assurance" of Russia's friendship.[20] Furthermore, he assured the American minister that the United States would be at perfect liberty, if she so desired, to carry prizes into Russian ports.[21]

January 21, 1861, Stoeckl requested instructions as to what attitude to take in case the Confederates requested recognition. He said:

> It seems to me that the reply most in keeping with our interest and dignity would be this: 'We shall recognize the Southern Confederacy as soon as it shall have regularized its position in respect of the Northern Republic by the establishment of diplomatic relations of a permanent character.'
>
> It is important not to show too much enthusiasm toward the secessionists, the conservation of the Union being to our political interest; but it is well, on the other hand, to make friends everywhere and not to create unnecessary irritation in respect of a condition of affairs that does not imply for us any principle and which we should recognize as soon as it has reached the stage of a *fait accompli*. The policy that I propose combines, it seems to me, these two advantages of conciliating our Unionist friends without offending the secessionists.[21a]

When the Trent affair, which had aroused England to threatening indignation verging upon open rupture, was amicably settled, Gortchakov instructed Stoeckl to congratulate the United States on the adjustment of the controversy, and to express the Tsar's wish for the early rehabilitation of the Union "not only because of the cordial sympathy which unites the two countries, but moreover because the maintenance of its power interests in the highest degree the general political equilibrium."[22] While this despatch was crossing the Atlantic Gortchakov called Clay to the Foreign Office, informed him of its contents, and offered to have it printed in the Journal de St. Petersbourg in order that it might exercise a favorable influence on European opinion and serve as a public avowal of Russo-American solidarity. Needless to say,

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[20] MS. Despatches, Russia, XVIII, No. 16, 8/20 April 1861.

[21] 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. No. 177, pp. 3-4; Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, II, 324.

[21a] MS. Central Archive, Moscow, Russia, Foreign Affairs, p. 49. Stoeckl to Gortchakov, 21 January 1861. Photostats, Library of Congress. Cited hereafter as Central Archive, Moscow.

[22] MS. Notes, Russia, V, 4 January 1862.

the offer was eagerly accepted.[23] From the first the Journal de St. Petersbourg, the official court newspaper of the Tsar, stressed the news of Union victories, sometimes suppressed despatches telling of Union reverses, warned the populace against giving credence to reports received from Reuter's Telegraphic Bureau in London, and, in short, showed uncompromising favor to the Union cause.[24]

Despite these marks of sympathy for the North, the Confederate government for some time entertained hope of securing recognition from the Tsar. November 19, 1862, Colonel Lucius Q. C. Lamar was appointed Confederate commissioner to Russia,[25] and shortly thereafter set out for St. Petersburg filled with bouyant hopes.[26] Scarcely had he arrived, however, before he became "convinced that the state of things supposed to promise useful results from diplomatic representations at the Court of St. Petersburg had been essentially altered,"[27] and after some unencouraging correspondence with Gortchakov, who consistently refused to accord him an official reception, he was recalled.[28] Yet, as Lamar himself said, there was "no party in Russia absolutely hostile to the South."[29] The policy of Russia was dictated solely by self-interest, which demanded that she lend no encouragement to a movement calculated to disrupt the Union.

For the maintenance of a strong, united American state was an axiom of Russian foreign policy. United the American states had been a real check to Great Britain; divided they would be her easy prey. As early as January, 1861, Stoeckl, who saw the war clouds gathering, lamented the fact that Great Britain was about to experience a "stroke of fortune" rare in the history of nations. She alone seemed destined to

[23] Diplomatic Correspondence 1862-63, I, 445.
[24] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 4, 23 July 1862; Diplomatic Correspondence 1862-63, I, 449-450, 457-458.
[25] Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series 2, III, 137-138, 606-608.
[26] Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, 455-456.
[27] Official Records, Series 2, III, 848.
[28] Ibid., p. 796; James Morton Callahan, Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, p. 95.
[29] Richardson, II, 455-456.

profit by an event which would be fatal to the rest of the world, for hitherto Anglo-American rivalry had been "the best guarantee against the ambitious projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race." [30] Baron Brunow, Russian ambassador in London, wrote in a similar vein: "The English government, at the bottom of its heart, desires the separation of North America into two republics, which will watch each other jealously and counterbalance one the other. Then England, on terms of peace and commerce with both, would have nothing to fear from either; for she would dominate them, restraining them by their rival ambitions." [31]

This seemed to be the consensus of Russian opinion. Gortchakov assured John Appleton that the Union was the only commercial counterpoise to Great Britain, and that consequently Russia desired its perpetuation; [32] while Tsar Alexander declared frankly that "he was very anxious the United States as a nation should suffer no diminution of power or influence." [33]

So benevolent was the attitude of the Tsar that Seward, the secretary of state, and Cassius Clay, the minister to Russia, the two Americans best qualified by their positions to know his true intentions, were both reported on reliable authority as believing that he would resist, by force of arms if necessary, any unwelcome interference in the American domestic conflict by a European state. Early in the war Seward confided to John Bigelow: "I have a belief that the European State, whichever one it may be, that commits itself to intervention anywhere in North America, will sooner or later fetch up in the arms of a native of an oriental country not especially distinguished for amiability of manners or temper"; [34] while

[30] Adams, II, 269-270.

[31] Ibid., I, 50-51. For other opinions of Stoeckl on the war and its leading figures see Golder, "The American Civil War through the Eyes of a Russian Diplomat" in the American Historical Review, XXVI.

[32] MS. Despatches, Russia, XVIII, No. 16, 8/20 April 1861; British and Foreign State Papers, LI, 98-99.

[33] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 3, 26 June 1862; Diplomatic Correspondence 1862-63, I, 447-448.

[34] John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, I, 499-500.

Clay, in a speech delivered at Odd Fellows' Hall, Washington,[35] assured his audience that

> I think I can say, without implication of profanity or want of deference, that since the days of Christ himself such a happy and glorious privilege has not been reserved to any other man to do that amount of good; and no man has ever more gallantly or nobly done it than Alexander II, the Czar of Russia. I refer to the emancipation of the 23,000,000 serfs. Here then, fellow-citizens, was the place to look for an ally. Trust him; for your trust will not be misplaced. Stand by him and he will, as he has often declared to me he will, stand by you. Not only Alexander, but *his whole family are with you*, men, women, and children.[36]

Enthusiasm so extravagant, while pleasing as a testimonial of domestic harmony, can be given scant value as historical evidence. Seward's statement, although made in a calmer mood, is unsupported by direct evidence, and must likewise not be given too much weight. Even if it was based upon assurances from Russia, there is no certainty that such assurances would ever have been backed up by active aid, for, as we shall see, Alexander, throughout the period of the war, was himself pretty well occupied with domestic troubles.[37] Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the knowledge of Russian friendship did strengthen Seward's hand, and helped make possible his firm attitude toward the meddlesome proclivities of Great Britain and France.

Indeed, in the first two years of the war, when its outcome was still highly uncertain, the attitude of Russia was a potent factor in preventing Great Britain and France from adopting a policy of aggressive intervention. France contemplated interference in the American conflict from the first; and as early as April, 1861, Mercier, French minister in Washington,

[35] Clay entered upon his duties at St. Petersburg in June, 1861. January 7, 1862, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania was commissioned to succeed him. Cameron's stay in Russia was short, for he left in October, 1862, and Clay was reappointed to the mission. He returned to St. Petersburg in March, 1863, Bayard Taylor discharging the duties of the mission as chargé d'affaires in the interim. It was while he was home, in the period between his two missions, that Clay made this speech.

[36] Quoted by de Arnaud, p. 25, from the Cincinnati Gazette, 19 August 1862. Clay frequently referred to the Russian-American "alliance."

[37] Below, p. 136.

urged Stoeckl and Lord Lyons, the British representative, to secure discretionary power from their governments to recognize the Confederacy when "the right time" should come. Fearing, however, that the possession of such authority would be a source of constant embarrassment to them in their subsequent dealings with the Union government, both refused.[38] Stoeckl, in fact, advised his government that if it should finally become necessary to recognize Southern independence, Russia should wait until England and France had acted in order that her recognition might be less offensive to the North.[39] About a year later Mercier again attempted to draw Stoeckl into joint action by proposing that he accompany him to Richmond on a mission of mediation. But Stoeckl had been ordered to eschew joint action with England or France, and again he refused. Furthermore, Seward had assured him that mediation, except at its own request, would be most displeasing to the United States government, and that if foreign mediation ever should become desirable, Russia, not France, would be requested to act.[40]

It was in the summer and fall of 1862 that the danger of European intervention became most acute. "It is useless," wrote Clay at that time, "to deceive ourselves with the idea that we can isolate ourselves from European interventions. We become in spite of ourselves—the Monroe Doctrine—Washington's farewell—and all that—a part of the 'balance of power,' and constitute a portion of that 'universal equilibrium' of which Prince Gortchakov so aptly spoke."[41] And in truth his forebodings seemed about to be realized. Reports of contemplated intervention by France, Great Britain, and Russia were rife in both hemispheres. Europe was excited, the North alarmed, when at the height of the crisis, an emphatic denunciation of intervention and firm disavowal of any intention on the part of Russia to participate therein ap-

[38] Lord T. W. L. Newton, Lord Lyons, a record of British Diplomacy, I, 34; MS. Central Archive, Moscow. Stoeckl to Gortchakov, 2/14 April 1861.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., 5 May 1862.
[41] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 22, 13 April 1862.

peared in the Journal de St. Petersbourg. The article, which as was subsequently learned was prepared in the Foreign Office at the behest of Gortchakov himself for the express purpose of curbing French zeal,[42] was a public avowal that "Russia entertains for the United States of America a lively sympathy founded on sentiments of mutual friendship and on common interests. She considers their prosperity necessary to the general equilibrium. She is convinced that the American nation can only find in the preservation of the Union the conditions of power and prosperity which she wishes to see it enjoy." [43]

This declaration did much to cool the interventionist ardor of England and France. Mediation had been the subject of several animated discussions between Lyons, Stoeckl, and Mercier in which Stoeckl argued that mediation, unless backed by force, would never be accepted, while Lyons agreed that "we ought not to venture on mediation unless we are ready to go to war." But Mercier, certain that merely the threat of force would induce the North to yield, was steadfast in advocacy of mediation on the basis of Southern independence.[44]

Indeed, the French government, already involved in a policy of aggrandizement in Mexico, was willing to support any plan calculated to weaken the United States, from which certain opposition to its imperialistic design was to be anticipated. Yet it had no desire to act without the concurrence or at least the tacit consent of the Tsar. September 18, 1862, Thouvenel, French foreign minister, informed Crowley, British ambassador in Paris, that any plan of joint intervention would probably be wrecked by Russia's refusal to participate. In fact, as he informed Crowley confidentially, "the French government had some time back sounded that of Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal." [45]

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[42] Diplomatic Correspondence 1862-63, I, 454-456.
[43] Journal de St. Petersbourg, 6 August 1862.
[44] MS. Central Archive, Moscow. Stoeckl to Gortchakov, 28 September 1862.
[45] Adams, II, 39.

Great Britain was seriously considering joint action with France, and was deterred at this time mainly by the antipathetic disposition of the Tsar. October 2, Russell wrote to Palmerston: "My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia holds back. Her separation from our move would ensure the rejection of our proposals." The day before this, Baron Brunow had written to Gortchakov from London that Russell was anxious to secure the cooperation of France and Russia in offering their good offices to secure peace. If this offer were rejected by the North, Russell planned to recognize the independence of the South, provided such a step would not entail an open break. He considered the adhesion of Russia essential to the success of the plan. No sooner had news of this project been received by Gortchakov than it was transmitted by him to Stoeckl with the observation that, come what might, Russia would not alter her policy of extreme friendship for the United States.[46] England was also informed of this determination, and henceforth Russell became increasingly uncertain of the wisdom of intervention, finally concluding, as he wrote Palmerston (October 20): "We ought not to move at present without Russia." [47]

About a week later, in anticipation of a definite proposal of intervention from France, d'Oubril, Russian representative in Paris, was informed by Gortchakov that while Russia was sincerely anxious for the restoration of peace in America, yet she could participate in no action which could be even remotely construed as exerting pressure upon the United States. If England and France offered to mediate, Russia, although ready to lend her moral support, could not give more active aid.[48] On the same day similar instructions were sent to Stoeckl authorizing him, if the North and South, contrary to expectations, should evince a desire for peace so strong that only foreign aid was needed to bring it about, to offer his assistance in leading the contending parties to initiate direct

[46] Ibid., pp. 40-45, 45 note.
[47] Ibid., p. 54.
[48] Ibid., p. 60 note.

negotiations; but this was as far as he was to go without express invitation from the Union government.[49]

Knowing the fear of foreign intervention prevalent in the United States, Gortchakov thought it well to reassure that country as to the disposition of Russia. Accordingly, on October 29, having summoned Bayard Taylor [50] to the Foreign Office, he said:

> You know that the Government of the United States has few friends among the Powers. England rejoices over what is happening to you: she longs and prays for your overthrow. France is less actively hostile; her interests would be less affected by the result; but she is not unwilling to see it. She is not your friend. Russia alone, has stood by you from the first, and will continue to stand by you. We are very, *very* anxious that some means should be adopted—that any course should be pursued, which will prevent the division which now seems inevitable. . . .
>
> You know the sentiments of Russia. We desire, above all things, the maintenance of the American Union as one indivisible nation. We cannot take any part, more than we have done. We have no hostility to the Southern people. Russia has declared her position, and will maintain it. There will be proposals for intervention: we believe that intervention could do no good at present. *Proposals will be made to Russia to join some plan of interference. She will refuse any invitation of the kind.* Russia will occupy the same ground as at the beginning of the struggle. *You may rely upon it, she will not change.* But we entreat you to settle the difficulty. I cannot express to you how profound an anxiety we feel—how serious are our fears.
>
> We were standing face to face during the conversation [reported Taylor], and the earnest, impassioned manner of the Prince impressed me with the fact that he was speaking from his heart. At the close of the interview he seized my hand, gave it a strong pressure, and exclaimed, 'God bless you!' . . . I thanked him for his frankness, and for the renewed declaration of the attitude of Russia.[51]

On November 10 the long-expected overture from France, proposing that Great Britain and Russia join her in attempting to secure for six months an armistice which should include a suspension of the blockade, was presented to those two countries.[52] The next day, intervention in North America was violently denounced by the Journal de St. Petersbourg, which made known its unalterable opposition in no uncertain terms.[53]

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[49] Ibid.

[50] Chargé d'affaires pending the return of Clay.

[51] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 16, 29 October 1862.

[52] Adams, II, 63.

[53] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 18, 11 November 1862; Diplomatic Correspondence 1863-64, II, 841-843.

The official Russian reply to France, although more reserved in tone, was no more conciliatory in spirit. Gortchakov refused absolutely to participate in the proceedings, offering merely the moral support of the Russian minister at Washington provided "it would not cause irritation." [54] At the same time he renewed his promise to Taylor that Russia's attitude toward the French proposal would be determined wholly by solicitude for the feelings of the United States.[55]

On the same day that the Tsar's official bulletin denounced the policy of France, Great Britain rejected the French invitation. Although the attitude of Russia had been a leading force in restraining Great Britain earlier in the war, while its outcome was still in doubt, it apparently had little or no influence upon this final British decision, which was due primarily to loss of faith in the ability of the Confederacy. In fact, Russell, who, just before the cabinet meeting at which the decision was reached, had received a telegram from St. Petersburg informing him that Gortchakov had rejected the request,[56] and who had previously been greatly concerned about the attitude of Russia, now advocated acceptance of the French proposal regardless of the hostility of the Tsar.[57] But the other members of the cabinet, who were unanimous in counselling rejection, ultimately controlled the decision. In declining the French invitation the British government alleged as its reason the fact that "if steps were to be taken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable"; but this was only a convenient pretext for avoiding a commitment which it feared might prove extremely embarrassing in the event of Northern success.

November 15, Taylor wrote, "while I infer . . . that Russia would, to a certain extent, be inclined to take part in a

[54] Adams, II, 63.

[55] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 19, 12 November 1862; Diplomatic Correspondence 1863-64, II, 843-844; Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor (ed. Marie Hansen-Taylor and Horace E. Scudder), I, 395.

[56] Sir H. Maxwell, The Life and Letters of George William Frederick, Fourth Earl of Clarendon, II, 268-269.

[57] Adams, II, 65-66.

movement which she foresaw to be inevitable on the part of England and France, rather than permit a coalition between these two powers from which she would be wholly excluded, the probable refusal of the English Government, announced today by telegraph, relieves me from all apprehensions of complications which might arise from that proposition." [58] Thus, although insidious rumors of foreign intervention continued to circulate, the United States was no longer worried about a change in Russian policy. December 23, Seward wrote to Taylor:

> You may say to Prince Gortchakov confidentially that in British quarters it is said that Russia is verging towards a French convention, while in French quarters it is said that Russia though reluctant, may yet be induced to join France if she should desire to interfere in the United States. This government gives no heed to any of these rumors. It has now no apprehensions of British interference. It knows that no possible advantage, and only misfortunes, could result to France herself from any such interference or intervention; and it further believes that France sees the right and justice of our cause.
>
> In regard to Russia, the case is a plain one. She has our friendship, in every case, in preference to any other European power, simply because she always wishes us well, and leaves us to conduct our affairs as we think best.[59]

In reply said Gortchakov: "Tell Mr. Seward that the policy of Russia in regard to the United States is fixed, and will not be changed by the course adopted by any other nation. . . . We shall gladly proffer our services when they are mutually requested—but not until then." [60]

In view of the situation in Europe, Tsar Alexander could hardly have taken any other position; for the struggle of his Polish subjects for independence raised problems for Russia

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[58] Diplomatic Correspondence 1863-64, II, 844-846.

[59] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, 304, No. 10, 23 December 1862. Of this quotation, the last paragraph only has been printed in Diplomatic Correspondence 1863-64, II, 851-852, and in the Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor, I, 399-401.

[60] MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 27, 21 January 1863; Diplomatic Correspondence 1863-64, II, 855-857; Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor, I, 401-403. The support of Great Britain and Russia having been refused, France proceeded alone, and in February, 1863, offered her good offices to end the war. Seward politely but firmly repulsed her, and Congress resolved "to look upon any further attempt in the same direction as an unfriendly act." (37th Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. No. 38, pp. 1-16).

analogous to those confronted by the United States. In January, 1861, the Poles, ever restless under Russian rule, seizing upon a new conscription law as a pretext,[61] had revolted again. Subtle propagandists had prepared the way in London and Paris, where press and people now denounced the suppression of the legitimate nationalistic aspirations of the Poles.[62] Great Britain and France, as signatories of the Treaty of Vienna, which guaranteed to Russian Poland a large measure of autonomy, protested against any infringement of the rights of the Poles; but Russia, regarding the revolt as a purely domestic matter, denounced all intervention as an unwarranted encroachment on her sovereignty.[63] Thus, consistency demanded that Alexander regard foreign intervention in all domestic struggles in a similar light.

The same consideration which constrained Russia to hold aloof from North America led the United States to reject the invitation of France to join her and Great Britain in exerting a "moral influence" on the Tsar in behalf of the Poles. Seward rejected this invitation on May 11, 1863, and on June 3, Gortchakov let it be known how much Alexander "appreciated the firmness with which the government of the United States maintains the principle of non-intervention, the meaning of which in these days is so often perverted; as well as the loyalty with which they refuse to impose upon other states a rule, the violation of which, in respect of themselves, they would not allow. The federal government gives thus an example of justice and political probity which must increase the esteem which our august master has avowed towards the American nation." [64]

The Polish question was not only of primary importance in determining the Tsar's attitude toward intervention, but was the real cause of the visit of the Russian fleet to the United States in the fall of 1863—a fact which was long unknown.

[61] MS. Despatches, Russia, XVIII, No. 15, 8/20 March 1861.
[62] W. F. Grace, "Russia and the Times in 1863 and 1867," in the Cambridge Historical Journal, I, No. 1, pp. 95-96.
[63] Francois Charles Roux, Alexandre II, Gortchakov et Napoleon III, pp. 315-316; British and Foreign State Papers, LIII, 766-918.
[64] Diplomatic Correspondence 1863-64, II, 873-874.

We know now that at the time of this visit the danger of foreign intervention in America had practically ceased to exist, but to contemporaries the possibility of attack from England or France still loomed large. Under such circumstances the arrival of two Russian squadrons was accepted, almost without exception, as an intended avowal of Russian support.

In late September, 1863, two Russian men-of-war, unheralded and unexpected, dropped anchor in the harbor of New York, and within a fortnight three other ships had arrived. During the course of the next month Admiral Popov, with a squadron of four corvettes and two clippers, anchored at San Francisco.[65] The whole North thundered with applause. Truly the deliverers had come! No longer would any foreign nation dare to interfere. The wildest rumors prevailed. Some said that "the services of the fleet had been tendered . . . [to the President] in case of war between the United States and either England or France," while others declared that recognition of the Confederate states by any foreign power would be considered as a *casus belli* by the Tsar.[66] The conviction that some sort of secret agreement existed between the two countries was almost universal.[67] The whole country rose spontaneously to do the Russians honor. Cities vied with each other in entertaining them.[68] Everywhere the officers were wined and dined. Their stay was a long succession of banquets, balls, and receptions. Toasts to "the friendship of Russia and America, beginning with our national existence,

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[65] Golder, "The Russian Fleet and the American Civil War," in the American Historical Review, XX, 807-808.

[66] For these and other similar reports, see Callahan. "Russo-American Relations during the American Civil War," in West Virginia University Studies in American History.

[67] Bigelow, I, 499-500; Thurlow Weed Barnes, Life of Thurlow Weed, II, 346-347. De Arnaud, a Russian who served in the Union army, returned to Russia in 1862. On his arrival he had an interview with Gortchakov whom he reports as inquiring whether or not the United States had enough vessels to maintain the blockade. De Arnaud replied that he did not know, whereupon he quotes Gortchakov as avowing, "I shall find out . . . and if they haven't we have! The Emperor . . . will not permit any one to interfere with this blockade, even if he has another war!" (De Arnaud, p. 21).

[68] Diary of Gideon Welles, I, 480-481.

in our darkest hour showing no abatement," met them everywhere.[69] The whole nation echoed Gideon Welles' fervent "God bless the Russians." [70] Russia itself thrilled to the contagion of amicable sentiments. "The Russian reception in American waters is the subject of conversation in all circles," reported Clay, "and the gentry and the common people seem alike to understand and feel the friendly demonstration." [71]

Paris and London were naturally perturbed. To Felix Aucaigne, a French publicist, a Russo-American alliance did not seem impossible or improbable. Indeed, he was not certain that one did not already exist. After all, did not the two countries present many analogies? One was no more liberal than the other. Was the North not crushing the aspirations of the South as the Tsar was crushing those of Poland? [72] Great Britain was shocked and surprised; to her the visit seemed less like a mark of affection for America than as a sign of hostility to herself.[73]

Although from the first a few, like Charles Sumner, suspected that the fleet was sent with a view to its own safety,[74] and that the Polish question was at the root of the matter, it was not until 1915, when Professor Golder published the result of his researches, that the matter was finally cleared up and those who were less gullible were found to be correct. It so happened that the Polish controversy reached its crucial point in the summer of 1863, when France, Great Britain, and Austria protested for the second time against the conduct of the Tsar. For some time French and British papers, as was their wont, had been clamoring against the Tsar, and war seemed almost inevitable.[75] The first protest of the powers had

[69] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, 349, No. 52, 8 December 1863; Complimentary Banquet given by the City Council of Boston to Rear-Admiral Lessovski and the Officers of the Russian Fleet. (Boston, 1864).

[70] Diary of Gideon Welles, I, 443.

[71] MS. Despatches, Russia, XX, No. 29, 8 November 1863.

[72] Felix Aucaigne, L'Alliance Russo-Americaine. (Paris, 1863).

[73] The London Times, 15, 24, 27 October 1863.

[74] E. L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, IV, 146; Harper's Magazine, October, 1863; Oscar S. Straus, The United States and Russia: Their Historical Relations.

[75] Grace, p. 97.

been presented April 17; the second, which demanded that the Polish question be referred to a European conference, was sent on June 17. But Alexander was determined not to yield, and in early April had begun to put his army on a war footing and to strengthen the defenses of Kronstadt.[76] And public opinion in Russia was squarely behind the Tsar.[77]

Thus even before July 18, when Gortchakov replied to the powers,[78] it was expected that Russia would reject their demands, and Drouyn de Lhuys, new French foreign minister, had already proposed to Great Britain that when this refusal had been definitely announced Great Britain and France should intervene and bring about a pacification by force. Great Britain ultimately refused to go to war for Polish independence, but it was while her answer was being deliberated upon that the Russian fleet sailed for the United States.

The Russian fleet was weak and unprepared for war. It consisted of two squadrons; one on the Pacific, small and antiquated; one of seven ships anchored at Kronstadt; and a frigate in the Mediterranean. All of the ships were of wood, and although they had engines, these were used only in emergencies, the principal means of movement being sails. Against modern British and French ships these vessels would have been practically useless. Only by getting out to sea and limiting their activities to the destruction of enemy merchantmen could they be of any service. But in the event of war with Great Britain it was feared that the British fleet would close in before the Russians could even clear from port—just as it had done in the Crimean War; or, if winter came on before the ships departed, they might be locked in by ice. In order to obviate both dangers the Grand Duke Constantine, head of the Russian navy, and General-Adjutant Krabbe had worked out a plan whereby the fleet would be either in a neutral port or on the high seas when war should break out. In 1862, Admiral Popov, commander of the Pacific squadron, had vis-

[76] Roux, pp. 341-347; MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 35, 20 April 1863.

[77] Diplomatic Correspondence 1863-64, II, 737-739; British and Foreign State Papers, LIII, 897.

[78] Ibid., pp. 901-910.

ited San Francisco, where he had been so well received that the United States had been determined upon as the rendezvous when trouble threatened again.

July 5, 1863, this plan, formulated some time before, was presented to Tsar Alexander, and two days later received his sanction. Orders were immediately given to condition the ships for foreign service and to provide them with money for two years. The Atlantic squadron was put in command of Captain Lessovski, who was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral. The utmost secrecy was maintained; only the commanding officers knew their destination, and even they were ignorant of the purpose of the voyage until the time of departure. July 26, Krabbe gave Lessovski his instructions. They read as follows:

> In case of war destroy the enemy's commerce and attack his weakly defended possessions. Although you are primarily expected to operate in the Atlantic, yet you are at liberty to shift your activities to another part of the globe and to divide your forces as you think best. After leaving the Gulf of Finland proceed directly to New York. It would be preferable to keep all the ships in that port, but if such an arrangement is inconvenient for the American government you may, with the advice of our representative in Washington dispose of the vessels among the various Atlantic ports of the United States. When you learn that war has been declared it is left to you how to proceed, where to rendezvous, etc. Our minister will help you in the matter of supplies; he will have a specially chartered boat to keep you informed of what is going on. Should you find out on the way that war has broken out, begin operations at once. If soon after reaching New York you deem it wise to go to sea try to keep your fleet together until war is actually declared, but avoid the enemy, even commercial ships, so as to cover your tracks. If through our minister or some other reliable source you are told of the opening of hostilities, dispose of your ships and plan your campaign as may seem best. Captain Kroun is preceding you to America to prepare for your coming. . . . Whether there is war or not make a study of the commercial routes, of the strength and weakness of the European colonies, of desirable coaling stations for our fleet, and of the economic and military importance of our own possessions. These instructions are made purposely general in order to give you a free hand to act according to your judgment and discretion.[79]

Nothing is said about helping the North, or about turning the fleet over to Lincoln in case of foreign intervention. The ships were sent to the United States simply because there was

[79] Golder, "The Russian Fleet and the American Civil War," pp. 803-804.

no other place where they would be sure of a friendly reception or from which their plan could be so well carried out.

During the whole visit the Russians skilfully avoided all reference to the European situation, dwelling rather, as they were ordered to do, on the traditional friendship between Russia and the United States. To be sure, the Russian officers evinced keen sympathy for the Union cause. During the winter of 1863-64, while the Russian squadron was lying in the harbor of San Francisco, the city was thrown into a panic by reports that several Confederate cruisers were about to attack the city. Popov's gratitude for his kindly reception evidently outran his discretion, for he gave orders that if the Confederates opened fire, his ships should "put on steam and clear for action." At the same time the Confederates were to be warned that the Russian squadron was "bound to assist the authorities of every place where friendship is offered them, in all measures which may be deemed necessary by the local authorities to repel any attempt against the security of the place." Fortunately, however, the Confederates did not appear. When Popov informed Stoeckl of the steps he had taken, he received in reply a sharp reprimand reiterating the injunction to keep out of our internal affairs and to manifest no antagonism for the South.[80]

Throughout the fall and winter the Polish question continued to disturb Europe,[81] but by spring the diplomatic skies were once more clear and the Russian fleet was ordered to return home.[82] The Russian officers were highly appreciative of the whole-hearted welcome which they had received, and when they arrived at Kronstadt they sumptuously entertained Clay, and Berg, his secretary of legation, aboard the Russian

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[80] Ibid., pp. 808-809.

[81] Roux, pp. 355-363.

[82] In November, 1864, Clay solemnly acknowledged "the debt of gratitude . . . to His Imperial Majesty, who . . . by his friendly course, prevented England and France from hostile intervention in our affairs." (MS. Despatches, Russia, XX, No. 64, 22 November 1864).

flagship while a Russian military band alternated in playing "Yankee Doodle" and the Russian national anthem.[83]

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[83] Ibid., No. 50, 3 August 1864, and No. 51, 22 August 1864. In the spring of 1866, Gustavus Vasa Fox, assistant secretary of the navy, was sent to Russia by order of Congress to convey to Tsar Alexander II a congressional resolution congratulating him on his recent escape from assassination. (J. F. Loubat, Narrative of the Mission to Russia, in 1866 of the Hon. Gustavus Vasa Fox).

The visit of the Russian fleet exercised a profound influence in Europe. In March, 1866, when trouble threatened with France over Louis Napoleon's activities in Mexico, Clay reported La Presse, of Paris, of January 31, as admonishing that "an alliance between Russia and the United States is an event destined, in our opinion, to bear with a decisive weight in the negotiations pending between Paris and Washington. . . . We, however, but note the signs of the time, it is for European diplomacy to consider them." (MS. Despatches, Russia, XXI, No. 106 inclosure, 12 March 1866).

CHAPTER IX

The Purchase of Russian America

With the second renewal of its charter in 1841 the Russian American Company had entered upon a period of unmitigated decline. Fur-bearing animals and natives alike were exterminated by its ruthless methods, while the arduous nature of employment in North America made it increasingly difficult for it to secure the services of honest and capable men. For some time prior to 1860 the company had been operating at a loss, and had already petitioned the Russian government to take over the management of its possessions. The government, however, showed little enthusiasm for an enterprise the expense of which promised to exceed by far the probable return. The petition was accordingly refused, and the company struggled on as best it could. As the profits from furs dwindled its officials contemplated the exploitation of the country's mineral resources. In 1852, Peter Doroshin conducted an extensive survey of the mineral potentialities of the company's territory, and on the strength of his report, the company entered for a time into a half-hearted attempt to mine coal. But little progress was made; and when the plant was consumed by fire, in 1854, the enterprise was abandoned.[1]

As early as January, 1857, Stoeckl advocated the sale of Russian America to the United States. Evidently a believer in the "manifest destiny" of the United States, his principal reason for wishing to be rid of the territory was his fear that it would become a source of friction between Russia and that country. The rush of American settlers to California and Oregon convinced him that it would be only a matter of time before the Russian territory itself would be overrun by them.[2]

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[1] Golder, "Mining in Alaska before 1867," in the Washington Historical Quarterly, VII.

[2] Just before the signing of the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, which transferred California to the United States, the Russians had abandoned their settlement at Bodega Bay. This settlement, which was just north of San Francisco and which served mainly as a trading post, had been established early in the century with the permission of Spain (40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. No. 177, p. 46). January

Then too, as he reported to his government, the Americans were resentful at their exclusion from the Russian possessions. Russian ships were permitted to trade without restriction with San Francisco, and Russian agents could open warehouses and offices there. The denial of reciprocal privileges to Americans in the Russian territory was becoming a source of constant complaint, while threats of retaliation were increasing steadily in volume. In St. Petersburg the Grand Duke Constantine supported Stoeckl's views, and in December, 1857, recommended to Gortchakov that a commission of inquiry be sent out to investigate the activities and methods of the Russian American Company. Gortchakov, although very solicitous for the company's welfare and opposed to any restriction of its rights, agreed that an investigation should be undertaken.[3]

Meanwhile, Stoeckl's perturbation was increased by rumors of a contemplated migration of Mormons to Russian America. In great alarm he sought an interview with President Buchanan to ascertain the truth or falsity of these reports, asking whether the Mormons were coming as colonists or conquerors. Buchanan laughingly replied that he knew nothing of the destination of the polygamists, and that it mattered little to him provided he got rid of them. But Stoeckl considered the matter in a serious light, and his letters to Gortchakov reflected deep concern.[4]

In 1860, a person well acquainted with the situation in the North Pacific, probably Admiral Popov, joined Constantine and Stoeckl in advocating the sale of the territory, which he believed was destined to fall eventually to the United States

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18, 1845, the American minister in St. Petersburg reported, "I have conversed recently with the former Russian Governor of the North West Coast who repeated what I had obtained from other sources, that the Russian establishments on the coast of California had been abandoned and he expressed the opinion that at no distant period it would be to the interest of the United States to obtain a footing in that remote district of Mexico." (MS. Despatches, Russia, XIV, No. 51).

[3] Golder, "The Purchase of Alaska," in the American Historical Review, XXV, 413-414.

[4] Ibid., p. 414.

at any rate. He advised the abandonment of all American possessions and the development of the nearer and more promising Korea and Amur regions. He condemned the Russian American Company which not only had failed to advance Russian interests, but was jeopardizing the friendship of the United States.[5]

The discovery of gold in Alaska in 1866, instead of enhancing the value of the territory, made it appear to the Russian government a greater liability than before; for now a huge influx of Americans was to be expected, and trouble with their government would inevitably ensue. Two years before this a false rumor of gold discoveries had threatened to start a stampede, and the company, anticipating trouble, had asked the Russian government for a man-of-war to protect its interests. Now it believed that its worst fears would be realized, since news of the finding of the precious metal would inevitably leak out.[6] The Crimean War had demonstrated the military weakness of the territory. Only its neutralization had prevented its capture by the ubiquitous British fleet, and Great Britain might be less agreeable if the two powers fought again. And a war with Great Britain was far from impossible, for already the long period of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia had begun.[7] Thus, by 1867, the Russians were willing to dispose of the territory; and they found a ready purchaser in the United States.

Since 1845, when Robert J. Walker had urged President Polk to acquire it,[8] the United States had shown intermittent interest in the Russian territory. During the Crimean War it was actually reported for awhile that a sale had taken place.[9] So insistent was this rumor that it prompted Secretary Marcy and Senator Gwin to believe that Russia might really want to sell, and they informed Stoeckl that if this were

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[5] Above, p. 110.
[6] Golder, "Mining in Alaska before 1867," p. 238.
[7] Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 590-591.
[8] 40th Cong., 3d sess., H. Rept. No. 35, p. 12. According to Nathaniel Banks, the United States offered to purchase the territory during Van Buren's administration.
[9] Above, p. 110.

so the United States stood ready to pay handsomely for the cession. Stoeckl replied, however, that the Tsar had no desire to part with his American possessions. Nevertheless, the American offer was most welcome to Stoeckl who, in 1858, returned to St. Petersburg on leave, and while there discussed American affairs with Gortchakov, pleading that if another offer was made it should be accepted.[10]

Stoeckl returned to Washington in 1859, and the United States government immediately renewed its overtures. Throughout December Senator Gwin, professing to speak for President Buchanan, had several interviews with Stoeckl in which he unofficially represented "that Russia was too far off to make the most of these possessions; and that, as we are near, we can derive more from them." In reply to an inquiry from Stoeckl he asserted that the United States would "go as high as $5,000,000 for the purchase." But Gwin seemed to make slight headway, so early in 1860 John Appleton, now assistant secretary of state, took over the negotiation, declaring to Stoeckl that "the President thought that the acquisition would be very profitable to the States on the Pacific; that he was ready to follow it up, but wished to know in advance if Russia was ready to cede; that if she were, he would confer with his cabinet and influential members of Congress."[11]

Stoeckl, considering $5,000,000 to be more than the territory was worth, immediately reported this offer to St. Petersburg and advised its acceptance. Gortchakov, however, was prone to haggle, writing that "the offer was not what might have been expected; . . . he was by no means satisfied that it would be for the interest of Russia politically to alienate these possessions; that the only consideration which would make the scales incline that way would be the prospect of great financial advantages; but that the sum of $5,000,000 does not seem in any way to represent the real value of these

[10] MS. Notes, Russia, IV, 14 August 1858.

[11] MS. Russia, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petrograd, 1867, I, 9, No. 4. Stoeckl to Gortchakov, 4 January 1860. Photostats, Library of Congress.

possessions." [12] Nevertheless, he promised to send a commission of inquiry to Russian America, and to base his future policy on its report.[13] Next year the commission was duly sent, and in 1861 it recommended that the territory be disposed of. But by this time the United States, engrossed in civil war, was forced to forego all imperialistic aspirations. Had the Civil War not intervened, however, Gortchakov would probably have yielded, and if Buchanan could have controlled the Senate [14] the purchase would probably have been consummated; for at that time the total estimated value of the Russian American Company's possessions—chiefly furs, goods, land, and dilapidated vessels—did not exceed $4,400,000.

It is said that in 1860, and again in 1864, the Russian government offered Alaska to Great Britain for $5,000,000, but that each time the offer was refused.[15] Although this is probably untrue it is certain that the Russian government, influenced by the adverse report of the commission of inquiry, had by this time fully decided to sell. This decision is evidenced by its refusal to renew the Russian American Company's charter, which expired January 1, 1862. Although the company continued operations after that date, it did so simply on sufferance, and at any time it could have been forced to desist. In 1864, Prince Maksutov, an imperial officer, took over the management of its affairs, and although it continued to agitate for a new charter it remained under imperial control until the sale of its territory to the United States.[16]

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[12] Golder, "The Purchase of Alaska," pp. 415-417.

[13] Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 331-332; Bancroft, pp. 591-592.

[14] Stoeckl reported Gwin as saying that due to the opposition between president and congress nothing definitive could be accomplished until the advent of the new administration. Cass, secretary of state, was purposely kept in the dark as to the negotiations (Golder, p. 417). Chicin, Russian manager of the Kodiak district, declared that arrangements for a transfer of the territory were almost completed in 1861, but the matter then lapsed and nothing further was heard of it at Kodiak until a few weeks before the actual cession. (Bancroft, pp. 591-592).

[15] A Russian American Diplomat, Jew Baiting in Russia and her alleged friendship for the United States, pp. 27-28.

[16] Bancroft, pp. 578-580, 590-591.

Even during the confused era of civil war ardent expansionists in the United States did not lose sight of the territory. When in Russia as financial agent, Robert J. Walker, who had urged Polk to buy it, reminded Clay, the American minister, of what had taken place during Buchanan's administration, and urged him to reopen negotiations at the earliest opportunity.[17] Seward, too, seems to have adopted from the first the policy of the previous administration in regard to Russian America; at any rate a confidential letter written to Clay, December 26, 1864, is susceptible of that interpretation. Referring to the Grand Duke Constantine, formost Russian protagonist of a cession to the United States, Seward wished that "it were possible for him to come out and spend a few months in America. I think it would be beneficial to us, and by no means unprofitable to Russia. I forbear from specifying my reasons. They will readily occur to you, as they would to His Imperial Highness, if his thoughts were turned in that direction. Of one thing he might be assured that, coming as a guest of this government, he would receive a cordial and most demonstrative welcome by it, and by the people." [18] This invitation was duly communicated to Constantine by Clay, but the press of official duties forced the Grand Duke, who had recently been appointed president of the Council of the Empire, to decline.[19]

It was about this time that the Hudson's Bay Company, which had leased a large strip of territory from the Russian American Company,[20] began to agitate for a renewal of its concession. Its progress was so slow, however, probably because of Russia's uncertainty regarding the future of the territory, that Louis Goldstone, an American dealing in furs at Victoria, British Columbia, came to the conclusion that the

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[17] MS. Despatches, Russia, XXI, No. 140, 10 May 1867; 40th Cong., 3d sess., H. Repts. No. 35, p. 19.

[18] Ms. Instructions, Russia, XIV, 380, No. 112; Diplomatic Correspondence 1865-66, part II, 366; 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. No. 177, p. 5.

[19] MS. Despatches, Russia, XX, No. 70, 12/24 January 1865; Diplomatic Correspondence 1865, part II, 367-368.

[20] Above, p. 107.

Russians were not anxious to renew the British company's lease, and that an American company might be able to succeed to its privileges. Accordingly, he sent two ships to gather information about the region, and having satisfied himself that the venture would be profitable, went to California to enlist support. Several Americans joined him, among them John F. Miller, collector of the port of San Francisco, Eugene Sullivan, Louis Schloss, and Judge E. Burke, brother-in-law of Senator Cornelius Cole of California. The aid of the judge proved invaluable, for through him was secured the support of Senator Cole himself.[21]

Already, in February, 1866, a memorial from the territorial legislature of Washington petitioning for an arrangement whereby the Russian salmon, cod, and halibut fisheries would be opened to American citizens had been submitted to the President and subsequently referred by him to the Russian minister with some comments on the necessity of an agreement between the two powers which would preclude difficulties over the fisheries.[22] Shortly after this Cole proposed to Stoeckl that an American company should be granted the privileges formerly enjoyed by the Hudson's Bay Company. Stoeckl had no authority to act upon such a suggestion, however, so after consulting the State Department Cole wrote to Clay, at St. Petersburg, explaining his project and requesting his aid. February 1, 1867, Clay replied that the Hudson's Bay Company was still negotiating for renewal of its lease, and until that was decided upon it would be useless to institute negotiations looking to a lease by an American concern.[23]

Meanwhile Stoeckl had returned to Russia on furlough.[24] By this time the Russian company was almost bankrupt, and it was imperative that something be done. Yet the imperial government wished neither to take over the colony itself nor to give it over to other private exploiters. In November

[21] V. J. Farrar, "Senator Cole and the Purchase of Alaska," in the Washington Historical Quarterly, XIV, 243-247.
[22] 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. No. 177, p. 4.
[23] MS. Notes, Russia, VI, 30 September/12 October 1866; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 332-333.
[24] MS. Notes, Russia, VI, 30 September/12 October 1866.

Stoeckl arrived in St. Petersburg, and Reutern, minister of finance, and the Grand Duke Constantine immediately asked him whether or not the United States could be induced to buy the territory. Stoeckl deplored the fact that Russia had refused its former offer, but believed that the United States might be induced to make another one. Evidently Gortchakov was still only luke-warm toward the project, for without consulting him Constantine and Reutern took the matter directly to the Tsar, who ordered Gortchakov to take steps towards a sale. The foreign minister proceeded slowly, requesting Constantine, Reutern, and Stoeckl to express in writing their reasons for wishing to dispose of the region. In reply, Constantine based his opinion on desire to concentrate on the development of the Amur region, Reutern urged financial considerations, while Stoeckl stressed the danger of trouble with the United States if the territory was retained. Having submitted these memoranda to Tsar Alexander, Gortchakov called a council at which Alexander, Constantine, Reutern, Stoeckl, Gortchakov, and Admiral Krabbe, minister of marine, were present. All were of the opinion that the American territory should be sold to the United States. Stoeckl was empowered to carry on negotiations, Constantine giving him a map showing the boundaries of the territory as claimed by Russia, and Reutern ordering him to accept no less than $5,000,000. These were his only instructions.[25]

Stoeckl arrived in New York in February, 1867; but a slight illness prevented his going to Washington until the following month.[26] No sooner had he arrived there than Cole renewed his efforts in behalf of his California associates. Following his first interview he reported: "After full and free consultations with the Baron, I regarded the matter as in effect settled in favor of the San Francisco company and I so informed them." But before Cole could secure another interview, Seward, probably informed by a mutual friend that Stoeckl had power to sell the territory, had begun negotiations for an outright sale. Accordingly, at their next inter-

[25] Golder, "The Purchase of Alaska," pp. 417-419.
[26] Ibid., p. 419.

view Stoeckl informed Cole of this, expressed regret that he would be forced to disappoint the Californians, and according to Cole, "offered to palliate matters." Cole, however, interposed no objection to sale of the territory to the government, and the Californians stepped aside and gave Seward a free hand.[27]

Seward opened proceedings by requesting permission for Americans to fish in the Russian territorial waters; Stoeckl replied that his government could not possibly grant this, whereupon Seward asked if Russia would consider an outright sale. The conversation then proceeded more smoothly, each agreeing that a transfer would be advantageous to both countries.[28] It was agreed, however, that Seward should consult President Johnson before going further, so on March 15 Seward produced a draft of a treaty of cession in a meeting of the cabinet, where all agreed as to the wisdom of acquiring the territory.[29] Seward and Stoeckl then resumed negotiations, haggling for some time over the price. Seward offered $5,000,000; Stoeckl demanded $10,000,000, at the same time writing Gortchakov that he hoped to get $6,000,000 or possibly $6,500,000. Finally $7,000,000 was agreed upon, whereupon Stoeckl insisted that the United States take over certain obligations of the Russian American Company. But Seward demurred.[30] At last, on March 23, he wrote to Stoeckl:

> With reference to the proposed Convention between our respective Governments for the cession by Russia of her American territory to the United States, I have the honor to acquaint you that I must insist upon that clause in the sixth article of the draft which declares the cession to be free and unencumbered . . . and must regard it as an ultimatum. With the President's approval, however, I will add two hundred thousand dollars to the consideration money on that account.[31]

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[27] Memoirs of Cornelius Cole, pp. 281-284.
[28] Golder, p. 419.
[29] Diary of Gideon Welles, III, 66, 68.
[30] Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward, II, 475-477; Golder, p. 420.
[31] MS. Notes to Russian Legation, VI, 211, 23 March 1867; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 325-326.

March 25, Stoeckl replied, accepting this proposition,[32] and the same day telegraphed to Gortchakov:

> Negotiations ended; result, project of treaty as follows. Article 1: cession of our colonies, frontiers of territory ceded, on the east, line of demarcation of our treaty of 1825 with England, on the west exactly the line of demarcation sent me by Minister of the Navy. Article 2: property of the crown ceded to the United States, private property remain with individuals to whom it belongs, orthodox churches remain sole property of persons of this creed with full liberty to exercise their religion. Article 3: inhabitants of colonies can return to Russia or remain and enjoy all rights of American citizens. Article 4: Russia will appoint one or two agents to make transfer to United States of ceded territory. Article 5: after exchange of ratifications of this treaty all fortifications, and military posts will be handed over to troops of United States; Russian troops will retire as soon as possible and practicable. Article 6: . . . United States shoulders no obligations contracted by our company. Article 7: ratifications to be exchanged at Washington. I send this telegram at request of Seward who told me if I receive answer within six days treaty can be signed and confirmed by Senate next week. A simple authorization by telegraph to sign treaty will be equivalent to full power in due form.[33]

Evidently Gortchakov lost no time, for on the evening of March 29 Stoeckl called at Seward's house and informed him that he had received a cable from St. Petersburg giving him full power to sign the treaty on the stipulated terms,[34] and suggested that they conclude the transaction the following day. But the enthusiastic Seward, rising from his customary evening game of whist, proposed that the matter be settled at once. It was already late, but clerks were summoned, Frederick Seward was despatched for Charles Sumner, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, while Stoeckl sent for his assistants. At midnight the little company met at the State Department, where the treaty was put in final form, and about four o'clock in the morning was signed by the respective plenipotentiaries.[35] A few hours later President Johnson submitted it to the Senate.

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[32] MS. Notes, Russia, VI, 25 March 1867; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 326.

[33] Ibid.

[34] MS. Notes, Russia, VI, 17/29 March 1867; Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 326.

[35] Bancroft, Life of Seward, II, 475-477; Frederick W. Seward, Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, pp. 360-365.

It was at this time that press and public got their first intimation of what was going on, and violent opposition to the treaty appeared at once. Already the administration was in disrepute, and the purchase of this "barren region" of "Walrussia," "a land of short rations and long twilights," "peopled only by Siberian malefactors" was denounced as its crowning folly. But this hostile outcry evoked speedy support for the Secretary of State from various persons who had visited the Russian territory. R. M. Collins, promoter of the trans-Pacific telegraph line, predicted that "the fisheries . . . will build up a population and commerce there which, at no distant day, will rival that of Newfoundland and the coast of the Atlantic east of Cape Cod." Furthermore, these fisheries would serve as a "nursery for first-class seamen, which, in the growing commerce of the Pacific, will be just what we want there in the future, in order to give us the supremacy of that great ocean." [36] While New England sea captains testified as to the value [37] of the territory, citizens and government officials in California and Washington protested that "the rejection of the treaty will cause great dissatisfaction on this coast," and that the loss of the territory "would create there a feeling not only of disappointment but of injury." [38]

In spite of this annexationist sentiment it seemed for awhile that the treaty would never pass the Senate. The reconstruction controversy between President Johnson and Congress was at its height, and Seward, besides sharing the general opprobrium against the administration, had many personal enemies in Congress. In fact, many senators threatened to vote against the treaty simply because it bore his name. Seward was a consummate politician, however, and with the help of Sumner, with whom he was on good terms and who

[36] 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. No. 177, pp. 25-28.
[37] Ibid., pp. 25-35.
[38] Ibid., pp. 29, 33. For a discussion of public opinion on the purchase see Theodore C. Smith, "Expansion after the War," in the Political Science Quarterly, XVI, and Ellis P. Oberholtzer, A History of the United States since the Civil War, I, 537-556.

made a masterful speech in support of it,[39] he secured its ratification on April 9, by a vote of 37 to 2.[40]

On May 15, Stoeckl informed Seward that the treaty had been ratified by the Russian government. The consummation of the transaction awaited only the exchange of ratifications and the payment of the purchase price; so at Seward's request,[41] the territory was immediately thrown open to American ships, several of which prepared to visit it at once. October 18, the final ceremonies of transfer were enacted at Sitka, the Russian troops under Captain Pestchourov and the Americans under Brigadier-General Lovell H. Rousseau firing a salute as the Russian flag was lowered and the Stars and Stripes run up.[42]

Meanwhile it had become apparent that there was a movement on foot in the House of Representatives to block the appropriation of the purchase money. July 6, President Johnson had sent a message to Congress requesting an appropriation of $7,200,000,[43] but when Congress adjourned no action had been taken. In November Congress convened again, but for six months its attention was absorbed by the impeachment proceedings against the President. During this period every measure or recommendation of the executive department was excoriated by the legislature whose attitude made it highly problematical whether or not the acquisition would receive its sanction, and whether or not the necessary funds would be forthcoming. Some representatives claimed that the House should have been consulted beforehand in a matter necessitating an appropriation of money; while to make matters worse, certain congressmen who had been enlisted in sup-

[39] Works of Charles Sumner, XI, 181-349; E. L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, IV, 324-329; Diary of Gideon Welles, III, 75, 83-84.

[40] Doubtless many Senators felt like Sumner who wrote to his friend John Bright: "The Russian treaty tried me severely; abstractedly I am against further accessions of territory, unless by the free choice of the inhabitants. But this question was perplexed by considerations of politics and comity and the engagements already entered into by the government." (Pierce, IV, 318-319).

[41] MS. Notes to Russian Legation, VI, 20 May 1867.

[42] Pro. Ala. Bound. Trib., II, 334.

[43] Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 524.

port of the so-called Perkins claim against Russia threatened to deduct the amount of that claim from the transfer price.

The Perkins claim originated during the Crimean War when Benjamin F. Perkins, an American, claimed to have sold a quantity of arms and ammunition to the Russian government, which subsequently disavowed the transaction and refused to reimburse Perkins. The claim hinged on the nature of two alleged contracts, the first of which, between Perkins and Lilienfield, a Russian army officer, had been brought to court in New York, where Perkins had agreed to settle for $200, which sum had been duly paid. The second contract, alleged to have been made verbally between Perkins and Stoeckl, was " explicitly and indignantly " denied by the Russian minister. The claim was first referred to the United States government in 1860, and was submitted by it to the Russian government, which refused absolutely to allow it.[44] Its further prosecution was rendered extremely delicate by the fact that it rested " directly upon the impeachment either of the veracity or memory " of Stoeckl. Nevertheless, it was taken up by Seward, who pressed it spasmodically from 1861 to 1867.[45] Meanwhile Perkins died, and the claim was taken up by his widow, who, having secured the support of various senators, representatives, and lobbyists, demanded that she be reimbursed from the money about to be appropriated for Russian America.

By September, 1867, Stoeckl had become worried, writing to Seward confidentially:

> I do not know, my dear Sir, whether you are aware that some persons in this country, who are interested in a pretended and stale claim against the Russian government, called the ' Perkins claim,' are proposing to ask Congress to withhold a portion of the consideration money of the Russian treaty, for the purpose of gratifying that claim. Rumors of this design may perhaps reach St. Petersburg and cause some uneasiness there. I hope you will not think me wrong in alluding to this matter.[46]

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[44] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, 183, No. 6, 26 November 1860; MS. Despatches, Russia, XVIII, No. 19, 1/13 December 1860.

[45] MS. Instructions, Russia, XIV, 220, No. 16, 16 October 1861; MS. Despatches, Russia, XIX, No. 21, 8 April 1862; Ibid., XXI, No. 129, 17 January 1867; MS. Notes to Russian Legation, VI, 231, 23 November 1867.

[46] MS. Notes, Russia, VI, ? September 1867.

September 11, Seward replied: "I do not think that in any case the Government of the United States will fail to fulfil the stipulations contained in the Russian American treaty to the letter as well as in spirit, and I think that you may, without hesitation, so assure the Cabinet at St. Petersburg." [47]

Despite this assurance no action was taken, and with Alaska already in American hands an embarrassing situation could have been brought about by the refusal of the House to vote the necessary appropriation. But the neglect of the treaty was due not to indifference or hostility, but merely to the urgency of other affairs. March 23, 1868, Seward again reassured Stoeckl, writing to him that:

> On my return from Auburn yesterday, I received from the Honorable Mr. Banks, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, a note . . . in which he says to me in substance that the despatches of the Associated Press give an erroneous statement of the action of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in regard to the Russian treaty. He further states that it is believed that the approaching impeachment trial in the Senate will suspend all public business in the House of Representatives during its progression; that the members of the Committee, in this belief, consented informally to pass the subject until the trial should be ended; but he added that it should not be understood as a result of opposition to the bill, but a recognition of the inevitable course of public business. Mr. Banks concludes with the opinion that the committee will report in favor of the payment and that the appropriation will be made by the House of Representatives in exact pursuance of the conditions of the bill. It is hardly necessary to say that the statements thus made by the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs are altogether reliable. I have thought proper to give you this information for the use of your government.[48]

Banks evidently had the situation well in hand from the first; for on May 18 the bill appropriating the $7,200,000 was reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and on July 14 passed the House by a vote of 113 to 43. It passed the Senate on July 17,[49] and became law July 27, 1868. The claim of the Perkins heirs received scant consideration in the final debate, the chief opposition manifesting itself over the constitutional question of the right of the House to be consulted beforehand on all questions of foreign policy involving

[47] Ibid., 11 September 1867.
[48] MS. Notes to Russian Legation, VI, 241, 23 March 1863.
[49] Congressional Globe 1867-68, p. 4159.

an appropriation of money. Banks himself was one of the counsel for the Perkins heirs, but was resolved to keep the question of the payment of this claim separate from that of the Alaska purchase, and when Butler of Massachusetts, hoping to embarrass him, proposed an amendment providing that $500,000 be withheld from Russia to satisfy the claim, Banks declared the amendment not germane, "without expressing any opinion in regard to the subject matter." [50]

Soon after the passage of the appropriation bill Congress adjourned. Before it reassembled in December, rumors ugly and insistent had begun to circulate regarding the real disposition of the purchase money and the methods by which the appropriation had been secured. It was discovered that the draft sent abroad in payment for the territory was considerably less than the $7,200,000 appropriated; it was reported in London, in fact, that when transmitted there it had been for only $5,000,000. It was said that Banks, Stevens, and other members of Congress had been bribed, that various leading newspaper correspondents and proprietors had been bought, and that Seward himself had been well remunerated for his part in the transaction. Finally, an article published in the Worcester Spy, which was owned by a member of the House of Representatives, led, December 14, to the passage of a resolution by that body directing the Committee on Public Expenditures to investigate the truth of the allegations.[51] The findings of this committee were meager and unsatisfactory, largely because of the refusal of the Russian legation to comply with its request to furnish data in regard to certain disbursements said to have been made by the Russian minister.[52] Nevertheless, the investigation did reveal several significant facts. In the first place, of the $7,200,000 paid to Stoeckl and deposited by him with George W. Riggs, banker, $7,035,000, less the bank's commission, had been sent abroad, so the discrepancy—$165,000—was not nearly as large as had

[50] Ibid., pp. 1871-1875, 3620-3628, 3658-3671, 3804-3814, 3885, 4052-4055; James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, II, 333-339.

[51] 40th Cong., 3d sess., H. Rept. No. 35, p. 1.

[52] MS. Notes, Russia, VI, 17 December 1868; MS. Notes to Russian Legation, VI, 280, 19 December 1868.

been reported. It was learned further that of this $165,000, which had been deposited to Stoeckl's account, $26,000 had been paid to Robert J. Walker, and the remainder had been drawn by Stoeckl in various amounts and at various times from August 1 to September 16, 1868. Walker had been retained by Stoeckl as counsel to aid in securing the passage of the appropriation bill. His duties had included interviews with congressmen and preparation of articles for the press. His original retainer of $20,000 had been increased after the passage of the bill to $26,000, of which $5,000 had been given by him to F. P. Stanton, for services as associate counsel. Walker, testifying before the investigating committee, asserted that some weeks after the passage of the bill he had suggested to Stoeckl that the Washington Daily Chronicle, having rendered valuable support "without compensation or previous expectation thereof," should be rewarded in some manner. Accordingly, $3,000 in gold had been offered to Colonel John W. Forney, proprietor of the paper. Forney, however, refused to receive anything, although he did suggest that the money be given to D. C. Forney, his junior partner, and this was done. According to the report of the investigating committee the only other recipient of Stoeckl's bounty was a Mr. Noah, connected with a California newspaper, who was given $1,000 for services rendered in securing and disseminating information in regard to Alaska.

Both Walker and Seward, who was also called upon to testify, denied absolutely any knowledge of any payments to public officials. Seward's testimony was indeed most dexterous, the secretary exhibiting the utmost skill in evading those questions or parts of questions which threatened to become embarrassing. Asserting that the State Department had spent not more than $500—chiefly in publishing information useful in the formation of opinion favorable to the treaty—Seward denied all knowledge of the use made of the funds by the Russian minister. Most ingenious were Seward's replies to questions like the following: "Have you any knowledge of any money or presents, directly or indirectly, being made from the fund at the disposal of the Secretary of State, *or any other*

fund, to subsidize or propitiate the press or any person connected therewith, anywhere?" The italicized clause threatened to prove troublesome, but Seward, with the utmost assurance, ignored it altogether, declaring blithely, "On the contrary, I have knowledge that no fund *at the State Department* went to subsidize any press anywhere."[53] The evasive qualification in this reply was apparently unnoticed; at least Seward was challenged no further as to his knowledge of the disposition of other funds. Thus, after the investigation, $135,000 was still unaccounted for.

Years later, however, Professor Dunning, browsing through some old manuscripts, happened upon one which sheds considerable light upon the disposition of at least a part of this sum. It so happened that one hot Sunday in early September, 1868, President Johnson and Secretary Seward rode into the country outside Washington to escape the heat of the city, and revelations made on this outing by Seward so astonished the President that upon returning to the capital he wrote down, in his cramped and painful hand, an account of what had occurred. It was this memorandum that was found and published by Professor Dunning. Uncorrected as to orthography it reads as follows:

On the 6th Sept Sundy Mr Seward and myself rode out some seven or eight miles on the Road leading to Malsboro Md—near place called old fields, we drove out into a shady grove of oak trees—While there taking some refreshment, in the current of conversation on various subjects, the Secretary asked the question if it ever occurred to me how few members there were in congress whose actions were entirely above and beyond pecuniary influence. I replied that I had never attempted to reduce it to an accurate calculation, but I regretted to confess that there was a much smaller number exempt than at one period of life I had supposed them to be—He then stated you remember that the appropriation of the seven $ million for the payment of Alaska to the Russian Govt was hung up or brought to a dead lock in the H of Reps—while the appropriation was thus delayed the Russian minister stated to me that John W. Forney stated to him that he needed $30,000 that he had lost $40,000 by a faithless friend and that he wanted the $30,000 in gold—That there was no chance of the appropriation passing the House of Reps without certain influence was brought to bear in its favor—The 30,000 was

[53] 40th Cong., 3d sess., H. Rept. No. 35, pp. 1-41; W. A. Dunning, "Paying for Alaska," in the Political Science Quarterly, XXVII, 393-398.

paid hence the advocacy of the appropriation in the Chronicle—He also stated that $20,000 was paid to R. J. Walker and F. P. Stanton for their services—N. P. Banks chairman of the committee on foreign relations $8,000 and that the incoruptable Thaddeous Stevens received as his '*sop*' the moderate sum of $10,000—All these sums were paid by the Russian minister directly and indirectly to the respective parties to secure appropriation of money the Govnt had stiputed to pay the Russian Govnt in solemn treaty which had been ratified by both Govmts.—

Banks and Stevens was understood to be counsel for a claim against the Russian Govnt for arms which had been furnished by some of our citizens—known as the Perkins claim—Hence a fee for their influence in favor of the appropriation &c—Banks was chairman of the committee on foreign retions—[54]

Since this revelation was made by Seward a few months prior to his testimony before the investigating committee, it is perhaps just as well for the reputations of certain men that he was not pressed too hard by his inquisitors. But we must not accept the account set forth in Johnson's memorandum without first subjecting it to critical analysis; for after all, it is, as Dunning says, "but hearsay in the second degree"; that is, it is Johnson's account of Seward's recital of what Stoeckl had said. Furthermore, at the time of the recital both Seward and Johnson had partaken of refreshment—probably liquid—which may or may not have been conducive to unimaginative recital or accurate comprehension.

Nevertheless, in part at least, it appears to be well-founded. The assertion that Walker and Stanton received $20,000 squares with Walker's testimony before the investigating committee as to the original amount of their retainer, although the subsequent increase of $6,000 is not mentioned. As for Banks and Stevens, no direct evidence to support the allegation of the memorandum has ever been adduced. Their active support of the purchase at a time when every other measure of the Johnson administration was incurring their vehement opposition did seem rather anomalous; yet Stevens, although hostile to Johnson, was friendly towards Seward, and his support may have been due to that fact.[55] It is intimated in the memorandum that money was paid these two primarily to

[54] Ibid., pp. 385-386.

[55] Stevens died before the congressional investigation was held, and his part in the transaction was not subjected to examination.

induce them to abandon their support of the Perkins claim for which they were counsel. Both men did insist that the payment of the claim was unrelated to the question of the acquisition of Alaska, and neither lent support to the motion to deduct the amount of the claim from the appropriation. Yet, in taking this position they were undoubtedly correct, and there is no reason to believe that they were influenced otherwise than by the dictates of honest conviction.

Forney's case, although sordid, is not without its humorous side. According to the Johnson memorandum, while "the appropriation was hung up or brought to a deadlock" in the House of Representatives Forney, then secretary of the Senate, had asked of and received from Stoeckl $30,000 in gold. The time referred to in the memorandum is obviously the period just prior to May, 1868, before the bill was reported from committee. It was at this time that Forney's papers, the Washington Chronicle and the Philadelphia Press, began to support the purchase most actively. As the investigation showed, after the passage of the bill Walker, knowing nothing of Forney's relations with Stoeckl, and thinking only of requiting one whose support had been so valuable, suggested to Stoeckl that Forney should not go unrewarded. Stoeckl said nothing of his previous donation of $30,000, but he must have smiled as he consented to Walker's giving Forney $3,000 more. Walker duly tendered the amount authorized, and was greatly surprised when Forney, although asserting his perfect legal as well as moral right to the money, since he had given up his position as secretary of the Senate and was no longer in public employ, refused to accept it, since "his position in connection with public affairs was of such importance in his own opinion that . . . he had rather not." Such incorruptibility elicited due admiration from Walker, who did not know that the man who so glibly refused $3,000 when not in public office had already accepted $30,000 while occupying an official position. The subsequent acceptance of the $3,000 by D. C. Forney, to whom it was offered at the suggestion of Colonel Forney, must have done much towards solacing Walker, who

was much perturbed lest the unselfish support of the Chronicle should go unremunerated.[56]

Adding the $30,000 reported paid to Forney, the $8,000 alleged to have been paid to Banks, and the $10,000 said to have gone to Stevens to the $30,000 accounted for by the investigating committee, and subtracting this sum—$78,000—from the original $165,000 discrepancy, we have only $87,000 unaccounted for. A large part of this probably went to defray certain incidental expenses and the remainder, whatever it may have been, probably never will be accounted for.

The semi-mysterious methods by which Alaska was acquired have led to a profusion of both abstract speculation and scholarly investigation concerning the real reason for the purchase. The motives ascribed to Seward have been many and diverse. Many professed to believe that the purchase merely furnished a convenient way of remunerating Russia for her friendship during the Civil War. The assertion of the Philadelphia Times, which quoted Simon Cameron as saying that the purchase of Alaska was "an act of recompense to a tried friend," was supported by John Bigelow, who wrote:

> Shortly after my return from France in 1867, I spent a few days in Washington, during which time I had frequent interviews with Mr. Seward and occasionally met at his house Mr. Bodisco, the Russian Minister at Washington.[57] The purchase of Alaska from Russia had just been consummated. Of course neither Mr. Seward nor Mr. Bodisco said distinctly to me that that purchase was made purely and simply as a gracious recognition on the part of the Washington Government of the attitude of the Czar toward the United States in 1862 [1863?], but I doubt if there was any member of either house of Congress who supposed the Government then had any other motive in the purchase of Alaska than to recognize its obligations to the Czar, or that as territory it had any value except as ridding us of an alien neighbor. The fact that there is, as I am told, no record of such an understanding in the government departments, is not surprising. Flirtations between nationalities, as between the sexes, are not apt to be proclaimed from the house-tops nor even made matters of record.[58]

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[56] Dunning, pp. 394-395.

[57] Bodisco was secretary of legation.

[58] Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, I, 499-500 note. Some believed that it was Cameron, who was in Russia as minister for a short time in 1862, who persuaded the Tsar to send his fleet to the United States. He was sent to Russia, however, merely to relieve him of the secretaryship of war. (Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History, V, 128).

The following manuscript note, found in the files of Franklin K. Lane, likewise purports to link the purchase of Alaska with the friendly attitude of Russia during the Civil War.

Washington, December 29, 1911.

Last night I dined with Charles Henry Butler, reporter for the Supreme Court and a son of William Allen Butler, for so long a leader of the New York bar.

In the course of the evening Mr. Charles Glover, President of the Riggs National Bank, told me this bit of history. That when he was a boy, in the bank one day Mr. Cochran came to him and handed him two warrants upon the United States Treasury, one for $1,400,000, and the other for $5,800,000. He said, 'Put those in the safe.' Mr. Glover did so, and they remained there for a week when they were sent to New York. Mr. Glover said, 'These warrants were the payment of Russia for the Territory of Alaska. Why were there two warrants? I never knew until some years later, when I learned the story from Senator Dawes, who said that prior to the war, there had been some negotiations between the United States and Russia for the purchase of Alaska, and the price of $1,400,000 was agreed upon. In fact this was the amount that Russia asked for this great territory, which was regarded as nothing more than a barren field of ice.

'During the war the matter lay dormant. We had more territory than we could take care of. When England, however, began to manifest her friendly disposition toward the Confederacy, and we learned from Europe that England and France were carrying on negotiations for the recognition of the Southern States, and possibly of some manifestation by their fleets against the blockade which we had instituted, (and which they claimed was not effective and merely a paper blockade), we looked about for a friend, and Russia was the only European country on whose friendship we could rely. Thereupon Secretary Seward secured from Russia a demonstration, in American ports, of Russian friendship. Her ships of war sailed to both of our coasts, the Atlantic and Pacific, with the understanding that the expense of this demonstration should be met by the United States, out of the contingent fund. It was to be a secret matter.

'The war came to a close, and immediately thereafter Lincoln was assassinated and the administration changed. It was no longer possible to pay for this demonstration, secretly, under the excuse of war, but a way was found for paying Russia through the purchase of Alaska. The warrant for $1,400,000 was the warrant for the purchase of Alaska, the warrant for $5,800,000 was for Russia's expenses in her naval demonstration in our behalf, but history knows only the fact that the United States paid $7,200,000 for this territory, which is now demonstrated to be one of the richest portions of the earth in mineral dedeposits.' [59]

Statements like the foregoing have led to much searching of archives, but nothing of a documentary character has been

[59] A. W. Lane and L. H. Wall, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, pp. 260-261.

found to substantiate them. Today they receive scarcely more credence than the vindictive assertion of N. H. Painter, who claimed that the acquisition was merely "one of Seward's jobs . . . put up by Fox when he went over there." [60]

It is now generally believed that when he made the purchase Seward had no other purpose in mind than to secure an accretion of valuable territory to the United States, and that, while the friendly relations between the two countries may have facilitated the transfer, there was no definite connection between this event and what had happened during the Civil War. Seward was a confirmed expansionist, ready to acquire anything which promised to increase the prestige or territorial extent of his country. As early as 1846 he had expressed the conviction that "our population is destined to roll its resistless waves to the icy barriers of the North, and to encounter oriental civilization on the shores of the Pacific." [61] Again he prophesied that the colonies of the Russians in the Northwest "will yet become the outposts of my own country." [62]

Seward was especially interested in the protection and encouragement of American enterprise in the Far East, and the desire for Alaska, which, stretching far out towards China and Japan, possessed all the requisites for a strong naval outpost, was perhaps a natural consequence of his interest in Asiatic trade.[63] Seward's son, Frederick, who was assistant secretary of state under his father, said: "During its [the Civil War's] continuance my father, as secretary of state, had found the government laboring under great disadvantages from the lack of advanced naval outposts in the West Indies and the North Pacific. So, at the close of hostilities, he commenced his endeavors to obtain such a foothold in each quarter." [64] In substantiation of this statement it will be remembered that at the time of the Alaska purchase Seward renewed

[60] 40th Cong., 3d sess., H. Rept. No. 35, p. 39.
[61] The Works of William H. Seward (ed. G. E. Baker), III, 409.
[62] Bancroft, Life of Seward, II, 471.
[63] Tyler Dennett, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," in the American Historical Review, XXVIII.
[64] F. W. Seward, Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, p. 360.

the attempt to acquire the Sandwich Islands and tried to buy the Danish West Indies.[65]

Shortly after the consummation of the Alaska purchase Cassius Clay wrote from St. Petersburg that one motive which had induced the Russians to sell was the hope that the cession would lead ultimately to the expulsion of England from the whole Pacific coast of North America.[66] Whether this was so or not it is certain that the transfer of Alaska did bring about an immediate reinvigoration in the United States of the ever latent hostility to Great Britain and a renewal of the old demand for the acquisition of British Columbia. "The purchase of Russian America is the entering wedge for assimilation of the Pacific countries to the United States," said the Pacific Tribune, adding, "We have no sort of doubt that could a fair expression of public opinion be taken in British Columbia tomorrow . . . more than three-quarters of the citizens would vote for annexation to the United States." The New York Evening Post, St. Louis Times, Boston Evening Transcript, and the Philadelphia North American and Gazette all agreed that annexation should not be deferred, the last named paper asserting that, "We must have . . . [British Columbia], cost what it will, and though Great Britain will probably be reluctant to part with it, she could do it now with a better grace than she can hereafter, when the question of its acquisition by the United States might be presented to her in a very disagreeable aspect." [67]

The New York Herald of April 29, 1867, said:

> Russia and the United States, the young giants respectively of the Old and New Worlds, in whom are concentrated greater vitality and strength than in any other of the modern powers, are at this moment, although in most respects the antipodes of each other, engaged in the same work—that of expansion and progression. They stand now upon two continents, the one the impersonation of absolutism, the

[65] 40th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 79; Moore's Digest, I, 484, 555.

[66] Diplomatic Correspondence 1867, p. 390. Writing to Gortchakov in 1860 Stoeckel said: "If the United States become masters of our possessions British Oregon will be cut off by the Americans on the North and South and will escape with difficulty from their aggressions." (MS. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petrograd, 1857, I, 9, No. 4. Photostats, Library of Congress).

[67] 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. No. 177, pp. 36-66.

other of republicanism. No two nations bear at once a more forcible resemblance and exhibit a more striking contrast, and at this moment no two . . . are watched with more solicitude or more likely to accomplish more stupendous results. The specific ultimate object at which Russia aims is the acquisition of the European possessions of the Sultan. With the proud city of Constantinople, the command of the Bosphorus and the commerce of the Black Sea under her control . . . she would effectually be mistress of Europe. The United States do not define their aspirations, but look quietly forward to the time the 'whole boundless continent' will form one unbroken republic. The remarkable *entente cordiale*, which for a quarter of a century has been increasing between us, renders this similarity of object the more natural.

Russia and the United States must ever be friendly, the colossi having neither territorial nor maritime jealousies to excite the one against the other. The interests of both demand that they should go hand in hand in their march to empire.[68]

Such expressions of good feeling must have been particularly gratifying to Russian advocates of the sale. Practically all Russian officials considered their country well rid of a troublesome appanage. Stoeckl and Bodisco, his secretary of legation, received the praise of their master for their skillful handling of the negotiations, while more tangible recognition was conferred upon them in the shape of warrants on the imperial treasury, one for 25,000 rubles for Stoeckl, the other for 5,000 rubles for Bodisco.[69]

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[68] Ibid., p. 44. For other annexationist sentiments see James M. Callahan, "The Alaska Purchase and Americo-Canadian Relations," in the West Virginia University Studies in American History.

[69] Golder, p. 421.

CHAPTER X

Conclusion

Any attempt to interpret Russo-American relations without considering at the same time the contemporary European diplomatic situation would be futile; for from the very beginning of her relations with us Russia regarded the United States as an actual or potential element in the European balance of power, while our desire for Russia's friendship was due entirely to belief that her support would be useful against Great Britain, or possibly France. Russo-American relations were usually most cordial when one or the other of the two countries was at odds with England. At such times the nation involved was always more amenable to any requests of the other; while when one of them was making advances to Great Britain it immediately became more indifferent toward the other. The interests of Russia and the United States cut across each other at only one point—Russian America. Twice during the first half of the nineteenth century controversies over commercial rights in that region threatened to terminate their entente, but each time matters were amicably settled. Each nation loathed the governmental system of the other and believed that its political principles were a menace to the world; but these feelings, although sometimes voiced by the press or even by officials of the respective countries, were not allowed to exercise any permanent influence on their policy towards each other.

The first overtures for friendship were made by the United States during its struggle for independence. But uncertainty as to its future led Russia to spurn the advances of the new nation. Common opposition to the principles of maritime law which Great Britain was trying to impose upon the world finally brought the two countries together. Russia, since her leadership of the League of Armed Neutrality, had become recognized as the champion of the rights of neutrals, and the United States, by going to war in defense of those rights in 1812, ranged herself beside Russia and against England. The

unexpected strength exhibited by the United States on the sea in the War of 1812 convinced the Tsar that that country was a force to be reckoned with in the future, and from that time forth he made it a point to pose as the friend of the young republic on every possible occasion. He early offered his mediation to end the war, ostensibly because of his friendship for America, actually because he wished England to be free to use all her strength against Napoleon.

After the Napoleonic Wars England and Russia drifted apart, and Tsar Alexander not only attempted to consolidate continental Europe against the island kingdom, but tried to isolate it completely by securing an alliance with the United States. He represented himself as ready to become the protector of the United States in any future trouble that she might have with the mother country. A number of pacifist organizations in America, which were in personal correspondence with Tsar Alexander and regarded him as the "Prince of Peace," favored the acceptance of his offer, but the American government, knowing that he would not offer support against England without expecting similar support in return, rejected it.

At this time suspicion of the Tsar's designs in Spanish America and a dispute over commercial and territorial rights in northwestern America drove the United States away from Russia and placed her on the side of Great Britain. But the defection was only temporary. In 1824 the three countries worked out a compromise agreement setting forth their respective spheres of interest on the northwest coast of America, and two years later the United States secured what amounted to an assurance that Russia would not intervene in Spanish America. This was obtained through the efforts of Henry Clay, who persuaded the Tsar to offer his mediation in the war between Spain and her colonies, and when this offer was ignored induced him to advise Spain to agree to a cessation of hostilities. By complying with these requests the Tsar gave Spain to understand that she could expect no help in America from him or his allies, and thus admitted that the system of repression which he had been imposing upon Europe should not be applied in the Western Hemisphere.

In the early thirties, when he was piqued at England, the Tsar, although previously opposed to commercial agreements with any country, signed such an agreement with the United States. At the same time, although he refused to sign a treaty of maritime rights, he assured the United States government that he would always uphold the principles of maritime law for which both governments had been contending.

In the late thirties and early forties the two countries drifted apart temporarily, first because of unfavorable newspaper comment in America about the Tsar's policy in Poland, and then because of the renewal of the controversy about northwestern America resulting from the expiration of a part of the convention of 1824. Domestic difficulties and foreign involvements forced the United States to acquiesce in Russia's pretensions in this controversy, and although we never formally receded from our position we allowed Russia to occupy in full sovereignty and to exclude American commerce from the territory north of 54° 40′.

During the forties Russia seemed less eager to cherish American friendship, but in the next decade England's opposition to Russia in the Near East and Anglo-American rivalry in the Caribbean brought about a rapprochement between Russia and the United States which eventually brought them closer together than ever before. Throughout the Crimean War the United States government, although officially neutral, sympathized privately with Russia, fearing that if England and France were victorious they would attempt joint intervention in American affairs. Apprehension of drawing the United States into the war on the side of Russia led Great Britain to agree for the first time that free ships make free goods and that neutral goods on an enemy ship are not subject to capture. At the conclusion of the war the United States was invited to subscribe to the Declaration of Paris, but refused to do so unless private warfare on the sea was abolished. To accede under any other condition, said Secretary Marcy, would put us at the mercy of Great Britain on the sea. Russia agreed to help the United States to secure complete freedom of the seas for neutrals and secretly encour-

aged the United States not to strengthen British sea power by renouncing privateering unless this freedom was obtained.

During the Civil War Russia, by her refusal to participate in any scheme of intervention in America, by her many assurances of friendship, and by the wholly selfish visit of her fleet to Northern harbors, reached a position of preeminence in American affections that has seldom been attained by any nation and that was almost comparable to that enjoyed by France during the Revolutionary War. Russia's attitude, as her statesmen admitted, was wholly selfish, for she wished the perpetuation of a powerful, united American nation as a counterpoise to England. But any sort of support was appreciated by the North which, dominated by war hysteria, was not disposed to be critical of motives. The United States, on the other hand, elicited the gratitude of the Tsar by refusing the invitation of England and France to intervene in Russia in behalf of the Poles. Two years after the war Russo-American friendship culminated in the transfer by Russia to the United States of the only region in which the two countries had conflicting interests. The American minister in St. Petersburg wrote that the Russians hoped that this acquisition of Alaska by the United States would lead ultimately to the expulsion of the British from the whole Pacific coast of North America.

For several years Russia held the unique position which she had gained. She was considered by the American people as their best friend. But such intimacy between peoples so different in race, governmental systems, and political ideals was certainly artificial and bound to be short-lived. It may be added, indeed, that in the latter part of the century the two conditions which had made it possible—common apprehension of Great Britain and absence of antagonistic interests—ceased to obtain. The isolated position of Great Britain after the Boer War induced her to seek cordial relations with the United States, whose sudden transformation into a world power after 1898 made it quite receptive towards British blandishments. At the same time that its fear of Great Britain was lulled the United States was led to protest against the Tsar's barbaric

treatment of the Jews in Russia, and its hostility was aroused by the acquisitive policy of Russia in North China, where the United States wished to maintain the Open Door. Some unhappy selections of Russian ministers to Washington did not increase our friendship, which was finally forfeited altogether by the lying and treacherous policy pursued by Count Lamsdorff. By the time of the Russo-Japanese War the United States was almost openly hostile to Russia, President Roosevelt warning Germany and France that if either of them aided Russia he would intervene forcibly on the side of Japan.

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VITA

Benjamin Platt Thomas was born at Pemberton, New Jersey, February 22, 1902. He received his primary education in the public schools of Newark, New Jersey, and his secondary education in those of Baltimore, Maryland. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from the Johns Hopkins University in June, 1924, when he was elected to membership in the Phi Beta Kappa Society. The following year he taught history in Saint Paul's School for Boys, Mount Washington, Maryland. For the past three years he has been pursuing courses of study in the departments of history, political science, and political economy in the graduate school of the Johns Hopkins University.

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